FEAR, HOPE & LOSS
UNDERSTANDING THE DRIVERS OF HOPE AND HATE

Rosie Carter
Fear, hope and Loss

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Additional research by Nick Lowles, Patrik Hermansson, Ian Warren and the Centre for Towns. With thanks to all at Focal Data, Populus and YouGov, to Lisa Nandy MP, David Lawrence and Nick Ryan and to British Future for their partnership in the National Conversation.
HOPE NOT HATE DATA

OUR DATA – OFTEN MORE ACCURATE THAN OUR OPPONENTS – HAS ALWAYS MADE SURE WE WERE KNOCKING ON THE RIGHT DOORS AND USING OUR TIME IN THE BEST WAY POSSIBLE.
THE DIVISIONS exposed by the EU Referendum were stark. In cities, younger middle-class voters came out overwhelmingly for remain while in nearby towns and villages older, working-class voters turned out in similarly large numbers to leave. We are divided by more than just attitudes to Brexit. Over the last 40 years, as our towns have aged and our cities have grown younger, social attitudes on immigration, social security and civil rights have diverged. Steadily but increasingly there are now two Englands that sit unhappily side by side.

The electoral challenge this poses for Labour is formidable. How to reunite these two groups with increasingly divergent views, values and priorities? The road to power relies on winning the liberal, cosmopolitan cities and the traditional working-class towns, where the frustration given voice by Brexit was evident, the vote a clear rejection of the status quo.

In truth we’d had warning signs for years. The declining turnout and dramatic rise in support for UKIP should have been a wake-up call. Elections in 2017 and 2018 turned class politics on its head: in many of the towns hit hardest by austerity – the key battleground for the next General Election – the Tories are gaining ground. This is not the only danger.

This report clearly maps the difference between areas that have benefitted most from globalisation, and those which have lost out with the decline of industry and the changing nature of work. The conditions around us have a big impact on our attitudes, and this report highlights how the difficulties people face in their own lives, if these struggles are ignored, can become manifest through hate.

The warning, issued starkly by Hope Not Hate in Fear, Hope and Loss, is that a widespread sense of hopelessness provides fertile ground for the far right.

But there are grounds for optimism. Consider what unites an area like Tottenham - young, socially liberal, diverse, remain voting – with a town like Wigan, with a more homogenous, older population that came out overwhelmingly for leave? The answer is Labour. For all the division, our values are the common ground on which a shared future can be built and our electoral dilemma central to Britain’s future success.

And the recent National Conversation on immigration published by Hope Not Hate and British Future showed that across the divide there is a sensible, committed majority in Britain whose concern for decency, humanity, kindness and fairness echoes strongly. They not only demand, but deserve, a greater say in the future of their country and the power to build the ambitious, inclusive communities they long for.

Our task is to match their ambition with a vision for every part of the UK that delivers on the priorities in those communities. This is the ground on which Labour must stake out the future.
IN MAY 2010 there was a lot of soul searching inside the Labour Party over the reasons for their first General Election defeat in 18 years. Politician after politician lined up to put Labour’s defeat down to the lax immigration policy pursued by the Blair/Brown Governments that had seen Britain’s population grow rapidly, and accept from movement of people from the new accession states to the EU. Gordon Brown’s off camera remarks about Gillian Duffy both appeared to highlight Labour’s failure to understand the anxieties that immigration was causing to its traditional working class support and the party’s own arrogance in dismissing their views as racist.

Six years later, Labour politicians were saying much the same thing as Britain voted to leave the European Union. Now, anger at immigration was mixed in with an acceptance that many communities in Britain were being “left behind”. These communities had both failed to see any benefit in globalization but where, if anything, going backwards. Old industries were closing down, job had gone, young people who could were leaving and their High Streets were becoming abandoned. The Brexit vote was, in the eyes of many, those in the left behind communities getting their revenge.

Two years on and we have to ask ourselves what has changed? Has Labour (or anyone else for that matter) really learnt any lessons from the 2010 General Election and the 2016 EU referendum? Have the views or underlying grievances in these communities that once were the bedrock of Labour support changed? Sadly, I fear not. If anything, views are hardening and the target of their anger is increasingly Muslims, Islam and the political establishment.

Of course there are no simple solutions to the issues that gave rise to Labour’s 2010 defeat and the Brexit vote. There are deep structural problems in the British economy and in an increasingly globalised and interlinked world, there will always be winners and losers. The decline of old industries cannot simply be reversed by political will alone.

On top of that, as this report and other HOPE not hate research graphically shows, there is a growing cultural divide in today's Britain between an increasingly educated, diverse and multicultural metropolitan population and those living in smaller towns, often geographically quite remote from the large cities. Globalisation and regeneration has favoured the more dynamic large cities, as has the move from traditional industry to finance and service sectors. This has only exacerbated the already declining old industrial heartlands and has led directly to the feeling of abandonment and anger that an increasing number of their residents feel.

This report sets out to explore these issues in details. It tries to understand the relationship between a sense of loss of hope and abandonment with hostility towards the system and “the other”.
Perhaps unsurprisingly we find that those communities with the greatest anxiety to immigration and multiculturalism are also the ones which has lost most through industrial decline. Those who have been able to have moved out, leaving older populations least equipped to compete in the modern global world. When you have communities where 61% of over 16’s do not have a single educational qualification, it is hardly a surprise that new industries seem reluctant to move there. And that’s even before the poor transport and tech infrastructure, which adversely affects these old industrial towns, are taken into account.

_Fear, Hope and Loss_ investigates these issues in a more granular fashion than has been down to date. Based on six years of polling, answers from 43,000 people, and using the most modern forms of data analysis, we have been able to map every lower super output area (approx. 1,000 houses) across England and Wales and grade them on their political and cultural attitudes.

Perhaps the biggest single finding we should take away from this report is that political parties will not reduce anxiety or even hostility to immigration and multiculturalism by cracking down on immigration alone. Given that the areas with the most hostile attitudes are those with some of the lowest levels of immigration in this country, reducing numbers of immigrants alone will have little impact of the attitudes of these people.

Immigration has become a totemic emblem for the many grievances people feel in modern Britain. It is the most visible indicator of a changing Britain. The liberalism, vibrancy and multiculturalism of our cities is contrasted with the sense of loss and abandonment in our former industrial towns. Immigration is seen as a consequence of globalisation, jobs moving abroad and foreigners coming in and taking our jobs here. And, which is often ignored, the strong view in many of these communities that they have been abandoned and left to rot by the political establishment in preference to addressing the needs and wishes of new arrivals in the cities. Lurid media stories about newcomers getting benefits that they have not earnt, politicians worried about hate crime as though the needs to others come before them and to criticise is to be attacked by the politically correct thought police only increase anger and their sense of grievance.

Labour has it worse than other political parties. They are hated more than other parties precisely because they are seen to have abandoned them most. Those communities with the most hostile attitudes to immigration and the many of the most fervent supporters of Brexit were – once upon a time – overwhelmingly Labour-voting communities. While they still might return Labour MPs and local councilors, the relationship between these communities and the Labour Party is broken. And if that relationship is to be rebuilt then Labour needs to do more to address the concerns, grievances and anxieties of these communities.

This is not about pandering to their prejudices or running after their negative views about immigration, but rather it is about rebuilding these communities, equipping their young people with the skills that will enable them to compete more effectively in the modern global world and – fundamentally – giving them a sense of hope in the future. It means genuinely empathising with them, ensuring that people like them are at the heart of the party and in decision making and it is about showing through action that they care.

All this will require money and political will, but if we are to genuinely reduce anxiety about immigration and now growing hostility to British Muslim and Islam more generally, which could have seriously bad consequences, then we have to address the underlying issues which give rise of these attitudes. _Fear, Hope and Loss_, and our collaboration with the excellent Centre for Towns, is the beginning of this process.
THERE IS NO DENYING that we live in an ever-more polarised society, clearly demonstrated by the 2016 EU referendum. Our Fear and HOPE reports have consistently marked a liberal shift in attitudes, but they have also marked a growing gulf between people in society with the most liberal outlooks and those with the most hostile. This report sets out to understand the drivers of fear and hate in England, and where data is available, in Wales and Scotland.

We are living in a time of “two Englands” as Will Jennings puts it, of liberal, outward-looking and cosmopolitan areas, and places with more hostile outlooks on life, where Euroscepticism flourishes, hostility to immigration prevails and people are anxious about cultural change, as well as nostalgic for a rose-tinted past and more English in their identity. The divide between cities and towns is growing even further, as the changing nature of work has replaced traditional industry with warehouses and service work. Graduates congregate in urban areas which celebrate diversity, while our towns age and many struggle to adapt to the pace of change.

HOPE not hate has spent the past 18 months speaking to people across all regions and nations of the UK, as part of the National Conversation on Immigration. While attitudes towards immigration and identity are hugely individualistic, the most hostile attitudes to immigration have emerged in places that have seen significant decline, where there is little opportunity.

Our conversations during the National Conversation were often about much more than immigration, but became a space where people expressed broader resentments at the pace of change, and the loss they felt in their lives. We found intersecting factors which shape attitudes to immigration, as national political and media discourses are filtered through community interactions, the environment in which we live, and our personal circumstances.

This report looks into these findings in more detail, by mapping our Fear and HOPE data across constituencies, localities, and neighbourhoods. Through this data and interviews conducted in some of the most liberal
and hostile areas of the country, we can clearly see how the environment around us shapes our worldview.

East Marsh estate in Grimsby and Castle in Cambridge are worlds apart. One of the most qualified places in the country, and one of the least; one an area with high employment and high earnings, independent businesses and cultural landmarks; the other tucked between an industrial estate and lost industry. They are each one of two Englands, emerging as the most hostile and most confidently multicultural places on our heatmap.

It is not that economics alone drives hostility towards others, but a sense of displacement and loss feeds anxieties, and speaks to pre-existing prejudice. Identity issues are dialled up or down depending on how the economy is doing, while a sense of power and privilege slipping away fuels resentment. Globalisation has rapidly changed the structures that govern people’s lives, but immigration that has occurred alongside offers a tangible target for resentment. A sense of loss fuels fears among dominant groups of being ‘overtaken’, from a dislocation of social status and wellbeing for those who are white and British, who struggle to keep up with progressive social norms.

Much of these findings will come as no surprise to those who have spent time living, working, or campaigning across the county’s inequalities. But laying out this data in this report, we hope to stress the extent of these divides, and the centrality of addressing some of the broader drivers of hate.

There are core lessons in this paper, not least for Labour. Some of the areas identified in this report which are among the most ‘hostile’ are disproportionately located in Labour’s traditional heartlands, working class communities built on traditional industry. But the areas identified among the most liberal also have disproportionately high representation with the Labour party. Labour has a circle to square in holding on to very different areas of support without alienating any one group. As some of the data in this report suggests, if they fail to do so, the risk of a space opening up for the far right exploitation is critical.

**REFLECTING ON THE NATIONAL CONVERSATION**

Much of this report stemmed from my own experiences running the National Conversation on Immigration, together with British Future. This was the largest public engagement on immigration ever undertaken, for which I travelled over 16,000 miles, from Penzance to Shetland, Ballymena to Folkestone, holding 130 meetings across all regions and nations of the UK.

These conversations were about immigration, but were often about so much more. Particularly where people held the strongest and most hostile attitudes to immigration, they talked about it in a way that was intertwined with other frustrations; the distance they felt from Westminster, the precarious nature of work, cuts to public services, the decline of industry, boarded up high streets, future prospects for their kids.

Over 60 focus groups for the National Conversation taught me a lot, but the biggest lesson was that it is not enough to talk about immigration alone. Tackling the underlying mood of anti-immigrant sentiments and anti-Muslim prejudice will also require talking about everything at once, about understanding the grievances people have about their own lives, not just how they feel about other people.
WE FIRST COMMISSIONED our Fear and HOPE survey in 2011, to try and better understand the deeper drivers of hate. A traditional class-based political axis failed to explain attitudes to culture and identity, which reflect personal experiences and life circumstances that frame a larger worldview.

We developed six identity ‘tribes’, each representing a set of views on economic optimism and pessimism, community, values, immigration, race and religion. At one end sit liberals and multiculturalists, while at the other sit those who are hold latent and actively hostile views. In the middle sit a more ambivalent group, sensitive to economic conditions which may drive them towards more hostile views, and an economically secure group with cultural anxieties.

While the debate often gets split into identity issues versus standard of living, our research, recommissioned four times over the last seven years, finds drivers of hate are often more complex and identity issues are dialled up or down depending on how the economy is doing. We have found that when economic conditions improve, and people feel more optimistic about their own quality of life, they are likely to be less anxious about anxiety change. However cultural concerns remain embedded, and views have become increasingly polarised.

Over the last few years, we have seen a liberal shift, with our confident multicultural and mainstream liberal groups growing, following increased diversity and economic recovery after the 2008 financial crash. However, the proportion of people with the most hostile views has remained stable over this same period. This report focuses on the two most hostile and the two most liberal tribes.

**Figure 1: The ‘tribes’ as a percentage of the population**

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<th>February 2011</th>
<th>February 2016</th>
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<tr>
<td>Confident multiculturals</td>
<td>Confident multiculturals</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mainstream liberals</td>
<td>Mainstream liberals</td>
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<tr>
<td>Immigrant ambivalence</td>
<td>Immigrant ambivalence</td>
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<tr>
<td>Culturally concerned</td>
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<td>Latent hostiles</td>
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<td>Active enmity</td>
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The Fear and HOPE identity tribes

CONFIDENT MULTICULTURAL
This tribe tends to be highly educated graduates or postgraduates who see immigration and diversity as hugely positive, both economically and culturally. 91% agree that it has benefited the country and 94% see cultural diversity as an integral part of British culture. Economically comfortable, outgoing, social and happy with their lives, they are confident about their own, as well as their country’s, future. They tend to live in London or the core cities and are most likely to identify politically with Labour, the Liberal Democrats and the Greens and to have voted Remain in the EU referendum. Although typical of the so-called ‘metropolitan liberal elite’, this tribe has become more mixed since 2011, as economic recovery and a growing sense of confidence and security have encouraged more people to adopt an optimistic, outward-looking perspective.

MAINSTREAM LIBERAL
This tribe shares much of the views of the Confident Multicultural tribe, though tend to be less enthusiastic in their views. These people are optimistic, self-motivated and for the most part educated to at least degree level. They are comfortable with increasing diversity, and see immigration and multiculturalism as beneficial for the country, though to a lesser extent than the confident multicultural group- 86% agree that immigration has benefited the country both economically and culturally.

IMMIGRANT AMBIVALENT
This group views other groups through the prism of its economic impact on their opportunities and the social impact on their communities. On the whole, those who fit within this tribe are less financially secure and less optimistic about the future than the two liberal groups. They are more likely to be working class, of working age, and to live in social housing. The largest single segment to vote Labour, the group also includes a high proportion of non-voters. They are more likely to have voted Leave in the EU referendum (40%) or to not have voted in the referendum (31%). This group are most likely to swing into the more liberal or more hostile tribes as economic conditions change for the better or for the worse.

CULTURALLY CONCERNED
This group is more economically secure than the Immigrant Ambivalent tribe, but is concerned about the pace of change. They are generally older and 27% of the over 65s identify with this tribe. Many are (or have been) professionals and managers but the social class make-up of this group has changed since 2011 to include a greater proportion from C2DE classes. This group forms the largest segment of those identifying with the Conservative Party and are most likely to have voted Leave in the 2016 referendum (54%). They are more likely to view immigration as a cultural issue with concerns about the impact of immigration on national identity and about immigrants’ willingness to integrate. Around half the group believe immigration has been good for the country (45%) and they see positive economic impacts through migrants taking jobs British people are unwilling to do, but over three quarters (77%) also feel that there is an increasing amount of tension between the different groups living in Britain and see Muslims as distinctly different from the majority population.

LATENT HOSTILE
For this group, immigration has undermined British culture, public services and their own economic prospects. More likely to be over 35, not university-educated, and more than likely working class. They view their own future with uncertainty and Britain’s future with pessimism. They would support political forces that stood-up for their identity and way of life, but are less confrontational than those in the Active Enmity tribe. This group was most likely to identify with UKIP and to have voted Leave in the EU referendum. This tribe is more likely to be economically pessimistic and fears the impacts of immigration on British culture.

ACTIVE ENMITY
The most hostile of all the tribes, this group sees immigrants and what they think immigration represents as having negative effects on all aspects of life. Just three percent (3%) of this tribe feel immigration has been good for the country. Opposed to all ethnicities or religions other than their own, many also believe that violence is acceptable if it is a consequence of standing up for what is ‘right’. This tribe draw more support from the unskilled and the unemployed, and people most disengaged from traditional political processes.
**INDIVIDUAL FACTORS**

Social attitudes are complex, developed within a broader worldview and shaped by personal circumstance, age, qualifications, social grade, migration, political views, ethnicity and geography, as well as the information we consume.

Our July 2018 poll of 10,000 people finds a significant difference between younger and older people, with younger people far more likely to see the benefits of multiculturalism, less concerned with immigration, and less likely to hold prejudiced views about Muslims and Islam in Britain. Just seven percent (7%) of 18-24 year-olds list immigration in the three most important issues facing them and their families, compared to 30% of people over 65. Twenty-two percent (22%) of 18-24 year-olds believe that Islamist terrorists reflect a widespread hostility to Britain among the Muslim community, compared to over a third of people over 65 (34%). Seventy-six percent (76%) of 18-24 year-olds feel that diversity is integral to British culture, whereas less than half of those aged 65+ share this view.

Seventy-six percent (76%) of people educated to degree level or above feel that having a wide variety of backgrounds and cultures is part of British culture, and that immigration has been good for the country. This can be compared to just 45% of people educated to GCSE or equivalent who are more likely to think that diversity has undermined British culture (55%), and that immigration has been bad for the country (55%).

We found that 74% of Guardian readers saw multiculturalism as having a positive impact on British culture and 78% felt it had a positive effect on the economy compared to Daily Express readers. Just 45% of Express readers see a positive effect of multiculturalism on the economy and 31% see a positive effect on British culture.

The National Conversation on Immigration found that in deliberative discussion, these individual factors also came to play. We found that younger people were more likely to see cultural diversity as a benefit of immigration than older people, and that more hostile attitudes tended to be expressed by those in precarious, low paid work, or people with more conservative values.

But we also found that individual circumstances, local factors and national discourses on immigration interact with each other and shape public attitudes. We found that for some people, their own personal circumstances – for example their career progression – had shaped their view. In the 60 citizens’ panels we held, we found that participants who were more confident about their own opportunities in life were less likely to see immigration as a threat than people in more precarious positions. The citizens’ panels were also influenced by what they saw around them in their local communities.

We found that the salience of immigration varied from place to place, and that immigration was much less salient in diverse cities where people were more likely to know migrants and people of different ethnicities to themselves.
Our discussions in less diverse areas were less informed, and opinions were often drawn from the media and peer group debate. The National Conversation also found that local issues informed attitudes, sometimes directly related to immigration, sometimes triggered by concerns about immigration at a national scale.

This report acknowledges the complexity of individual differences in influencing social attitudes, but instead takes an ecological approach to look at how the environment around us shapes our social attitudes. By this measure, it is by no means exhaustive, but it offers an insight into the wider drivers of hate, the factors that create fertile ground for these ideologies to flourish, and for hateful narratives to take seed.

FROM IMMIGRATION TO ISLAM AND INTEGRATION

Over the last seven years, we have seen a considerable shift in attitudes, as (on the whole) the country feels more confident about immigration. But concerns about Muslims and Islam in Britain have hardened. We have also noted an increase in the public salience of integration, with public perceptions of integration cynical, and at odds with the reality of community relations in the UK.

Attitudes to immigration have become steadily more positive over time, and on the whole people see more gains than pressures. Immigration has steadily fallen down the public’s set of ‘most important issues’, and our July 2018 poll finds 60% of people think that immigration has been good for Britain, up from 40% when people were asked the same question in 2011 and 50% when people were asked in January 2016. The reasons for this more positive view of immigration are complicated, but much can be attributed to a broader liberal shift in public attitudes, increased diversity, an improvement in economic conditions, and for those with more hostile attitudes, a sense that Brexit might solve the ‘immigration problem’ has reduced concern.

Figure 3: Fear and HOPE 2017 % of total English population agreeing with statements about recent terrorist attacks by segment

- I’ve been impressed with the way British people have come together in unity in the face of the terror attacks
- The recent attacks have made me more concerned with cuts to police budgets
- I would be willing to relax some of our human rights laws to help fight terrorism
- I have noticed the Muslim community leaders have strongly spoken out against the attacks
- The recent terrorist attacks have increased my suspicion of Muslims in Britain
But Muslims are seen as uniquely different from the majority British public, and distinctly different from other religious groups. In our July 2017 poll, just 10% of the total public believed Muslims were similar to them, and even among the most liberal group in the survey, just under a quarter felt Muslims were similar to them.

Between 2011-2016, our Fear and HOPE polls found attitudes to Muslims and Islam in Britain were softening, although Muslims were still seen as distinctly different from other groups in society. However, the spate of terror attacks which hit the UK in 2017 have had an enduring impact on attitudes towards Muslims in Britain. In our March 2018 poll, 18% of people in our survey were more suspicious of British Muslims and the way they felt British Muslims had responded to the attacks. Meanwhile, 24% felt there was no difference, although they were already suspicious before.

The child sexual exploitation (“grooming”) scandals across the UK, including the scandals in Rochdale, Rotherham, Oxford, and Telford, have all added to tensions. In Rotherham alone, the NCA estimated 1,510 children were exploited over a 16-year period. It also found that 80% of the suspects were of Pakistani heritage while the vast majority of victims were white British girls. The cases saw severe police failures to investigate and safeguard, with many abusers going unchecked. Some claimed the ethnicity of abusers meant authorities largely turned a blind eye on the abuse, the NCA report said, out of fear of being branded racist.

In our July 2018 poll, 40% of people felt that the police and media treated all child sex grooming gangs the same, regardless of their ethnic background, while 60% felt that political correctness was causing the police and media to deliberately play down the ethnic background of some child sex. Conservative and Leave voters (73%), Mail on Sunday readers (75%), and retirees (72%) were all most likely to feel the police had covered up the ethnicity of perpetrators in the name of ‘political correctness’.

Narratives about Islam as a threat, or ‘taking over’ UK cities have moved from the margin to mainstream thought. In our July 2018 YouGov research of 10,383 people, a staggering 32% of people believed that there were no-go areas in Britain where sharia law dominates and non-Muslims cannot enter, with almost half of all Leave voters (49%) and Conservative voters (47%) stating that this was true.

In the same poll, a small majority (53%) felt that there was an increasing amount of tension between the different groups living in Britain, spanning political and demographic groups. Nearly a third – 28% – of respondents felt that Islamist terrorists reflected a widespread hostility to Britain from among the Muslim community, with 32% of men perceiving this broader hostility, 37% of Conservative voters, and a huge 62% of Leave voters.

Integration has become a concern around which many have hung broader resentments, and it is term that strings together different issues. It encapsulates cultural anxieties and a feeling of unfairness, of being left behind. It conflates the economic with cultural, grounded by the reality.

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**Figure 4: July 2018 YouGov poll**

- There are no go areas in Britain where sharia law dominates and non-Muslims cannot enter: 32% total agree, 19% Leave voters agree, 49% Remain voters agree.
- Political correctness is causing the police and media to deliberately play down the ethnic background of some child sex grooming gangs: 60% total agree, 63% Leave voters agree, 57% Remain voters agree.
- Islam is generally a threat to the British way of life: 35% total agree, 17% Leave voters agree, 54% Remain voters agree.
- Islamist terrorists reflect a widespread hostility to Britain amongst the Muslim community: 28% total agree, 12% Leave voters agree, 42% Remain voters agree.
Fear, hope and Loss

that integration has been an uneven success. A public and political debate on integration which disproportionately holds the spotlight on Muslim communities feeds an underlying sense that integration failures are the responsibility of Muslims in Britain. A view that ‘multiculturalism has failed’ resonates with a significant share of the population: 41% of our March 2018 poll, and a massive 67% of Conservative Leave voters, believe that Britain’s multicultural society isn’t working and different communities generally live separate lives.

Our research, through interviews, focus groups, surveys and polling, clearly indicates a shift in the target of hate. Concerns about immigration have increasingly become focused on Muslims and Islam in Britain, and integration is of increasing public salience.

AN AMALGAMATION OF ISSUES

The shift in concerns from immigration to integration also reflects the way in which different issues amalgamate in the expression of fear and hate. Our polling shows that Euroscepticism and prejudice towards Islam are clearly interlinked issues for many. This amalgamation can also be politically driven, as seen when the Leave campaign deliberately mixed up immigration, refugees and freedom of movement, and empowered anti-establishment and free speech discourses.

In our July 2018 poll, it was Leave voters, especially those who also voted Conservative, who were most sceptical about immigration, that were also the most cynical about political correctness being used by a ‘liberal elite’ to limit what people wanted to say. These same people were also the most hostile towards Muslims and Islam.

An amalgamation of issues was also something we saw in almost all of our National Conversation discussions, where our conversations were often not just about immigration, but about broader issues in people’s lives.

Immigration was not such a live issue among people who were more economically stable, in areas such as Durham, Harrogate, Sutton Coldfield and Uckfield. The most hostile attitudes emerged in places which had suffered loss of key industries, where there was high level deprivation, where participants often told a broader story about dissatisfaction with their own lives.

We found that a sense of unfairness underpinned much hostility towards migrants and minorities. People often perceived migrants as receiving preferential treatment from public services, explaining this judgement through their own struggles in attaining these services. Unfairness, and a sense that ‘it’s working better for you than me’, feeds a swelling anti-establishment feeling. People often referred to an anonymous ‘they’, which could refer to migrants, Muslims, politicians, London or the City; it often referred to people seen as external powers who were feeling the gains of immigration not equally shared across the country. Lost industry and changing work, local decline, alongside changing neighbourhoods and increased diversity mean that identity issues and people’s standard of living become intertwined.

Resistance to change is not only about a decline in welfare and opportunity. These anxieties trigger a defensive instinct to protect and reassert a social position. A sense that British or English identity is waning becomes more pronounced, tradition is revived, and media stories about bans on Easter eggs or nativity plays stick with people, because they resonate with a broader worldview.
The amalgamation of issues that drive hostile attitudes is complex, but in daily experience it can seem rational. Resistance to changes that are not in your favour is understandable. At the same time, those who have been ‘left behind’ also need to keep up with changing social norms, that being white, British, straight and male does not entitle superiority.

We need to understand social attitudes as intertwined with the way that people perceive and experience other factors. This report attempts to do so by looking at the external, environmental factors which influence how people see others around them.

OPTIMISM AND PESSIMISM: THE BREXIT SHIFT

Our Fear and HOPE reports have traced optimism and pessimism since 2011, as this was identified as a key driver behind attitudes. People who are more optimistic about their own lives tend to hold more liberal views than those who feel pessimistic.

Fear and HOPE 2016 identified a shift towards cautious optimism across all tribes, as economic recovery restored a sense of greater security and contentment. From 2011 – where only around a quarter of the hostile tribes felt optimistic about the future – to 2016, pessimism was more of a minority view and optimism increased across the board.

The results of the EU referendum had a clear impact on how people felt about the future, and showed just how divisive the referendum result and Brexit process could be. Immediately after the referendum, it was clear that some felt positive change was in the air, while for others the shock of the result felt unsettled their whole outlook on life.

July 2016 saw a surge in economic optimism from the tribes with the most hostile views towards immigration and multiculturalism: latent hostiles, active enmity and culturally concerned groups. These were all groups which had previously had been more pessimistic and most likely to have voted to Leave the European Union. The referendum result was seen to offer a window for opportunity for many of these
groups. The messaging of the Leave campaign, centered around control, was likely to have resonated with these groups. For people feeling that life was not working for them, it may have seemed that it was finally possible to take control and challenge some of the root factors for long-standing pessimism among the two hostile groups.

The patterns of optimism for confident multiculturals and mainstream liberals reflected almost the opposite. These groups were the most optimistic in 2011, becoming more so between 2011 and 2016. Many in these groups experienced an initial shock as the result of the referendum became clear. Confidence among these groups plummeted after the result. Overall optimism for confident multiculturals fell by five percent (5%) over 18 months, a trend which was echoed in respect to people’s own selves and families as well as Britain as a whole.

Our July 2018 YouGov poll found that this trend remained, or become more engrained as the Brexit negotiations went on. Remain voters were far more pessimistic about the future than Leave voters. Seventy-one percent (71%) of Remain voters said they felt pessimistic for the future, more than twice the proportion of Leave voters (35%). Eighteen percent (18%) of Remain voters felt that the next generation would have more opportunities than them, compared to 53% of Leave voters. Forty-six percent (46%) of Leave voters felt that Brexit would increase the economic opportunities for people like themselves, compared to just seven percent (7%) of Remain voters.

Nearly two-thirds (64.3%) of Remain voters felt that the economic prospects for themselves and their family would be better if the UK remained in the EU, compared to a tiny 5.1% of Leave voters. Instead, 42.7% of Leave voters felt optimistic that their personal economic situation would improve if the UK left the EU, while 32.2% felt it wouldn’t make much difference either way. Messages about the potentially detrimental economic impacts of Brexit just did not resonate with those feeling a newfound optimism as a result of the referendum result.

Focaldata’s constituency estimates reveal that pessimism about Brexit is not equally spread across the country.

Figure 8 looks at how Leave voters in the five constituencies with the strongest 2016 Leave vote feel about their personal economic prospects. The levels of optimism about economic prosperity are greatest in those areas that voted most strongly to leave the EU, with just 2.7% of Leave voters in Boston and Skegness and in Castle Point feeling that their economic prospects would improve if Britain did not leave the EU.
Figure 7: July 2018 Focaldata MRP: Constituency estimates: Do you think that Economic prospects for you and your family will be better if the UK remains in the EU?
Economic projections suggest that the West Midlands economy could shrink by up to 13% after Britain leaves the EU. This would have a direct negative impact on people living in Dudley, where there are already pockets of acute deprivation. But Leave voters in Dudley North clearly do not see this threat. Just 3.6% feel their economic situation would improve if the UK remained in the EU. As an area where the BNP previously had electoral success and far-right groups remain active, and where our heatmaps show a close affinity to the two hostile tribes, the risk of broken optimism fuelling a far-right resurgence should not be taken lightly, not just in Dudley but across the country.

Focus groups we have run as part of our campaign against a hard Brexit echo these findings, with those holding the strongest Leave views least likely to be concerned about potential economic crashes following Britain's exit from the EU, remaining instead hopeful that leaving the EU will bring greater prosperity to the county and to them and their families.

Those feeling this newfound optimism are also most likely to hold negative views towards immigration, Muslims and multiculturalism. As our heatmap data suggests, these people are also concentrated in areas where there are significant socio-economic problems. With all economic projections suggesting that it is deprived areas which will be worst affected by a Brexit-triggered economic downturn, their bubble of optimism will burst.

This swing in optimism and pessimism matters, as the confidence we feel in our own lives has a direct effect on our broader social attitudes. Pessimism drives fear and hate and, ultimately, support for the far right. Hopes that fail to materialise could see a resurgence in the political salience of immigration, and open a window of opportunity for those promoting a populist rightwing agenda to exploit people's fears and resentments.

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**DUDLEY NORTH**

Economic projections suggest that the West Midlands economy could shrink by up to 13% after Britain leaves the EU. This would have a direct negative impact on people living in Dudley, where there are already pockets of acute deprivation. But Leave voters in Dudley North clearly do not see this threat. Just 3.6% feel their economic situation would improve if the UK remained in the EU. As an area where the BNP previously had electoral success and far-right groups remain active, and where our heatmaps show a close affinity to the two hostile tribes, the risk of broken optimism fuelling a far-right resurgence should not be taken lightly, not just in Dudley but across the country.
Figure 9: Map showing affinity to the Active Enmity tribe by Local Authority
WHERE ARE FEAR AND HOPE CONCENTRATED?

IN THE WEEK after the EU referendum, we polled 4,035 people across England. We then modelled this data onto Lower Super Output Areas, small areas of around 1,600 people to create a series of heatmaps. Each area is coded according to the affinity of the people who live there with each of the most liberal and most hostile Fear and HOPE ‘tribes’: Confident Multiculturals, Mainstream Liberals, Latent Hostile and Active Enmity.

Of the 32,845 lower super output areas identified on our heatmap, some clear trends emerge when profiling the 100 areas which most closely associate with the most liberal and most hostile Fear and HOPE identity tribes.

The most hostile tribes are concentrated in areas which face significant socio-economic problems, ex-industrial areas and isolated coastal communities. Almost all are in towns, places which have experienced significant decline, with overwhelmingly white British populations, where work is scare, precarious, low-paid and low-skilled.

Conversely, the most liberal tribes are concentrated in major cities or in university towns, places where a university education is customary, where opportunities are abundant. This analysis looks only at England.

The index of multiple deprivation ranks every small area in England from 1 (most deprived area) to 32,844 (least deprived area). This is calculated by combining a number of indicators, including income, employment, education, training and skills, health deprivation and disability, crime, barriers to housing and services and living environment deprivation.

The Income Deprivation Domain measures the proportion of the population in an area experiencing deprivation relating to low income. The definition of low income used includes both those people that are out of work, and those that are in work but who have low earnings (and who satisfy the respective means tests).

Figures 10 to 14 rank the top 100 neighbourhoods (LSOA) most aligned with each tribe according to its deprivation rank in terms on the vertical axis, where the more deprived an area is, by varying factors, the lower its position on the graph.

The Employment Deprivation Domain measures the proportion of the working age population

**Figure 10: 100 best fit: Income (index of multiple deprivation 2015)**

index of multiple deprivation income rank: 1 (most deprived area) to 32,844 (least deprived area)
in an area involuntarily excluded from the labour market. This includes people who would like to work but are unable to do so due to unemployment, sickness or disability, or caring responsibilities.

The concentration of tribes according to income deprivation, and to employment is clear, with the active enmity tribe concentrated at the very bottom, in the most income deprived areas of the country, while the upper section of the chart – the least income deprived areas of all of the country – is dominated by the more liberal tribes, specifically mainstream liberals.

Employment is one of the most clearly segregating factors for the 100 neighbourhoods most aligned to the tribes. The urban-based liberal tribes are most prevalent among some of the least deprived areas in the country, squeezed up towards the very top of the graph, while the post-industrial areas identifying as latent hostiles and active enmity are pushed down to the more deprived section of the country. The dominance of the active enmity tribe in the most deprived section of the chart is stark.

According to the BMA3, twice as many people are obese in the most deprived areas of the UK,
and those living in poverty are three times as likely to suffer from mental health problems. Children living in poverty are more likely to have low birth weights, to suffer chronic diseases or affect their cognitive development. While our data does not show such a stark contrast between the tribes and health and disability deprivation, it is evident that the areas where actively hostile views predominate are also places where there is significant health and disability deprivation.

Education has consistently been considered an important individual factor in determining attitudes to immigration, with the more educated tending to have more liberal attitudes towards newcomers. The Education, Skills and Training Domain measures the lack of attainment and skills in the local population. The indicators fall into two sub-domains: one relating to children and young people, and one relating to adult skills.

Figures 13 and 14 indicate a similar pattern in terms of poor education, skills and training most prevalent in areas where there are hostile attitudes to immigration. The neighbourhoods which identify most with the latent hostile and active enmity tribes are, once again, sat in the lower parts of the chart: the most deprived.

Figure 13: 100 best fit: Education and Skills (index of multiple deprivation 2015)

Index of multiple deprivation education and skills rank: 1 (most deprived area) to 32,844 (least deprived area)

Confident Multiculturals Mainstream Liberals Latent Hostile Active Enmity

Figure 14: 100 best fit: Adult skill (index of multiple deprivation 2015)

Index of multiple deprivation adult skills rank: 1 (most deprived area) to 32,844 (least deprived area)

Confident Multiculturals Mainstream Liberals Latent Hostile Active Enmity
While a considerable number of the more liberal areas remain at the very top – the least deprived area – of the chart, the majority of the other tribes are more mixed. This could also be attributed to the performance of schools in inner city locations for some of the areas identifying with the most liberal tribes. When only adult skill factors are analysed, an even more fragmented picture emerges. Figure 14 indicates that education among the adult population is a clear and divisive factor in determining attitudes to immigration, and a factor around which there is a huge, unbridged gap between the tribes.

These cannot be causal or determinate factors, and these graphs do show outliers. But the overall trends, showing hostile attitudes are more likely to dominate in deprived areas, are undeniable.

ACTIVE ENMITY

The Active Enmity tribe holds the most hostile attitudes towards migrants and minorities, and may even advocate for violence against these groups.

Of all the 100 areas with the greatest proportional affiliation to the active enmity group, all are located in residential areas in towns or on the outskirts of cities, with 93 of the 100 are in the Midlands and the North, and over half located across the North East and Yorkshire and Humberside.

These are mostly in towns that have experienced de-industrialisation and disconnection, with pockets of deprivation in places such as Hull, Middlesbrough and Wigan. None are in city centres; most are concentrated on isolated social housing estates on the outskirts of town. Using the Centre for Towns’ definition of place type in figure 15, it is clear that the vast majority of these areas are in towns.

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**Figure 15: 100 best fit: Active enmity by place type**

- Community: 60%
- Core city: 12%
- Large town: 3%
- Medium town: 1%
- Small town: 1%
- Village: 1%

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**Figure 16**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>100 best fit: Confident multicultural</th>
<th>Mainstream liberal</th>
<th>100 best fit: Latent Hostile</th>
<th>100 best fit: Active Enmity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Median age</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>37.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Population white British</td>
<td>63.4</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>94.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
According to the 2015 Indices of deprivation:

- 18 of these areas sit within the 100 most deprived of 32,844 areas of England and 99 are in the top 10% most deprived areas in the UK, with the exception in the most deprived 20%
- 21 of these areas are in the 100 most deprived areas in terms of income
- 15 sit within the 100 most deprived areas in terms of employment
- Education and skills have a clear association with those areas that fit most with the Active Enmity tribe: 34 are within the most deprived 100 areas of the country in terms of education, 99 are in the top 10% most deprived areas according to education, and all sit within the most deprived 10% according to adult skill level.

They are generally not diverse areas, with an average white British population of 95%. In all of the top 25, the percentage of those identifying as white British is over 93%, far above the national average.

These are all areas with low levels of employment, where residents are less educated and skilled than the majority of the population, and where many children are growing up in poverty. These are all areas where people are struggling to make ends meet, and opportunities are scarce. The lack of education, skills and disposable income make the poverty trap very difficult to escape.

The Brambles Farm and Thorntree area of Middlesbrough is one of these places, also thought to be the most pro-Brexit place in the country: 82.5% voted to leave the EU. Immigration was a primary concern for many. High numbers of asylum seekers are housed by the Home Office in nearby areas of the town, which has triggered some tension. For some, this has offered a target for frustration at what feels to have been taken away. Thorntree has a 95% white British population and faces some real challenges. It is ranked the 135th most deprived place in the UK, within the most deprived 100 places (of over 35,000) in relation to income, employment, adult skills, and in the most deprived 10% in terms of health, education and child poverty. The area was hit hard in the 1970s with big jobs losses in nearby British Steel and Welfords Bakery.

Nunsthorpe estate in Grimsby has become notorious for “poverty, drugs and anger”, with well-reported high rates of anti-social behaviour, following the closure of the area’s sports and community facilities. It is the 51st most deprived place in the UK, the 15th most deprived in terms of income, third in terms of education, 18th in terms of child poverty, ninth in terms of adult skills. The population is, according to census data, almost 98% white British.

Orchard estate in Hull has seen large scale regeneration and community-driven efforts to change its reputation as an area of high anti-social behaviour and decline. Within the most deprived 400 areas of the country, the 85th most deprived in terms of education, skills and training, and 95th in terms of adult skill level, it has a population that is 94% white British.

Each of these areas tells a different story, but share much in common. They have seen economic loss while core cities have prospered. They are not diverse places, with average white British population of 95%. They are areas that have gained bad reputations as ‘sink estates’, areas of high levels of economic and social deprivation. There is understandably a lot of anger and frustration in these places, where many are struggling to make ends meet.

**LATENT HOSTILE**

The Latent Hostile tribe shares similar views to the Active Enmity tribe, though to a lesser extent. The 100 places which show closet affiliation to this tribe are mostly located in post-industrial or coastal communities, places such as Canvey island, Corby, or Rossington. Many are geographically isolated, far from transport links, on the coast or the outskirts of cities, where the majority of properties are social housing. Using the Centre for Towns definition of place type, the vast majority of these areas are in towns.
Most are less diverse than the UK average, with overwhelmingly white British populations in 93 of the 100 areas, with an average white British population of 94.3%.

According to the 2015 indices of deprivation, 80 of the 100 areas with a high proportion of latent hostile association are in the 20% most deprived decile, with six areas in the top 100 most deprived lower super outputs in the whole country.

- 76 are in the 20% most deprived areas according to employment
- As with the Active Enmity tribe, education and skills have a strong association with these places: 99 are in the 20% most deprived in terms of education, training and skills, with 81 in the most deprived 10% of the country. Eight areas are in the most 10% deprived in regards to adult skill level, and all 100 are in the most deprived 20%. The Latent Hostile tribe is concentrated in similar areas to the Active Enmity tribe; places which have seen economic decline and the loss of traditional industries. They are areas where people have few opportunities, and are behind in terms of skills and education, taken for granted in many other areas of the country.

**CONFIDENT MULTICULTURAL**

The 100 areas most associated with the Confident Multicultural tribe are all located in central city areas, nearby the universities of core cities – London, Sheffield, Nottingham, Newcastle, Manchester, Liverpool, Leeds, Bristol and Birmingham – or around the university colleges of Durham, Oxford and Cambridge.

These are diverse areas, with an average white British population of 63.4%, well below the national average of 81.9%. They are places that are not only comfortable with this diversity, but celebratory of it.

71 of the 100 are in the least deprived 20% in terms of income and in the least deprived 10% in terms of employment, and in all areas house prices are far above the local average. These are wealthy areas: not the wealthiest, but prosperous places where there is ample opportunity, cultural offerings and prestigious educational institutions.

All have thriving high streets full of independent cafes, greengrocers, delis and boutiques; Jericho in Oxford to Jesmond in Newcastle, the city centres of Birmingham and Manchester, and Bristol’s Clifton Down. There are theatres, independent cinemas, and jazz bars. They are well connected by train, metro and bus, with cycle lanes and pedestrianised streets.

Notably, over 90% are within a few hundred metres of universities, and according to data from the indices of deprivation they are among the most educated and skilled places in the country. Ninety of the 100 are in the least deprived 10% of areas in England for adult skill level, and include some of the most highly skilled areas of the country.

Perhaps as a result of the proximity to universities, the median age of these places is far younger than that of the more hostile areas, at 25.4, almost 12 years younger than the median age of the 100 areas most affiliated to the Latent Hostile tribe (37.0).

Castle in Cambridge is a central area of the town, covering the prestigious St John’s College and the surrounding residential area. It is one of the least deprived areas of the country, with an ethnically diverse population (according to the 2011 census, around 42% BAME). It is within the least deprived 10% of the country in terms of income, employment and adult skills. Many of its residents are employees of Cambridge University, and many more are students residing in and around the grounds of the impressive, elite colleges. The area is both pretty and prosperous, where few of its residents are dependent children or retirees. Economic concerns are uncommon in areas such as this.

‘Newcastle’s Notting Hill’, Jesmond in Newcastle-upon-Tyne, is lined with restaurants, bars, cafes and shops, including a Waitrose® serving the area’s large student population which adds diversity to the wealthy suburb. In the least deprived 10% of the UK in terms of income, employment, education...
and skills and a small proportion of elderly and dependents, the area has much to offer.

Central Manchester, just North of Oxford Rd station, is among the 10% least deprived in terms of income, with one of the highest rates of employment in the country, a very small proportion of dependents, and among the least deprived areas of the country in terms of adult skills. It is a highly diverse area, with a minority white British population (45%).

These are all areas where there are opportunities. They are aspirational places, with good educational opportunities and cultural offerings. They are places where it is easy to have hope in your own life, and for those around you.

**TOP 100 MAINSTREAM LIBERALS**

The 100 areas with the greatest proportion of the Mainstream Liberal tribe tend to be in large core cities, Bristol, Manchester, Sheffield, Leeds, Liverpool and Newcastle, with the highest proportion - 28 of 100 - within London boroughs.

These are all diverse areas, with an average white British population of 62.5%, well below the national average, with only 14 places of the 100 bucking the trend.

As mostly urban areas, these are all places with opportunity. According to the indices of deprivation, they are all in the least deprived 20% of the country in terms of employment – 95 are within the least deprived 10% – and include some of the least deprived areas in the country in terms of employment. Moreover, these tend to be places with higher than average incomes. Ninety-nine of these 100 areas sit within the least deprived 30% by income, with 81% in the least deprived 10%.

The main difference between these areas and those most associated with the Confident Multicultural tribe is in relation to education. The majority (79 of 100) lie in the least deprived 50% by education, and 37 in the least deprived 10%. Mostly inner city areas where school performance is more mixed, these are places with greater educational value than the British average, but not as highly educated as the most liberal areas of the country. However, in terms of adult skills, all sit in the least deprived 30% and 96 in the least deprived 10%.

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**Figure 19: 100 best fit: Mainstream Liberal by place type**

- **Community**: 86%
- **Core city**: 12%
- **Large town**: 1%
- **Medium town**: 1%
- **Small town**: 1%

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BRISTOL HAS BEEN NAMED the UK’s best place to live\textsuperscript{10}, the best place to study\textsuperscript{11}, the world’s 4\textsuperscript{th} most inspiring city\textsuperscript{12}, and one of the top 10 cities in the world\textsuperscript{13}. Known for its green ethos, leftfield counterculture, and independent businesses – boosted by the Bristol pound – it is a fiercely independent city with a strong identity.

But our data paints a different picture. While it will come as no surprise that 13 of the 100 most confidently multicultural areas are located in the city of just over half a million, Bristol also houses some of the most hostile areas of the country. Unpicking what’s behind this data really underlines the gulf between Bristol’s different sides. Spending a day between these contrasting sides of the city, in Clifton Down and Hartcliffe, the national story told by our heatmap makes a lot more sense.

Bristol tells a tale of two places: a forward looking city, and areas which remain isolated from the city’s gains. The north-south divide in the city is one of the most evident in the country, and Bristol’s two football clubs speak to this divide. I’m told through my conversations in Bristol that the river acts as a barrier: “Not a real barrier but a psychological barrier. People rarely cross it”.

Whiteladies Road in Clifton Down, just north of the city centre creeping up from Bristol University, is lined with independent cafes and restaurants alongside upmarket furniture and home furnishing shops. I meet a community representative in an organic café, lively with people picking up veg boxes.

Bristol West is seen as the most politically engaged area of the country, and, I am told, is far more left wing than first impressions of the area would give away, with its wealthy-looking streets...
of impressively large Georgian houses. I’m assured that most of these properties are flats, housing students and new graduates. It’s a place where a university education is an expected norm.

Initially I’m told there’s not such a strong sense of community. But as conversation progresses, I learn about numerous initiatives, community sponsorship for refugees, street parties, campaigns to protect the libraries.

The impact of the university on the local area is obvious, and the area has a high rate of graduate retention. Many are employed by the university, or in the nearby BBC offices. Demographically, Clifton Down has a disproportionately high young working population between 20 and 35, with very few dependents. The population is predominantly white British with an above-average population of white Europeans, with the largest migrant groups from Germany and France.

Unsurprisingly, the ward had one of the strongest Remain votes in the 2016 referendum, and two years on, homemade EU support banners and Remain campaign posters still line the windows of leafy streets. Eighty-one percent (81%) of Clifton Down residents voted to Remain in the 2016 referendum, an area where, I am told, people are more likely to identify as European than Bristolian.

In Hartcliffe and Withywood, just four miles away, just 33% voted Remain, with a strong vote to Leave the EU at odds with the Bristol vote overall. A woman I meet in Clifton tells me that Hartcliffe “feels like an alien place... Clifton Down and Hartcliffe are at the opposites of every end of the spectrum”.

The statistics on Bristol’s inequality are well known. By virtue of where you live, you may live 12 years less than someone living in another part of the city. A youth worker in Hartcliffe tells me these figures are often quoted by people he meets on the doorstep, and that while people rarely talk about them, a sense of anger and injustice carries.

An area of Hartcliffe emerges as one of the most hostile areas on our heatmap. When we meet, the same youth worker tells me that “just through doing youth and community work on the estate, you’re considered an expert in the far right... Those views don’t come from nowhere”.

Problems on the estates are complex, amalgamating to a propensity for far-right narratives which offer a response. Financial restraints for people in the area are huge, accompanied by further problems that come with poverty. Housing is in poor shape. Drugs offer one escape, and mental health issues are prevalent. Education isn’t respected or understood, and university-focused institutions don’t always know how to deal with areas like Hartcliffe. Family is important, but “not a normal middle class sense of family, our families are much more chaotic”.

There is a strong sense of community and pride in being from the area, but these are fragile sentiments. Poverty is often internalised as shame: “There’s no business sector... no money, no sense of people doing things for themselves”. People are disenchanted with politics, not feeling heard or represented by anything or anyone. For many Brexit was an opportunity to manifest discontent.

While there is a strong Bristolian identity in Hartcliffe, pride in the accent, in Bristol City FC, people rarely go into the city centre. The estate is geographically isolated, penned in by main roads on Bristol’s southernmost tip. Isolation limits aspirations, with little access to the city’s opportunities.

How each side of Bristol sees the other frames much of the river divide. The areas rarely come into contact. In Hartcliffe, people don’t feel valued, they feel ignored: “They know what’s going on, and nothing’s being done”. The pro-EU tone of areas like Clifton does not match the inequality they feel. After the referendum, the distances between these places felt much greater than four miles: “People feel they can’t say things, and we, as people who think we’ve got it right, we’re not good at talking to other people”.

Poverty does not correlate directly with fear and hate, but in areas like Bristol, the depth of inequality felt across two sides of the river has created two different worlds. Opportunity has forged a path for openness, while isolation triggers anger, resentment and shame.
I’VE SPENT THE last few years studying and documenting the demographics and voting behaviour of people who were voting for UKIP in local and national elections. This process meant I often found myself in towns rather than cities, since it was in towns like Grimsby, Oldham, Dudley and Rotherham that former Labour supporters were most likely tempted to vote for UKIP. In discussing their reasons, it quickly became apparent that the characterisation of such voters as ignorant racists was wide of the mark by some distance. Voters often expressed longstanding economic challenges in the towns they lived in, and much more pragmatic concerns about immigration than you might believe if you read their somewhat hysterical representation in the media.

In setting up the Centre For Towns we wanted to push back against the unfair characterisation of such places and provide a platform for more research into the challenges they face. At the Centre For Towns we recognise the importance of historical context when trying to understand the importance of place. Without an explicit recognition of how towns have changed over time, we shouldn’t be able to describe why such towns are often the context for racial tensions and fertile territory for political parties like the BNP or UKIP. In recent years towns like Grimsby, Hartlepool, Oldham, Dudley, Burnley, and Rotherham have seen UKIP take votes from the Labour party as concerns about immigration reached a peak in around 2015. However, the political impact aside, those towns have too often been unfairly characterised as ‘left behind’: an unfortunate label which too often is shorthand for ‘backward’ or ‘ignorant’.

Residents of all backgrounds in our towns face significant economic challenges. The last 50 years have seen significant and profound changes...
visited upon them. The decline of manufacturing from the 1960s onwards resulted in hundreds of thousands of job losses in industrial towns across Britain. Many of our industrial towns were also the destination of choice for immigrants from the Second World War onwards. So when the decline in manufacturing came it impacted on both immigrant populations and the white British residents of such towns. One example of such a process highlights how this decline in manufacturing impacted on both white British and Pakistani households: the Mirpuri immigration of the 1960s.

A little over 50 years ago the construction of the Mangla Dam in the Mirpur district of Kashmir in Pakistan submerged hundreds of towns and villages, leading to the displacement of thousands of Mirpuris. The British dam constructor provided legal and financial assistance to the displaced, many thousands of whom were granted visas by a British government in need of workers for its textile factories across the north of England. Some made their home in the town of Oldham. The recent male immigrants and white residents of Oldham were both ill-equipped to deal with the decline in manufacturing when it came from the 1960s onwards.

By 2016, Oldham was reportedly the most deprived town in England14. However, it is also one of the towns with highest levels of inequality between its white and non-white population. There is still a disparity between employment, health and education outcomes are worse for Asian residents than they are for white residents. Four in ten residents in Oldham do not have a qualification. Health outcomes are amongst the worst in the country. Both communities have suffered, and while recent political advances by UKIP in the town provide a convenient outlet through which to express anger at this suffering, we believe the story of Oldham is one which requires a community-wide and overwhelming response from central government. Only by such an overwhelming response can towns like Oldham recover.

For while the town of Oldham still struggles to adjust to the realities of the decline of its manufacturing base it is by no means on its own. Towns and communities across ex-industrial Britain have faced similar challenges, and for too long have been left out of economic models which see highly-skilled cities as the only engines of economic growth. Successive governments have appeared to pay lip service to the challenges faced by towns like Oldham, preferring instead to advocate for high-skilled, white collar employment. Underlying the shift from manufacturing to high-skilled employment was an assumption that places were equally capable of making that shift. However, the shift inevitably favoured places with access to skilled workforces and marginalised those with workforces with non-transferable skills in manufacturing. These shifts produced significant geographical patterns in unemployment both for white and non-white residents of our towns.

Little surprise then that the residents of such places view central government and politicians of all parties with suspicion. They have long felt ignored by Westminster, believing that politicians are not interested in ‘people like them’ or the places where they live. This combination of economic decline, high levels of inward immigration and record levels of dissatisfaction with mainstream politics provided a space for populist right-wing parties like the BNP and UKIP to drive a wedge between communities in places like Oldham.

The demise of the BNP, and the slow death of UKIP, are to be celebrated for those of us on the progressive side of the aisle. However, the belief that the anger and disaffection they catalysed has disappeared is a dangerous illusion. Only by meeting the multi-faceted challenges faced by ex-industrial towns across Britain can we hope to head off the next populist right-wing challenge. Failure to do so will condemn us to fighting repeated manifestations of this anger, rather than dealing with the conditions which invoked them.

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The Centre for Towns is an independent non-partisan organisation dedicated to providing research and analysis of our towns. Whilst our cities receive a good deal of attention, we believe that there should be equal attention paid to the viability and prosperity of our towns.
Fear, hope and Loss

HOPE IN ENGLISH AND WELSH TOWNS

There are clear differences in the concentration of the hostile tribes, according to the size, demographics and socio-economic makeup of each conurbation. This section collates our heatmap data with data from the Centre for Towns, which classifies places according to a sense of place; their population size, socioeconomic profile, and history.

Although there is huge variation between places across England and Wales, there are some clear trends in the types of place and attitudes held by people living there. Hostile attitudes are most likely to be held by people in ex-industrial or commuter towns, while the most liberal attitudes are concentrated in inner London, and to a lesser extent in outer London and commuter towns.

Positive figures (strength indicated by blue colouring) indicate a high degree of affiliation with the identity tribe. Negative figures (strength indicated by red colouring) indicate a low level of affiliation with the identity tribe.

The size of a place also has an effect on attitudes. Figure 21 explains the Centre for Towns typology:

Core cities, such as Bristol, Liverpool or Manchester, emerge as the most liberal places, with far higher proportions of people identifying with our two most liberal identity tribes, confident multiculturals and mainstream liberals.

Villages also show a stronger connection with the more liberal tribes, though to a lesser extent than core cities.

Small and medium towns share a similar affiliation with the tribes, showing the highest degree of affiliation with the two most hostile identity tribes, latent hostile and active enmity.

Breaking this down by region offers a more in-depth understanding of how a sense of place feeds different attitudes.

---

**Figure 20**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of place</th>
<th>Confident multiculturals</th>
<th>Mainstream Liberals</th>
<th>Latent hostiles</th>
<th>Active enmity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coastal</td>
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<td>-0.24</td>
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<td>University</td>
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<td>0.06</td>
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**Figure 21**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Villages (less than 5,000)</td>
<td>Places with less than 5,000 residents</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communities (5-10k)</td>
<td>Places with between 5,000 and 10,000 residents</td>
<td>567</td>
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<tr>
<td>Small towns (10k-30k)</td>
<td>Towns between 10,000 and 30,000 residents</td>
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<td>Medium towns (30k – 75k)</td>
<td>Towns with between 30,000 and 75,000 residents</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large towns (over 75k)</td>
<td>Towns with over 75,000 residents</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Core Cities</td>
<td>Core cities as defined by Pike et al (2016)</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
EAST MIDLANDS
Nottingham hosts the region’s greatest proportion of confident multicultural, but in the East Midlands, it is the villages which overall hold the greatest affiliation with the liberal tribes. Although the degree to which they affiliate is much less than core cities in other regions. The reasons for this are complex, but may speak to the concentration of wealth in some of the East Midlands’ villages, which have become desirable for homeowners. Regional inequality in the East Midlands shows the greatest gap outside of London, with high-wealth households 12 times more wealthy than those worse off15.

The East Midlands shows a lean towards the more hostile tribes overall, with the greatest affiliation with the Latent Hostile and Active Enmity tribes found in new towns such as Corby, or in keeping with the rest of the country, ex-industrial towns such as Ollerton. The East Midlands’ small and medium sized towns harbour the greatest affinity to the most hostile tribes, areas such as Bilsthorpe and Sutton Bridge, as a region, the highest scoring in the country outside of the North East.

EAST OF ENGLAND
The East of England hosts no core cities, but the region’s university towns buck the regional trend, leaning more towards the liberal tribes than latent hostile or active enmity. Cambridge and Norwich are among the most liberal places in the country, with strong affiliation to the confident multicultural and mainstream liberal tribes.

Villages in the East of England also show more open attitudes than the region’s towns, with the most hostile attitudes concentrated in the region’s coastal towns, such as Jaywick in Tendring, which has also been named the most deprived area of England16.

NORTH EAST
The North East of England, as a region, shows a closer affiliation to the hostile tribes than to the liberal groups, with the exception of Newcastle upon Tyne, as the area’s core city. In fact, several small areas of Newcastle sit within the top 100 LSOAs identifying with the confident multicultural tribe.

Villages in the North East show no strong affiliation with either the hostile or liberal tribes, however the strongest association to the latent hostile and active enmity tribes in the North East lies in large towns. This contrasts to other regions of England where it is small towns that foster the greatest affinity to the hostile tribes. This could be result of the North East’s relative isolation, geographically far and disconnected from major cities, and also economically isolated: places such as Middlesbrough and South Shields.

NORTH WEST
In the North West, liberal views are most prevalent in the core cities of Manchester and Liverpool, as well as in the region’s villages. Commuter towns in the North West are also more likely to house liberal attitudes.

Medium and large towns are most likely to house hostile perspectives, most often post-industrial places or coastal towns like Ince-in-Makerfield or Bootle, where core industries have been lost.

SOUTH EAST
Of all regions of England and Wales, the South East holds the strongest affiliation to the liberal tribes, as an area saturated with wealth and opportunity, and a more diverse population than the UK’s other regions. While London hosts the greatest proportion of the mainstream liberal and confident multicultural tribes, there is a distinct difference between inner and outer London, with inner London most likely to feel positive and open about modern, diverse Britain. University towns such as Oxford also show the strongest affiliation with the liberal tribes.

Coastal towns emerge as the South East’s outlier, harbouring a lean towards the latent hostile and active enmity tribes. Sheerness, on the Isle of Sheppy for example, is a dockland town which has seen industrial decline; Havant, a post-industrial near-seaside town has lost out on economic renewal which has occurred in nearby areas such as Brighton & Hove.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of place</th>
<th>Confident multicultural</th>
<th>Mainstream Liberals</th>
<th>Latent hostiles</th>
<th>Active enmity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Village</td>
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<td>0.05</td>
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<td>0.23</td>
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<td>Large town</td>
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<td>-0.43</td>
<td>-0.34</td>
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<tr>
<td>Core City</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>-0.43</td>
<td>-0.34</td>
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</table>
SOUTH WEST
In the South West, the core city of Bristol leans most towards the liberal tribes, although as our heatmap data shows, views across different areas of the city cannot be homogenised, with some of the most liberal and most hostile attitudes emerging in the city’s contrasting sides (see page 28).

Large towns in the South West show greater alignment with the ‘middle ground’ tribes, while small and medium towns are most likely to indicate higher proportions of the latent hostile group. Areas like Chard and Bridgewater, market towns which are not typically thought of as post-industrial areas, have seen significant decline and a change in industry from manufacturing to logistics and distribution centres.

WALES
The strongest attitudes emerge in Wales’ post-industrial areas, places like New Tredegar, Mountain Ash, and Aberfan, showing strong associations with the active enmity and latent hostile tribes. These are small ex-mining communities in the valleys and isolated rural regions of Wales which have faced socioeconomic decline with the closure of the region’s pits.

Conversely, Cardiff shows a stronger affiliation to the confident multicultural tribe, a lively city with a large student population.

WEST MIDLANDS
Towns such as Bloxwich, Cosely and Dudley emerge as areas which have struggled to adapt to change, areas with high proportions of residents identifying with the active enmity and latent hostile groups. These Black Country towns have experienced deindustrialisation, the closures of mines, core industry and manufacturing, with ageing populations. The proximity of Birmingham to these areas means that they have seen significant, and sometimes rapid, changes to their populations.

On the whole, commuter towns are more likely to lean towards the liberal tribes, places which draw in younger populations looking for affordable housing to settle in.

YORKSHIRE AND HUMBERSIDE
As with the other regions of England and Wales, towns hold the greatest share of hostile attitudes in Yorkshire and Humberside, most profound in the area’s coastal and post-industrial areas of varying sizes. Small former mill towns such as Mexborough and larger towns like Castleford, where large manufacturers who replaced traditional industry have now moved elsewhere, each tell a different story of loss. Not just of industry, but of the traditional way of life that accompanied this work, and with it, of population.
Core cities, such as Bristol, Liverpool or Manchester, emerge as the most liberal places.

Liverpool waterfront. Photo: Beverley Goodwin from wikimedia
East Marsh, Grimsby

Grimsby sits within the top six places of the UK with the highest level of relative decline shaped by its industrial history, skill levels and national and regional location.

Grimsby was once the fishing capital of the UK. The industry’s decline has left a legacy of high unemployment. A 2011 study labelled Grimsby the worst area in the country for “disengaged youth”, with those not in education, training or employment as high as 25%. Economic restructuring and deindustrialisation have had a massive impact on the town, but the effects are concentrated in certain areas.

East Marsh in Grimsby has emerged as one of the country’s most hostile areas on our heatmap. Life expectancy for people born in East Marsh Estate in Grimsby is 10 years lower than in the rest of town. East Marsh is a working class district, immediately south of the docks, within the top one percent most deprived areas of the UK. In 2011 it was judged the second-most deprived area in England and Wales. Date from 2008 shows that 44% of the children and young people in East Marsh lived in poverty, and at one point one of its streets was the worst in the country for crime. Housing is in poor condition,
and focus groups have shown high levels of insecurity felt by residents, in response to anti-social behaviour and drug abuse in the area, and with the threat of demolition hanging over high-rise flats which Shoreline housing association does not intend to replace. The area is at high risk of flooding, and was almost inundated in the storm surge of 2013.

Figures from the 2011 census estimate that over 40% of the population aged 16 and over in East Marsh has no qualifications. According to the 2001 census, 22% of East Marsh residents of working age stated that they had a long-term illness. According to a report by the Centre for Social Justice (CSJ), 51% of people of working age (16 to 64) in the ward are claiming out-of-work benefits.

Outside perceptions of the area citing these statistics are often crude. The area's poverty made it the setting for Channel 4 documentary Skint, a controversial documentary telling the stories of people living out of employment in the area, out of work following the decline of the fishing industry. A Sacha Baron-Cohen film made millions mocking the town.

Problems on the estate are complex, a community group tells me, and outsider representations of East Marsh have added to a culture of judgement and becomes internalised: “People denigrate the area out of hand... but its only become like that because people have nowhere to go... it creates a permanent record.”

When I ask what hope means to people on the estate, I’m told:

“It’s the same as everywhere, you want a nice house, a nice family, a nice neighbourhood... you just need to know that there’s a buffer between you and abject poverty... there’s not much love out there anymore.”

Life on the estate is challenging. Poverty opens up a growing spiral of issues on the estate. Halfway houses have set up in the area, adding to issues with drug and alcohol dependency. There are properties and businesses boarded up, while cuts have closed community and youth centres. My conversations in Grimsby are tinged with nostalgia, a sense of loss not only for industry, but for a way of life, for the community that once accompanied the fishing industry, for a sense of pride in a community that has lost its core support.

“They took away from Grimsby and they never put anything back... we used to have 3-day millionaires. The fishermen would be away for three weeks then they’d come back loaded and splash out on everything like mad for 3 days... That was all about work. Everything followed from the work.”

In a National Conversation panel in Grimsby, the majority of the panels’ concerns about migration related to this sense of loss: of public resources and housing, of jobs, and of identity:

“They’re [migrants are] just coming in and taking our resources. I’ve got to wait until I’m 67 instead of retiring at 60 now to get my pension... so where is my, after working all my life, my little bit of life?”

Grimsby’s poverty, loss of status, poor transport connectivity and largely white British population suggest ‘closed’ communities that struggle to adapt to change and absorb newcomers. A view that things are working better elsewhere, for other people, for migrants, offers a direction for broader resentment.

While there is redevelopment funding available, and there have been efforts to invest in the estate, I’m told that authorities often don’t know where to begin: “Doing it to us, it needs to be doing it for us.” East Marsh United is a community group set up to do just that, to change life on the estate from within. They have been working to pull people together for positive action, cleaning up the estate and throwing community days, investing in lifting the community up.

But tackling problems in East Marsh also needs action at a national scale to address economic inequalities. It is no coincidence that East Marsh is flagged as the most hostile area of the country, while the area surrounding St John’s College in Cambridge emerges as the most liberal. People need decent housing, stable work, social care and support, community facilities, investment in local infrastructure, education, and healthcare. They need to feel hope.
IN JULY 2018, we commissioned a YouGov poll of over 10,000 people. This data was then modelled onto constituencies and to demographic data, to better understand different individual and environmental drivers.

At a constituency level, this data is less detailed than our heatmap and towns data, but it shows some clear trends in drivers of social attitudes.

IMMIGRATION

Using our YouGov polls of over 10,000 people, we have mapped responses to what people consider the three most important issues facing them and their families at this time.

Overall, the most important issues emerged as health (41.5%), Britain leaving the EU (38.2%) and the economy (29%). Immigration and asylum was seen as one of the top three most important issues by 17.8% of people across the UK overall, crime by 16.5%, pensions by 17.9% and education by 12.2%. However the spread of these issues does not map consistently across the country.

Looking at where immigration is seen to be an issue correlates with our lower super output area heatmap data.

There are clear rings around the core cities and university towns, where immigration is seen to be much less of a priority issue than in neighbouring towns, particularly coastal towns and ex-industrial communities.

In Castle Point, a coastal constituency to the east of London, 28.6% of people listed immigration as one of their most important issues, compared to just 10.8% of people in the inner London constituency of Bermondsey and Old Southwark.

It is not necessarily that these places have experienced more immigration: Castle Point has a population that at the last census was 95% white British whereas Southwark council’s 2015 estimates state that 48% of the population identify as BAME. But the salience of immigration is greater in those constituencies that also voted more strongly to leave the EU in 2016. Castle Point voted 72.2% to leave the EU, while 72.3% of people in Bermondsey and Old Southwark voted to remain in the EU.

As our heatmap shows, liberal attitudes are most concentrated in areas where diversity is a normal part of everyday life and is not a new phenomenon; where the population tends to be better educated and younger, and where there is greater opportunity.
Figure 24 shows the distribution of views in the five seats that voted most strongly to Leave the EU, and five of the seats that voted to Remain in the EU.

It is clear from this data that there are strong anxieties about immigration in areas that voted most strongly to leave the EU. Almost 80% of people who live in the Hackney North & Stoke Newington constituency in London believe that immigration has been good for Britain. In Boston & Skegness, 62.2% of people believe immigration has been bad for Britain.

These places also vary in their demographics, economic situation, size, and migration histories. Areas with the greatest concern about immigration also tend to have older populations, are areas of towns and villages rather than core cities, who are most confident about diversity.

ATTITUDES TO MUSLIMS: A HALO EFFECT

We also asked people a series of questions about popular conspiracies: whether humans are the primary source for global warming, whether the BBC distorts its news to fit a left-wing agenda, if Jews have control over the UK’s banking system, and whether there are ‘no go areas’ in the UK where sharia law dominates and non-Muslims cannot enter.

The responses to our ‘no-go zone’ question were shocking. Overall, 32% of people told us that this was true, compared to 31% of people who thought it was false.

Again, the distribution of these responses was uneven across the country. Core cities tended to reject these claims, while this was most likely to be seen as true in the surrounding areas, especially in more isolated coastal areas and ex-industrial towns. These are also areas where Muslim populations are smaller, so people are less likely to know Muslims.
Our maps also reveal a ‘halo effect’ around areas, specifically cities, where more liberal attitudes are held in areas where there are large Muslim populations, in stark contrast to more hostile attitudes which prevail in the surrounding areas.

This is evident looking at the West Midlands. Birmingham’s Muslim population makes up around 20% of the overall population: 35.2% of the Ladywood constituency and 46.6% of the Hall Green constituency populations are Muslim. In nearby North Warwickshire, just 0.2% of the population are Muslim. But people in North Warwickshire were 26% more likely to believe that there are ‘no go zones’ than people in Ladywood, and 23.9% more likely than those in Hall Green.

This ‘halo effect’ is something we also found in the National Conversation on Immigration. People in towns with predominantly white British populations often constructed their views from media and peer group discussions, but anxieties were further engrained by visits to nearby diverse cities, where they witnessed super diversity but did not have meaningful contact with people different to themselves.

For example, in Kidderminster interactions with preachers when visiting Birmingham were the only interactions many panel members had with Muslims and when twinned with stories in media and on social media of events such as the ‘Trojan horse schools’, the citizens’ panel had some anxieties about security which they linked directly to integration challenges for the Muslim community.

Proximity of non-diverse areas to large Muslim communities can be considered a factor in propensity to hostile views. Where non-Muslims live, work and socialise with Muslims, these interactions are likely to reduce prejudice. But people witness rather than experience super diversity, existing prejudices can be reinforced.
UNDERSTANDING WHERE FEAR, hate and resentment become manifest through political representation is complicated. Attitudes are indicative, but not definitive in predicting election results, as turnout, political loyalties, tactical voting and judgements of individual candidates all factor into decision making at the ballot box.

However, looking at key elections where far-right and right-wing parties in the UK have gained electoral success, the British National Party’s (BNP) gains in the 2009 European elections, and UKIP’s success in the 2014 local elections, offer some understanding of factors driving political right wing support.

The 2009 European Elections marked a peak of support in the electoral trajectory of the BNP. The party won 943,598 votes and gained two seats in the European Parliament. Figures 26 and 27 below lists the local authorities with the greatest share of this vote, and which saw the largest increase in BNP votes between 2004 and 2009.

Each one of these places tells a different story, but many of them share a similar socio-economic context. All are post-industrial areas, most with high rates of unemployment. While car part production continues in Dagenham, it employs a fraction of those who once manned the assembly lines. Stoke on Trent has seen the decline of its pottery industry. Thurrock has experienced the loss of work in the quarries and chalk pits, at Fords car plant, and on the docks. Amber Valley and Wakefield saw their largest employers shut down with the closure of mines in the 1980s.

### Figure 26

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Top 20 LAs by BNP vote (%)</th>
<th>2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Barking/Dagenham</td>
<td>19.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stoke-on-Trent</td>
<td>17.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thurrock</td>
<td>17.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barnsley</td>
<td>16.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rotherham</td>
<td>15.31</td>
</tr>
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<td>Havering</td>
<td>14.77</td>
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<tr>
<td>Burnley</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>NW Leicestershire</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bolsover</td>
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<td>Ashfield</td>
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<td>Wakefield</td>
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<td>Nuneaton/Bedworth</td>
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<td>South Tyneside</td>
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<td>Sandwell</td>
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<td>Bexley</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pendle</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hyndburn</td>
<td>12.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wigan</td>
<td>11.79</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: House of Commons Research paper 09/53

### Figure 27

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Top 20 LAs by increase in vote(%)</th>
<th>2004-09</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Barnsley</td>
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<td>Thurrock</td>
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<td>South Tyneside</td>
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<td>N W Leicestershire</td>
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<td>Rotherham</td>
<td>6.12</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nuneaton/ Bedworth</td>
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<td>Bolsover</td>
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<td>Havering</td>
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<td>Melton</td>
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<td>Amber Valley</td>
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<tr>
<td>Barking &amp; Dagenham</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bexley</td>
<td>4.51</td>
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<tr>
<td>St. Helens</td>
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<td>Hartlepool</td>
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<td>Durham</td>
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<td>Allerdale</td>
<td>3.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swale</td>
<td>3.71</td>
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</table>

Source: House of Commons Research paper 09/53
The Centre for Cities\textsuperscript{29} has found that between 1911 and 2013 the number of jobs in Burnley more than halved, while Wigan saw a 25% reduction.

Eight of these areas where the BNP gained some of its highest proportion of votes or gained the greatest increase in votes sit within the 20 local authorities ranked as the most deprived local authorities on EDI\textsuperscript{30} between 1999-2009: Sandwell, Knowsley, Barking and Dagenham, Stoke-on-Trent, Hartlepool, South Tyneside, Burnley and Barnsley.

Many of the areas where the BNP succeeded are also all places that also experienced rapid immigration, where the population has historically been homogeneously white British, resulting in community tensions: for example, the outer London boroughs of Havering and Barking and Dagenham. University of Manchester research from 2007 also found that many of these places were among those that had significant residential segregation, with Burnley among the 35 areas of the UK with at least one ‘minority white’ ward\textsuperscript{31}. The proximity of some of these other areas to large minority, and specifically Muslim, populations fed hostile attitudes.

However, the other most deprived areas by EDI are all core cities (Manchester, Birmingham and Liverpool) and diverse London boroughs, with the exception of Rochdale, Middlesbrough, Blackpool.

### WHY CHARNWOOD AND MELTON?

Among the BNP’s success areas, two anomalies emerge: Charnwood and Melton, both in Leicestershire. Both are among the least 100 deprived local authorities by EDI in England, so while they are not the most affluent areas, they do sit in contrast to other places where the BNP gained a high increase in their vote between 2004-9.

Both have above average white British populations, areas on the outskirts of Leicester, a diverse city where according to the 2011 census, the white population was just 50.6% and the foreign born population stood at 33.6%. Some places, such as the village of East Goscote in Charnwood where the BNP held an elected county councillor until 2018, have a white British population of over 95% according to the 2011 census. The proximity of these traditional English, village communities to a super-diverse city may have played into support for the BNP among the older white British population with greater cultural anxiety.
and Wolverhampton. These city areas which showed active resistance to the politics of the BNP, areas with longstanding diverse populations, where people of different backgrounds are more likely to mix, and where growing diversity was not new. These are also all areas with opportunity, as core urban centres that have not lost industry or employment in the same way. Deprivation is not a determinant for hostile attitudes or far right support, but it is one ingredient that can be activated when combined with other factors.

In 2014’s local elections UKIP won 161 council seats and took 27.5% of the vote in the European elections, in what Nigel Farage termed a “political earthquake” which had shaken the country’s political establishment.

It is notable that UKIP struggled to get a foothold in London or the core cities. UKIP struggled in areas like Barking and Dagenham that had once been core areas for the BNP, but where the population had rapidly become more diverse, offsetting some of this support. Senior UKIP politician Neil Hamilton claimed London was “difficult territory” for UKIP because it was so “cosmopolitan” while his colleague Suzanne Evans, on BBC Radio 4’s Today programme, said that the party had some difficulty appealing to Londoners because they tended to be “cultural, educated, and young”.

Looking at the council seats won by UKIP in 2014, it is clear that just like the BNP, it capitalised on discontent in areas where both economic activity and local government services had declined. Hyndburn, Rotherham, Newcastle-under-Lyme, Thurrock, Derby, New Waltham were all post-industrial areas where there were pockets of high-level deprivation.

Moreover, these were areas with significant community tensions, which the party exploited with its anti-immigration message. UKIP won 10 seats in Rotherham, following community tensions sparked by the child abuse scandal in which 1,400 children were sexually exploited from 1997 to 2013 by predominantly British-Pakistani men. Ramsey in the Fenlands is an area that has seen some of the most rapid immigration in the UK, with the foreign-born population in the region growing by 70% between 2001 and 2011. Large numbers of EU migrants have moved to predominantly white British communities that had previously seen little demographic change, for work in the agri-manufacturing industry, leading to some tensions around integration.

UKIP also had huge success in the 2014 European elections, taking first place nationally with 27.5% of the vote, the first time in modern history that neither Labour nor the Conservatives had won a British national election.

The next two pages display the 2014 European elections by local authority, and our lower super output area data mapped to local authority units. Both maps share trends: the strongest UKIP vote came from Lincolnshire, which has seen rapid EU migration. The docklands area of the South East, the corridor running through Yorkshire and Humberside from Kings Lynn through to Wakefield, and the towns that line the North East coast emerge as the areas most affiliated to the Active Enmity tribe, and took held some of the highest vote share for UKIP in the 2014 European elections.

These are areas where there are areas of prosperity alongside deprivation, but they are also areas that have experiences the decline of core industry, which are often geographically isolated, and where economic growth has slowed while populations age.

Deprivation offers fertile ground for the political right to take root, but this political threat is only triggered when there are other elements at play. Deprivation in diverse cities rarely results in far-right support at the ballot box. But opportunity also offers a foundation for resilience, so that when other elements that could trigger fear and hate come into play, the political right fails to make ground.

**ONLINE ACTIVISM**

The demise of the political far right in the UK does not mean the threat has been eliminated, as we have witnessed a growth of online activism headed by international far-right figureheads such as Paul Joseph Watson and Stephen Lennon (‘Tommy Robinson’).

On the 25 May 2018, Lennon live-streamed outside a courthouse in Leeds, confronting defendants in a trial while shouting insults. He was arrested and pled guilty to contempt of court, receiving a 10-month sentence and activating a three-month suspended sentence he had received for a similar charge in Canterbury in 2017 (he was subsequently released on appeal and faces a rehearing for the Leeds charge on 27 September 2018).

Lennon’s imprisonment sparked a campaign on social media under the hashtag #FreeTommy, which soon also sparked street demonstrations in the UK and abroad. The support for the campaign quickly gained a scope far beyond what Lennon had previously been able to muster. This level of support is especially noteworthy given Lennon’s extremity, as the former leader of the English Defence League (EDL), a violent and anti-Muslim street gang with a history of outspoken anti-Muslim hatred.

After his arrest, Lennon was portrayed as a martyr and received an outpouring of support on social media as well as considerable attention from mainstream media outlets. The Twitter campaign trended in many locations around the world, amplified by large far-right Twitter accounts such
Figure 29: UKIP vote (%) 2014 European Elections in England and Wales
Figure 30: Affinity to the Active Enmity tribe by local authority
as Rebel Media’s ‘reporter’ Katie Hopkins and former Breitbart London editor Raheem Kassam. Millions of posts were published on Twitter mentioning Lennon/Robinson in the days after his arrest and several petitions were created calling for his release. However, the attention has clearly reached far outside of the murky far-right corners of the internet.

In a poll commissioned by HOPE not hate in July 2018 of 10,383 people, 13% said it was wrong to imprison Lennon and 43% claimed to not know enough to answer the question. In regards to a far-right, anti-Muslim activist, with a background in a violent street gang, these are significant numbers.

Several rallies were also organised in support of Lennon. The largest one, on 9 June, attracted as many as 10,000 people onto the streets of Westminster, making it over double the size of any demonstration held by the EDL.

However, it’s online where the scale of support has been the greatest. Several petitions were created calling for his release. Approximately two-thirds of the signatures originated from the UK. One racked up over 630,000 signatures, an indication of the intensity of the movement. The signatures and related data, which contain geographical information, provide some important insights into the movement around Lennon. This analysis is based on data from the two largest petitions on Change.org in support of Lennon.

This map, showing the number of petition signatures relative to population size, shows similar patterns to our heatmap, with rings of support concentrated around the fringes of core cities. This map indicates very few petition signatures from London, with most coming from around the dockland areas of Tilbury and Canvey Island. They also indicate that there was less pickup of the petition in better-off areas, such as Oxfordshire or Berkshire.

This evidence functions quite differently from our constituency, town and lower super output area data, as it is based on place markers which are self-selected. This means that cities are over-represented in individual responses, but the trends tell a similar story about the environmental drivers of hate.

Among the 20 areas with the proportionally greatest numbers of signatures in support of Tommy are places where the political right and far right have historically succeeded, and where our heatmaps indicate high alignment to the active enmity and latent hostile tribes: Sunderland, Scarborough, Blackpool, Grimsby, Thurrock, Newcastle-under-Lyme, Havering, Preston, Lincoln and Cannock Chase.

The majority of these are post-industrial or coastal towns, places that have seen significant decline and long-term issues with unemployment and deprivation. They are on the whole not diverse places, and with the exception of Preston, not areas with any significant Muslim population, despite the overt and sometimes violent Islamophobia in comments attached to the petition signatures. They are areas where broader resentments have found expression through far-right narratives.

Political manifestations of hostile attitudes may have moved from the ballot box to Change.org, from local representatives to global figures, but the environmental drivers of hostile attitudes clearly still charge these sentiments and their political mobilisation.
Figure 32: concentration of #FreeTommy petition signatures: UK
THE FACTORS that influence social attitudes are hugely individualistic, but the data presented in this report would suggest that environmental factors also have a role to play. While aspects such as income deprivation or poor health are not in any way deterministic in predicting social values, there are clearly relations between the difficulties people face in their own lives, and an expression of these struggles through hate of others.

Our data consistently suggests that where opportunities are greater, and where people feel more in control of their own lives, and optimistic about their successes, these communities become more resilient to hateful narratives and to political manifestations of this hatred.

The data suggests that resentment towards ethnic minorities, migrants and Muslims is often part and parcel of broader resentments in people’s lives, a sense of unfairness, and of something that has been lost or taken away. Issues are often merged in their articulation.

Figures 33 to 36 show the relationship between affinity to both the active enmity and latent hostile tribes and measures of deprivation for each lower super output area in England.

Despite broad trends that show the more deprived an area in terms of income, employment or education, the more likely people living there are to hold hostile attitudes, this data suggests that these various measures of deprivation do not, in themselves, predict hostile attitudes. A propensity to fear, hate and to support for the far right depends on a combination of many factors: individual circumstances, demographics, broader worldview, information absorbed, trust in authorities, contact with people of different backgrounds, proximity to concentrated minority communities, among hundreds of other factors.

However, looking at the concentration of areas at either end of the spectrum, most and least hostile, the areas where the strongest attitudes are prevalent lie among the most and least deprived areas of the country. This is particularly true in terms of education, training and skills deprivation and employment deprivation. These are factors which offer opportunity to people; they offer hope. Where opportunity is lacking, the ground becomes more fertile for hostility to grow, and for broader anxieties about the unfairness or loss people perceive and experience in their own lives to become manifest as hate.
Resilience and Hope

This report has raised the importance of an ecological model in understanding what drives hate, and what offers a buffer against divisive narratives.

Perhaps unsurprising, but the dearth of active hostility in Britain’s diverse and cosmopolitan core cities, and the proximity of universities to all of the most confidently multicultural areas in the country, offers an understanding of resilience and of hope.

Hate does not emerge in isolation, but is triggered by other factors. As our political analysis on pages 41-47 shows, where there are localised community tensions, these trigger manifestations of hostile attitudes when there is already an environment in which hate can thrive.

There were cases of child sexual exploitation committed by predominantly men of British Pakistani ethnicity in both Rotherham and Oxford. But while in Oxford anger about this issue did not charge a far-right surge, the same cannot be said about Rotherham. Oxford is more diverse than Rotherham, with a BAME population of 22% compared to 14.4% in Rotherham (according to the 2011 census). Rotherham is a town with an old age dependency ratio above the UK average, while Oxford’s is far below.

The towns also have very different histories and socio-economic profiles. Oxford is home to one of the world’s most prestigious universities, while Rotherham is an ex-industrial town where the decline of coal mining and steel production has seen pockets of deprivation grow across the area. Oxford has a broad economic base, and
while there are significant inequalities in the town, most work is highly skilled and highly paid. Tourism and the university bring in additional revenue in what is considered a ‘fast growth city’\(^3\). The far right had far more success tapping into public anger about grooming in Rotherham than in Oxford, where economic prosperity and comfortable diversity offered resilience to these narratives.

Our research has consistently shown that where people are more likely to feel in control of their own lives, they are more likely to show resistance to hostile narratives, and are more likely to share a positive vision of diversity and multiculturalism in Britain. The environment around us affects how much we can feel in control of our own lives. Concerns about immigration and multiculturalism do not stand in isolation from a sense of injustice or loss in how people see their own lives, for which migrants and minorities are often blamed. Where there are opportunities we can access, we are more likely to feel like we have power over our own successes. Where there are not the same opportunities, where there is a perception of unfairness, that external forces control your destiny, people are more likely to share hostile attitudes.

Hope, an optimism based on an expectation of positive outcomes in our personal circumstances, is the best resilience to hate. What gives us hope means many different things to different people, but as this report suggests, hope has an economic element. As someone on East Marsh told me, hope is knowing “there’s a buffer between you and abject poverty.” While this may not seem to be asking for much, this is not a hope that exists everywhere.

Challenging hate means ensuring that people can hope. Hate is driven by a complex matrix of things, but the data presented in this report suggests that economic factors, which offer a foundation, are undeniable.

If economic inequality continues to be a central driver of negative attitudes towards others, no amount of alternative narratives, community work to build resilience or integration initiatives will be able to counter the tensions and fears exposed in our polling unless we also take economic inequality seriously.
THE CHALLENGE FOR LABOUR

UNDERSTANDING THE socioeconomic environment as a driver of social attitudes, our heatmap data throws a challenge to Labour.

The 2017 election saw a swing in traditional voting patterns, as Labour’s strongest performance took hold in core cities, university towns, and among a demographic of younger, university educated city dwellers. Meanwhile, the Conservatives saw gains in post-industrial areas. While Labour celebrated gains in Kensington and Canterbury, the Conservatives gained Mansfield, East Cleveland and Middlesbrough South. Many of the areas that swung in the Conservatives’ favour had previously moved from Labour to UKIP.

The collapse of UKIP left behind a key political target, particularly in Labour’s traditional heartlands. Typically swing voters driven by economic insecurity, Farage’s party had tapped into a sense, particularly in the North, that Labour was no longer representative of working class communities but part of the establishment, metropolitan and London-centric. Our 2017 Fear and HOPE survey found that just seven percent (7%) of this group turned to Labour in 2017. Fifteen percent (15%) of people who voted UKIP in 2015 stayed with the party in 2017, half (49%) unenthusiastically defected to the Conservatives who they saw as the ‘Brexit party’, and 24% did not vote at all.

Our 2017 Fear and HOPE also found core differences in the values of Corbyn supporters and 2015 UKIP voters. While many 2015 UKIP voters would have economically and socially benefited from a Corbyn-led Government, on political and cultural issues the two sets of supporters were miles apart.

Combining our heatmap data with political control of local authorities, the challenges Labour faces moving forward are all the more stark.

Figure 38 shows the political representation of council wards in England overall, and by the 500 lower super output areas most closely aligned to each of the identity tribes: Confident Multicultural, Mainstream Liberal, Latent Hostile and Active Enmity.

What is most striking from these charts is the similarity in political representation at a ward level in the localities with the highest affiliation to the most liberal tribes, and those with greatest affiliation to the most hostile tribes.

Figure 37: Fear and HOPE 2017: Key attitudinal views of Corbyn supporters and 2015 UKIP voters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corbyn supporters</th>
<th>2015 UKIP voters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Opportunities in this country are limited to too few people</td>
<td>We should not be spending 0.7% of gross national income on Foreign Aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In a civilised society people’s obligations to pay their taxes is more important</td>
<td>It is important for a country to protect its own interests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The time for austerity is over</td>
<td>Immigration has on balance made this country worse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The NHS urgently needs more funding</td>
<td>Government benefits are too readily available to people who have never contributed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public sector pay cap at 1% should be lifted</td>
<td>The best guarantee of your rights and freedoms are the history and traditions of the country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulations is often necessary to protect workers, consumers and the public</td>
<td>I favour more jail time for criminals</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Overall Council ward representation by Lower super output area: England

Council ward representation in the 500 areas most aligned to the confident multicultural tribe

Council ward representation in the 500 areas most aligned to the latent hostile tribe

Council ward representation in the 500 areas most aligned to the mainstream liberal tribe

Council ward representation in the 500 areas most aligned to the active enmity tribe

Figure 38

*Political representation correct as of 10th April 2018, with thanks to Open Data Manchester*34
The most hostile areas are predominantly in Labour’s traditional heartlands, working class communities mostly in the North and Midlands, places like Dudley, Barnsley and Rotherham: 86% of the areas most reflecting the active enmity tribe, and 72% of the areas most reflecting the latent hostile tribe are in wards represented by Labour.

But 63% of the areas identifying most strongly with the confident multicultural tribe are also in Labour-represented wards, places like Manchester, London and Nottingham.

The disproportionate share of political representation by Labour in the most liberal areas of the country, as well as the most hostile areas of the country shows the difficult bridge the Labour party must make if it is to hold on to its growing liberal, educated and tolerant base while appealing to its traditional, more socially conservative, working class supporters.

Moreover, as the party has shifted its focus to this new and growing liberal group, the loss of its heartlands poses even more of a threat.

As this report has highlighted, the shift in optimism and pessimism since the EU referendum poses a political threat from a new far right organisation. The revived optimism among leave voters, among the most hostile tribes, and in these areas currently represented by Labour, indicates political fragility. For those who feel a new optimism for their future, that Brexit will bring the change needed for their communities and families to thrive, an economic crash could be detrimental to their political support.

All economic projections suggest that the negative impacts of Brexit will fall on those who have been economically hit hardest during the last 20 years, the same people who feel a revived optimism. This will most likely lead to even greater broken trust with the political system. Moreover, our research, including this heatmap, shows that hate flourishes when times are hard, as economic resentments feed anxieties underlined by pre-existing prejudice.

It would seem an impossible circle to square for Labour, who must speak to both the confident multiculturals and active enmities, at opposite ends of almost every spectrum. But the risk of ignoring Labour’s traditional base in favour of younger, liberal city dwellers also risks leaving the door wide open to the populist right, who are able to exploit fears and genuine problems.
Fear, hope and Loss starkly lays out how long term economic inequality has harmed communities, through deprivation where opportunities are scarce, but also where this fuels hostility. Where it is hardest to have hope, fear and hate take its place.

This report makes explicit a case for economic renewal, to eradicate the inequalities that plague our post-industrial and coastal towns. We also make a case to Labour, to re-engage with their heartlands, and to rebuild trust in a party that many feel abandoned by.

Intervention and action will require engagement, and will require serious structural, political and financial commitment to re-set the status quo of winners and losers in the UK.

While Fear, HOPE and loss does not make any specific policy recommendations, it sets the stage for us to move forward.

This is a primer for HOPE not hate's future work. In the coming months and years, we will focus on addressing the drivers of hate, and to ensure everyone can hope; from our research and data work, through to how we engage with communities on the ground.
NOTES

8. https://www.dianajohnson.co.uk/content/hull-mp-raises-orchard-park-moped-%E2%80%98yob-culture%E2%80%99-commons
15. https://www.resolutionfoundation.org/media/blog/regional-wealth-inequality-a-nation-divided/
19. https://www.lrb.co.uk/v37/n08/james-mEEK/why-are-you-still-here
21. https://www.lrb.co.uk/v37/n08/james-mEEK/why-are-you-still-here
25. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/apr/01/grimsby-channel-4-skint-documentary-benefits-street
30. The Economic Deprivation Index (EDI) is a measure of deprivation which is produced at Lower Layer Super Output Area (LSOA) level and is made up of two domains: income and Employment.
32. https://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/briefings/east-of-england-census-profile/
34. Open Data Manchester, available http://www.opendatamanchester.org.uk/?p=878

ADDITIONAL REFERENCES

This report combines data from a number of different polls, focus groups and open access data.

**FEAR AND HOPE**

Populus, who undertook our Fear and HOPE research based the segmentation on a subset of both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ questions, covered the following key issues:

- Attitudes and exposure to race, multiculturalism, immigration, religious minorities and their impact on the British communities
- Participants’ perceptions of their own racial, religious and cultural identities
- Perceptions of what makes somebody British
- A segmentation was created from these using Latent Class Analysis
- A form of Latent Class Analysis called “Dfactor Modelling” was used:
  - Exploratory Technique
    - Involves the creation of four factors (known as Dfactors) which summarise the responses across questions
    - The factors can be thought of as four different cuts of the data
    - Each factor cuts the data into two groups: those Low on a dimension AND those High on the same dimension
    - Populus then interpreted the dimension by profiling each factor
    - The four factors emerge in such a way that in combination they maximise our ability to explain different response patterns across the underlying questions
    - On this basis Populus had four dimensions upon which to create a segmentation

**FEAR AND HOPE 2011**

Populus interviewed a random sample of 5,054 adults aged 18+ online between 28th January 2011 and 31st January 2011. Interviews were conducted across England and the results have been weighted to be representative of all adults.

**FEAR AND HOPE FEBRUARY 2016**

Populus interviewed 4015 adults aged 18+ between 1st February 2016 and 9th February 2016 representative by age, gender, social grade and ethnicity. The sample was segmented using the same variables as 2011. These relate to attitudes and exposure to race, multiculturalism, immigration and religious minorities. This means that the 2016 analysis and 2011 segmentation is comparable. Where the results do not sum to 100, this is due to rounding or the inclusion of multi-select answer options.

**FEAR AND HOPE JULY 2016**

In the week after the Referendum, the polling organisation Populus asked 4,035 people in England a total of 84 questions about their attitudes to race, identity, multiculturalism and their thoughts on the EU Referendum itself.

**FEAR AND HOPE: LSOA HEATMAPS**

These segments were then modelled by Populus onto Lower Super Output Areas (LSOAs), designated geographic areas with an average population of 1,600, using data from our February 2016 Fear and HOPE poll. The degree to which each LSOA identified with each tribe provides a heatmap, from which we can identify to see national trends as well as localised patterns across the country.

**YOUgov RESEARCH**

**January 2018: Britain Divided poll**

Our exclusive YouGov poll of over 5,000 people, carried out in late January 2018, revisits many of the questions we’ve asked during our Fear and HOPE surveys – examining race, faith and identity – since 2011, and also poses some new ones.

**June–July 2018**

Between 28 June and 6 July and 26 and 31 July, YouGov polled 15,340 people on behalf of HOPE not hate and Best for Britain with a range of questions about Brexit and other political and cultural issues.
FOCALDATA

Our constituency estimates were compiled by Focaldata using our June-July 2018 YouGov poll, using a statistical method called multi-level regression with poststratification (MRP).

MRP has two main elements. The first is to use a survey to build a multi-level regression model that predicts opinion (or any quantity of interest) from certain variables, normally demographics. The second is to weight (post-stratify) your results by the relevant population frequency, to get population level (or constituency level) estimates.

At the end of this process you get more accurate, more granular (thus more actionable) estimates of public opinion than traditional polling. There are however significant technical challenges to implementing it effectively. These include large data requirements, dedicated cloud computing resources, and an understanding of Bayesian statistics.

CHANGE.ORG DATA

The data used in the following analysis was scraped from two Change.org petitions in support of Tommy Robinson on 28 August 2018 and includes those signatures which the user chose to make public. The self-selected city of each signature was then mapped to local authority units in England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, and in turn weighted according to population size.

THE NATIONAL CONVERSATION ON IMMIGRATION

The National Conversation on Immigration, run by HOPE not hate and British Future, is the largest-ever public consultation on immigration and integration.

The National Conversation had three main components:

- 60 visits to towns and cities across the UK, chosen to offer a mix of places with different experiences of migration, as well as political and geographic variety.
- An online survey, hosted on our website, completed by 9,327 people over an 18-month period.
- A nationally representative poll of 3,667 UK adults undertaken in June 2018 by ICM.

In each location we ran a citizens’ panel made up of members of the public, recruited to be representative of the local area. Basing our conversation on a discussion guide, the citizens’ panels discussed the approach that they would like to see the Government take to different types of migration. They were also asked their views about integration. Crucially, participants considered what would need to change in order for the Government to get their support for its handling of immigration. In a separate meeting in each location we met with local stakeholders, including councils, business groups and civil society organisations.

We were given the opportunity to work alongside the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, which undertook its own inquiry on the future direction of immigration policy. Our findings were given as evidence to the Home Affairs Committee Inquiry on building consensus on immigration policy, and informed the Committee’s recommendations.
HOPE not hate exists to provide a positive antidote to the politics of hate.
We combine first class research with community organising and grassroots actions to
defeat hate groups and to build community resilience against extremism.

Hate is often the consequence of a loss of hope and an articulation of despair,
but given an alternative, especially one that understands and addresses their anger,
most people will choose HOPE over hate. Our job is to expose and undermine
groups that preach hate, intolerance and division whilst uniting communities
around what they have in common.

We aim to take a part in building a society that celebrates
rather than scapegoats our differences.

To visit the Fear and HOPE website:
www.fearandhope.org.uk

To learn more about HOPE not hate:
http://charity.hopenothate.org.uk/