• On the whole attitudes toward Islam and Muslims in Western society have improved, as general race relations have improved.
• But over the last 30 years, Muslims have also become seen as a distinct group, apart from wider society.
• The effects of terror attacks and assimilationist rhetoric that distinguishes Muslims as a culturally-distinct outgroup, have hardened hostile attitudes among those already predisposed to prejudice.
• The impacts of anti-Muslim media, politicians, groups and activists, and their high profile statements resonate with these people and may lead to more polarised and possibly even violent responses in the long run.
There has been a Muslim presence in Western Europe since the religion’s inception[i] and Muslims have been an integral part of some European societies for generations and centuries. America, too, has had a Muslim presence since the nation’s founding.
Attitudes towards Islam and Muslims have changed considerably over time as the Muslim population in the West has grown rapidly. Since the mid-19th century, Muslims from European colonies in Africa and Asia began moving into the continent alongside refugees. These migration flows then grew exponentially following the end of the Second World War as Northern and Western Europe began importing labour for its growing post-war industries.
Across Europe and America, Muslim communities have long been politically and culturally marginalised, and have faced multiple intersecting barriers to socioeconomic advancement. This systematic oppression remains within a racialised social structure, but as a religious group Muslims have been increasingly targeted.
While on the whole acceptance of Muslims in the public sphere has been normalised by an increasingly established population, explicitly anti-Muslim attitudes and behaviours have taken root in tandem[ii]. In Europe, the Muslim population reached about 30 million by 1990[iii] and in Britain alone, the Muslim population had reached a million by the late 1980s. In the United States, the Muslim population was relatively small, at around 2 million in 1990[iv].
The 1990s saw increasing hostility specifically aimed towards Muslims, and the term “Islamophobia” was coined at this time. The Runnymede Trust launched the UK’s Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia in 1997 in response to growing concerns[v]. Muslims began to be seen as a distinct group, formerly subsumed under the category ‘Asian’ International ‘crisis’ moments, alongside increasing visibility of Muslim communities in the West, pushed Islam to the forefront in media coverage and political discourse.
Events such as the Rushdie affair, the Gulf Wars, the Iraq War and subsequent occupation, controversies over cartoons, veils and Islamic schools have subsequently all had an effect on public attitudes towards Muslims.
Public knowledge of Islam in the West was patchy in the early 1990s, as many had little contact with Muslims, but according to a Gallup poll from 1990[vi], 17% of Brits exhibited a prejudice against having Muslim neighbours, more so than Hindus or Jews, but less than drug addicts or left-wing extremists. The world rate at this time, according to the same survey, was 21% with the highest rates of prejudice found in Czechoslovakia at 49%, and Bulgaria at 41%, with the USA hosting one of the lower rates of prejudice at 14%.
By 1993, prejudice towards Muslims in the UK was not vastly distinct from wider racial prejudice against Asians, as 25% of white British people surveyed admitted to being biased against Muslims, 1% less than against Asians and 5% more than for Caribbeans[vii]. But relations appeared to be improving, as the number of Muslims in Europe increased by about 14.5 million between 1990 and 2010 and in North America were estimated to grow by around 90% over the same period[viii]. This has led to a better public understanding of Muslim cultures and practice and increased contact between Muslims and non-Muslims.
By 1996, only 6% of white people in the UK were biased against Muslims, the same as for Hindus but twice the figure for Jews[ix]. The European values study indicates an overall decrease in anxieties about Muslims during this period, looking at intolerance to neighbours. Around 17% of those asked between 1990-1993 indicated intolerance, falling to 13% in the period between 1999-2001[x].
Yet it is clear that animosity based on a perceived division between ‘the West’ and ‘the Muslim world’ have intensified. The last 30 years has seen a rise in anti-Muslim hate crime; a rise in populist anti-Muslim political parties; controversies, often violent, over mosque constructions; the ban on face-covering veils in public places in France, and on the building of new minarets in Switzerland.
Added to this are Trump’s proposed ‘Muslim travel ban’ in the US and similar discussions reflected across Europe, in the UK, Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, Austria and Denmark.
The broader environment has a considerable impact on the way in which minority groups are seen.
Attitudes towards Islam and Muslims vary considerably between countries, and comparing countries, it is possible to see the impact of national culture on how Islam and Muslims are seen. Factors such as size and history of Muslim populations, overall rates of cultural and economic xenophobia and national culture all contribute to public attitudes. Each country has a different history.
In Europe attitudes towards Muslims and Islam have been increasingly influenced by fears of Islamist extremism and violence. The events of 9/11 are considered by many to be a pivotal moment which has shaped contemporary attitudes to Muslims, which triggered an enduring rise in associations of Islam and Muslims with violence and extremism internationally[xi]. Conscious of inter-country differences, but aware that analysing these in detail is beyond the scope of this paper, the next section offers an overview of changing public attitudes towards Muslims from the events of 2001.
A 2001 European Commission poll[xii] found associations made between the 9/11 attacks and Islam as a faith by 30% in Europe overall. However, attitudes towards Islam and Muslims vary considerably between European countries.
In the same poll, the association of the 9/11 attacks with Islam as a religion was highest in Denmark at 45%, with Sweden, France, Finland, The Netherlands, and Belgium among the more hostile in a range between 33% to 39%. Others have argued that factors such as size and history of Muslim populations, overall rates of cultural and economic xenophobia and secularism, all contribute to differences[xiii].
An analysis of the 2014/15 European Social Survey (ESS), the largest study into European social attitudes, places Muslim immigrants and Roma immigrants as the least favourable groups in all European countries. According to ESS data, nearly all the countries with large Muslim populations (Germany, Netherlands, France, Belgium and the UK) are more favourable to Muslim immigration than the average country, but responses were again increasingly polarized, with more educated people holding more liberal attitudes than less educated people who had become more hostile[xiv].
But high-profile debates over accommodation of Muslim practices and institutions in these countries influence the direction of debate. In France, laïcité and the political debates about the secular state in France, contribute towards public attitudes[xv]. L’affaire du voile (the veil affair) had put the spotlight on Muslims and triggered fears of cultural difference and an “Islamization” of French society long before the 9/11 events.
In Denmark, anti-asylum seeker coverage demonised Muslim immigrants in the press, pre-dating the cartoon controversies[xvi]. These debates can trigger more extreme responses from those with hostile views, which have a strong correlation with certain demographics and outlooks.
According to a 2016 poll, majorities in Hungary, Italy, Poland and Greece say they view Muslims unfavourably, and across five countries more than a quarter of people say “many” or “most” Muslims support ISIS: 46% in Italy, 37% in Hungary, 35% in Poland, 30% in Greece and 25% in Spain[xvii].
Again, there is a polarization in responses, and those on the right of the ideological spectrum are far more likely to feel anxiety and hostility towards Muslims than those leaning towards the left. There was a 31% difference in Greece, a 30% difference in Germany, and a 29% difference in Italy between those placing themselves on the left or right of the ideological scale of people holding unfavourable views of Muslims. In France, 57% of anti-immigrant Front National supporters felt negatively towards Muslims compared with 25% of Socialist party supporters. 75% of supporters of the anti-immigrant Swedish Democrats also held negative views compared with 21% of those identifying with left wing values[xviii].
And a 2017 Chatham house survey of more than 10,000 people from 10 European states showed widespread support for a total ban on migration from mainly Muslim countries, where sentiment was especially intense in Austria, Poland, Hungary, France and Belgium. But differences were most acute among those classified as ‘left behind’ and among people self-classifying themselves on the right of the political spectrum.
Three quarters of those on the ‘right’ would support a ban on Muslim immigration, while two thirds of those on the ‘left’ would oppose it. Nearly two-thirds of those who feel they don’t have control over their own lives support the statement. Similarly, 65% of Europeans who say that they are dissatisfied with their life oppose further migration from Muslim countries[xix].
In Europe, age and education strongly correlates with anti-Muslim sentiments. Looking at those who would support ending all migration from mainly Muslim countries, 44% of 18-29 year olds would support a ban while 63% of over 60s are in favour. 59% of Europeans educated to secondary standard or below would support it, while 48% of people educated to degree level or above answer in favour.
Interestingly, there appears to be little difference between those residing in rural areas (58% support), small towns (55% support) or cities (52%), despite the fact that people living in urban areas are more likely to have contact with Muslims[xx].
Looking specifically at the UK, it is clear that the events of 9/11 impacted how the British public saw Muslims. 22% of British people reported a changed attitude to Islam as a whole after 9/11 in an Observer poll from October 2001[xxi] and 13% said their feelings about British Muslims had become less favourable in a Telegraph poll from the same period[xxii].
Primed by the transatlantic response to 9/11, the aftermath of the London 7/7 bombings saw hostility towards Muslims increase dramatically in the UK, and rates of British people seeing all or most Muslims as terrorists or terrorist sympathisers rose sharply after the attacks.
Concerns about an incompatibility of Islam with British values doubled between 2001 and 2006[xxiii], as controversies about veiling and free speech hit the front pages of newspapers across Europe and America. Perceptions of Islam as a threat to free speech and Western liberal democracy jumped from 32% in the immediate aftermath of 9/11[xxiv] to 53% in 2006[xxv].
The vast majority of people (70%) in 2001 felt that British Muslims had assimilated well, this figure was reversed by 2006[xxvi] where 74% argued they need to do more. Consistently, since 2006, polling has produced data concluding that one in four or one in five people in the UK hold strongly negative perceptions of Islam and Muslims, specifically when asked about integration and associations with violence[xxvii]
Our Fear and HOPE reports[xxviii] have tracked attitudes towards race, faith and belonging linked to degrees of economic optimism and pessimism, one of the most comprehensive studies of its kind. Since 2011, we have seen a shift in public attitudes across England, separating the population into six identity ‘tribes’.
Two of these tribes hold liberal views towards immigration and multiculturalism, only differing in their level of enthusiasm. They are overall more economically optimistic than the general population and tend to be, but are not exclusively, highly educated and working in professional and managerial positions.
Two of the tribes hold polar opposite views, economically pessimistic, hostile towards immigrants and multiculturalism, especially hostile towards Muslims and differ in their likelihood to endorse violence. Of the two ‘middle ground’ tribes, one is economically secure with cultural concerns, while the other is more economically insecure but ambivalent about immigration, though likely to become more concerned if economic conditions worsen.
Economic recovery since the 2008 financial crisis and changing demographics, as well as a sense of optimism gained by leave voters after the referendum result, have eased concerns about immigration for many. The proportion of those in the more liberal ‘tribes’ has swelled, leaving a shrinking ‘middle ground’ and a constant hostile group. But the picture of public attitudes to Islam and Muslims in England is starkly worrying.
While religious discrimination and islamophobia had reduced between 2011 and 2016, much of this progress has been set back following the result of the EU referendum and a spate of terror attacks across the UK. 42% of all respondents felt that recent terror attacks had increased their suspicion of Muslims.
According to our 2017 study, 39% of English people overestimate the proportion of Muslims in the British population although 51% of white respondents report to not know any Muslims well. Muslims are considered uniquely different from the majority British population by 90% of respondents across the identity ‘tribes’, and attitudes have hardened among those with more hostile attitudes.
While the association of Muslim communities in Britain with extremism deeply divides the ‘tribes’, a quarter of English people believe that Islam is “a dangerous religion that incites violence”, and among the most hostile identity ‘tribe’, seven out of 10 agree. There is a sizable percentage of the population (52%) who agree that Islam poses a serious threat to Western civilisation, a cornerstone of anti-Muslim ideology.
The recent terror attacks in the UK have not fundamentally changed society, but their effect has hardened attitudes towards Muslims for those with pre-existing concerns about modern society. The majority of English people prefer stronger law and order and authoritarian approaches to more community-focused alternatives in addressing their concerns with others.
Although there has been a shift in support away from street-based anti-Muslim movements since 2011, there remains a 60/40 split between people who would support a peaceful vigil in response to terror attacks and those who would prefer to see demonstrations calling for stronger action on Islamic extremism. When asked which initiatives would best encourage the integration of Muslims into British society, 46% would agree with a ban on the burqa, 79% choose the need to ensure that all Muslims spoke English and 71% wanted closer monitoring of faith schools, in Muslim faith schools.
Just as in Europe, in the UK men, people over 65, those in manual jobs or unemployed, and most significantly those who align themselves with right wing political parties or ideology, are all more likely to hold hostile views[xxix].
Our Fear and HOPE studies would suggest that these groups are most susceptible to hardening attitudes as a response to exceptional events, whereby attitudes towards Muslims of those in the most hostile tribes have hardened. While polling evidence from the UK indicates that terror attacks do have an impact on attitudes towards Islam and Muslims, this would also suggest that this shift is not societal but is concentrated among a subset of the population most susceptible to anti-Muslim rhetoric.
In America, soon after the 9/11 attacks the rate of those who felt religion had a growing role in American life more than doubled from 8 months prior, but favourable views of Muslims actually increased, and it was clear America had responded with resilience, voicing a greater acceptance of Muslim-Americans[xxx]. However, violent anti-Muslim assaults after the attacks shot up, indicating a hardening of negative attitudes in some quarters. Further, initial resilience was worn down as the Iraq war, the so called “war on terror” and further Islamist attacks led to increased suspicions.
A study of the impact of 9/11 looking at polling data from 2000-2007 finds that the structure of anti-Muslim sentiment has changed little since the attacks. Attitudes to Muslims remain affected by feelings about cultural outgroups, so that those most opposed to other migrant groups, LGBT+ rights and identifying with greater degrees of patriotism are most likely to hold negative attitudes which are furthered by the impact of events such as 9/11[xxxi]. Pew research similarly found favourable attitudes towards Muslims in the US to have declined between 2005 and 2010, but found that levels of those associating Muslims with violence and extremism had remained steady[xxxii].
Ten years on from 9/11, resilience appeared to have dissipated. 47% of the American public felt that Islamic values were at odds with American values, and almost half would be uncomfortable with a woman wearing a burqa, Muslim men praying at an airport, or a mosque being built in their neighbourhood[xxxiii]. By 2014, a third maintained that Islam is a religion which encourages violence against non-Muslims[xxxiv]. A study in 2017 found about three-quarters of Americans (76%) named the attacks as one of the 10 events in their lifetimes that had the greatest impact on the U.S, a far larger share than for any other event[xxxv] and 91% of Americans claim to recall exactly where they were the moment they heard about the attacks[xxxvi].
But just as other polls from around the world have indicated, hostile views towards Islam and Muslims are most likely to be held by a certain section of the population. Research from Pew[xxxvii] has indicated gradual improvements in the way Muslims are seen by the American public over time, but shows increasing polarisation between Republican and Democrat voters.
70% of Republicans think that Islam is more likely than any other religion to encourage violence among its believers while only about a quarter of Democrats (26%) and 39% of independents would say the same. Republicans are also more likely to have stronger reactions, 64% are very worried about extremism in the name of Islam in the U.S., more than double the proportion of Democrat voters sharing these concerns.
In America, Tea Party supporters (66%) and Republicans (63%) are far more likely than Democrats (45%) and political independents (47%) to think that the values of Islam are at odds with American values. A majority of American millennials (54%) reject this statement, while 52% of seniors believe it to be true, and over two thirds of people (68%) who trust Fox News accept that the two are incompatible, compared to just 45% who trust broadcast news and 37% who trust CNN or public television[xxxviii].
As Muslim populations in the ‘West’ have increased and have become more visible, so too has a broader acceptance of Muslims, alongside overall attitudes to minority groups. But for some, attitudes have not shifted, or have in fact worsened.
Consistently, polls show significant differences in how the public see people of different social backgrounds. Hostility towards Muslims is concentrated among certain demographics; whiteness is clearly an indicator for any racial prejudice, and prejudice towards Islam and Muslims is no different. Men, working class people, older generations, less educated people, and most importantly those who identify with right wing ideologies or political parties are all more likely to show negative attitudes towards Islam and Muslims.
Economic insecurity is often seen as a driver for prejudice, aligned to theories of intergroup competition. Resource-based conflict may explain why those who are more deprived- working class, less educated and reliant on public services and welfare benefits may be more likely to hold resentment, and will be more impacted by international events. This may explain some of the individual factors correlating with anti-Muslim sentiment, consistently found in polling data.
Taking the UK as an example, intergroup hostility over social housing and benefits has long been considered a driver of anti-immigrant sentiment.
As British Muslims are disproportionately concentrated in low income groups – 60% of Muslims of Bangladeshi and Pakistani heritage are in the bottom quintile of income distribution – they are more likely to be seen as a group posing competition than other minority groups[xxxix]. However, while inter-group competition may be a contributing factor to anti-Muslim prejudice it does not fully explain anti-Muslim sentiment, as poverty is also more likely to affect Black and Asian Brits who are less likely to hold anti-Muslim views.
The drivers of hardening public attitudes are frequently linked to high profile campaigns capitalizing on national and international events. But there is evidence to suggest that this does not always become manifest in broader societal change. Instead terror can act as a driver for further division among those with predisposed views or characteristics. These individual factors also mean that some individuals are more likely to respond negatively to islamist terror attacks, and are more susceptible to the influence of media and political narratives which associate violent extremism with Islam and Muslims as a whole.
Research tracing responses to the 2015 Paris attacks showed that on the whole tolerance increases after an incident, but triggers a growing sense of polarization.
Respondents profiled to be “liberal” or “authoritarian” became “mobilized” after the attacks, both groups increasing their commitment to their values[xl]. This is evident from polling data, where authoritarian profiles are strongly correlated with anti-Muslim views, which harden following an incident; and where there appears to be an upshot in support for Muslim groups following a terror attack, concentrated among those affiliated to liberal political groups and ideologies.
Initially in France, the public appeared to show resilience following the 2015 Paris attacks, as there was little shift in support for political refugees between September and November 2015, who remained the most favourably viewed group of migrants[xli], and overall views became more favourable towards Islam[xlii]. In Britain, too, the public responded with immediate resilience[xliii]. And an upsurge of tolerance towards Muslims recorded in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 in America, where favourable views of Muslims actually increased[xliv]. Nonetheless, this initial response appears fleeting, and polls reveal a more persistent degree of hostility overall.
Testing the validity of different explanations for the drivers of anti-Muslim sentiment, authoritarianism appears to be the strongest motivator, whereby broad right-wing ideology is most clearly correlated with islamophobic prejudice[xlv]. Terror has a polarising effect, and while resilience is not always maintained outside of exceptional periods, attitudes on the more hostile side can harden following a succession of incidents. The cumulative effects of multiple attacks may weaken any resilience and those with more hardline views may become mobilized towards violent responses. Islamophobic hate crimes were reported to increase by 300% in the week following the 2015 Paris killings[xlvi] and peaked after the Westminster, Manchester and London Bridge attacks, a rate far above the spikes in hate crime seen post 9/11[xlvii].
Further, the impact of media and political influence needs to be considered. Meaningful contact which challenges the ‘us and them’ foundations of intergroup difference, and polling consistently shows that those who know Muslims or have direct contact with Muslims are less likely to hold hostile attitudes. But a lack of direct contact with Muslims means that for many, media sources are relied on[xlviii]. Perhaps it is unsurprising that individuals who trust Fox news, who once reported Birmingham as a “Muslim only city” and a “no go zone”[xlix], are more likely to be disposed to anti-Muslim prejudice[l], but these are not the only media sources presenting a negative profile of Islam and Muslims.
The content and frequency of negative coverage of Muslims in the West plays in to their marginalisation. A 2007[li] analysis of UK press articles on integration and faith schools concludes that this discourse promotes assimilation, exaggerates difference, and privileges the dominant group, further marginalising Muslims as a group whose values do not fit with those of the wider population. And a meta-analysis of studies into the media’s representation of Islam found that Muslims tend to be depicted negatively, and that Islam is dominantly portrayed as a violent religion[lii].
A recent study by academics at Georgia State University raised concerns about the coverage of terror attacks in American media. Looking at attacks which met widely-used definitions of terror, researchers found that while Muslims had perpetrated 12.4% of attacks, 41.4% of media coverage was focused on these events, and that overall Islamist terror attacks receive 5 times coverage of other incidents[liii].
The role and impact of media on attitudes to Muslims and Islam has been contested, but it’s understandable that negative coverage of Islam and Muslims in the press may have a greater appeal to those already more accepting of right-wing views or authoritarian values. Social psychologists have long argued that the degree to which an individual may agree with an opinion determines the degree to which they see credibility in media. This may also go some way in explaining the rise of ‘fake news’, such as the image of a Muslim woman seemingly ignorantly walking by victims of the Westminster attacks[liv].
Social media, as a more recent information source has been looked at in less detail, although its confirmation bias potential is greater than media’s traditional forms. According to Pew, 61% of millennials get their political news from Facebook[lv] , while “consistent conservatives” said they were twice as likely to say posts on their feed were “mostly or always” in line with their own political views than the average Facebook user[lvi]. When these views start to become more extreme, and become at odds with mainstream media, it is understandable that users can be drawn into digital silos of more radical ideology.
Extreme views in political leadership are also important here, as mainstream carriers of anti-Muslim messages, they can be driving forces behind the polarisation of attitudes and hardening anti-Muslim sentiments. The last ten years have seen political figureheads with anti-Muslim views rise to prominence in a way that further drives division, capitalising on tragic events in a way that resonates with those already holding hostile views, and angering those on the more liberal side, driving a wedge between the two groups who harden their views.
The election of Trump has been considered a key enabler for active anti-Muslim sentiment, but polling shows that actually his election triggered a more positive shift in views, with greater numbers holding favourable attitudes towards Muslims[lvii]. The more radical a politician puts across a view, the more can be expected to pushback, as liberal voices across the U.S challenged Trump’s statements towards Muslims, pulling liberal sympathisers with them.
But it can be expected that attitudes also harden on the other side, as demonstrated in a report from the Council on American-Islamic relations which indicated a spike in hate crime following the election result, the worst year on record since it began documenting incidents in 2013[lviii].
Attitudinal polling offers just a snapshot of societal islamophobia. It does not indicate how this affects the everyday lives of Muslims in Europe and America, nor does it explain the nuances and importance of individual perspective for informing attitudes. But it does provide a macro view of how anti-Muslim prejudice has emerged since the 1990s.
There is much to be concerned about. The gravity of societal anti-Muslim prejudice is evident through high proportions of Americans and Europeans associate all Muslims with violence and extremism, see Islamic values at odds with their own, or oppose further Muslim immigration. It’s very clear that islamophobia has seeped into the mainstream.
But it’s also possible that polling offers some insight into challenging anti-Muslim views. Polling consistently highlights that certain demographics, and those with certain worldviews are most likely to hold anti-Muslim views, are most susceptible to more severe narratives, and are most likely to respond to terrorist incidents and assimilationist controversies with a hardening of attitudes. It also tells us that those who hold more progressive values lean further into these following an incident.
While the hardest end of the spectrum, those with the most hostile attitudes, will always be difficult to challenge and may well never change, there is room to connect those with softer anxieties about cultural changes and security issues to avoid further swings to reactive islamophobia. We need to crack down on those airing hate, but we also need to mobilise those more liberal to speak to the middle ground in a way that resonates with the concerned.
 The publication of Salman Rushdie’s Satanic Verses in the late 1980s, which became known as the Rushdie affair, became a pivotal point for attitudes towards Muslims. The perceived blasphemous treatment of the prophet Muhammed, spearheaded by book burnings and a fatwa calling for Rushdie’s death, mobilised young British-born Muslims and triggered a backlash in the British media.
[i] Nielsen. J (2011) The rise of Islam in Europe, Magma, march 2011 http://magma.fi/post/2011/3/31/the-rise-of-islam-in-europe
[ii] Vertovec, S. (2002) Islamophobia and Muslim recognition in Britain, in: Y. Y. Haddad (Ed.) Muslims in the West:
From Sojourners to Citizens (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 19–35.
[iii]The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2010-2050, Pew research centre, April 2015 http://www.pewforum.org/2015/04/02/religious-projections-2010-2050/
[iv] Pew research centre (2011) The future of the global Muslim population, http://www.pewforum.org/2011/01/27/future-of-the-global-muslim-population-regional-americas/
[vi] G-1990c: Gallup, 1 June–20 September, n ¼ 1,474; Timms, 1992, p. 17; Ashford & Timms, 1992, pp. 14–15; Inglehart et al., 1998, p. v. G-1990c Hastings & Hastings, 1999, p.47;,http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org.in Clive D. Field (2007) Islamophobia in Contemporary Britain: The Evidence of the Opinion Polls, 1988–2006, Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations, 18:4, 447-477
[vii] G-1993a: Social and Community Planning Research, November 1993–December 1994, n ¼ 2,867 whites, England and Wales; Modood & Berthoud, 1997, pp. 134, 277. .in Clive D. Field (2007) Islamophobia in Contemporary Britain: The Evidence of the Opinion Polls, 1988–2006, Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations, 18:4, 447-477
[viii] Pew research centre (2011) The future of the global Muslim population, pew research centre, January 2011, http://www.pewforum.org/2011/01/27/future-of-the-global-muslim-population-regional-americas/
[ix] G-1996a: NOP October–November 1997 n ¼ 933 whites, 282 Asians, 252 Afro-Caribbeans, 252 Jews; Institute for Public Policy Research, 1997. in Clive D. Field (2007) Islamophobia in Contemporary Britain: The Evidence of the Opinion Polls, 1988–2006, Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations, 18:4, 447-477
[x] Klicperová-Baker and Jaroslav Košťál, (2011) Won’t You Be My Neighbor? European attitudes to neighborhood diversity and latent variables https://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/226dc8d2-f980-4dc5-b512-503d700de1f1.pdf
[xi] Panagopoulos (2006) Trends: Arab and Muslim Americans and Islam in the Aftermath of 9/11, The Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 70, No. 4 (Winter, 2006), pp. 608-624, https://www.jstor.org/stable/4124213?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents
[xii] G-2001m: NOP, 13–22 November, n ¼ 1,006;,http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/index_en.html in Clive D. Field (2007) Islamophobia in Contemporary Britain: The Evidence of the Opinion Polls, 1988–2006, Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations, 18:4, 447-477
[xiii] Ribberink, 2017, “There is probably no God” A quantitative study of anti-religiosity in Western Europehttp://www.egbertribberink.nl/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/PhD-thesis-Ribberink-Antireligiosity-in-Western-Europe.pdf
[xiv] Heath, Richards and Ford (2016) ‘Attitudes towards immigrants: contextual and individual sources’, presented at the 3rd International ESS Conference, 13-15th July 2016, Lausanne, Switzerland https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/docs/about/conference/HEATH_FORD_how-do-Europeans-differ.pdf
[xv] Ribberink. E (2017) “There is probably no God” A quantitative study of anti-religiosity in Western Europe http://www.egbertribberink.nl/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/PhD-thesis-Ribberink-Antireligiosity-in-Western-Europe.pdf
[xvi] Hervik, Peter (2012) “The Danish Muhammad Cartoon Conflict” Current Themes in IMER Research. Malmö Institute for Studies of Migration, Diversity and Welfare, https://www.mah.se/upload/Forskningscentrum/MIM/CT/CT%2013.pdf
[xvii] Lipka. M (2017), Muslims and Islam: Key findings in the U.S. and around the world, Factank, August 2017, Pew research centre, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/08/09/muslims-and-islam-key-findings-in-the-u-s-and-around-the-world/
[xviii] Wike, Stokes and Simons (2016) Negative views of minorities, refugees common in EU, pew research centre, http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/07/11/negative-views-of-minorities-refugees-common-in-eu/
[xix] Goodwin, Raines and Cutts (2017) What Do Europeans Think About Muslim Immigration?, Chatham House https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/what-do-europeans-think-about-muslim-immigration
[xx] Goodwin, Raines and Cutts (2017) What Do Europeans Think About Muslim Immigration?, Chatham House https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/what-do-europeans-think-about-muslim-immigration
[xxi] G-2001e: 3–5 October, YouGov (2011) n ¼ 3,572;,http://www.observer.co.uk.. in Clive D. Field (2007) Islamophobia in Contemporary Britain: The Evidence of the Opinion Polls, 1988–2006, Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations, 18:4, 447-477
[xxii] G-2001f:8–10 October, NOP (2011) n ¼ 600; Daily Telegraph, 12 October 2001. in Clive D. Field (2007) Islamophobia in Contemporary Britain: The Evidence of the Opinion Polls, 1988–2006, Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations, 18:4, 447-477
[xxiii] Clive D. Field (2007) Islamophobia in Contemporary Britain: The Evidence of the Opinion Polls, 1988–2006, Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations, 18:4, 447-477
[xxiv]G-2001d: 19–21 September, YouGov, n ¼ 3,128;,http://www.observer.co.uk.. in Clive D. Field (2007) Islamophobia in Contemporary Britain: The Evidence of the Opinion Polls, 1988–2006, Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations, 18:4, 447-477
[xxv]G-2006l: 22–24 August, YouGov, n ¼ 1,757; Daily Telegraph, 25 August 2006;,http://www.YouGov.com.. in Clive D. Field (2007) Islamophobia in Contemporary Britain: The Evidence of the Opinion Polls, 1988–2006, Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations, 18:4, 447-477
[xxvi] G-2006h: 9–11 June, Populus, n ¼ 1,005; The Times, 4–5 July 2006;,http://www.populuslimited.com.. in Clive D. Field (2007) Islamophobia in Contemporary Britain: The Evidence of the Opinion Polls, 1988–2006, Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations, 18:4, 447-477
[xxvii] Clive D. Field (2007) Islamophobia in Contemporary Britain: The Evidence of the Opinion Polls, 1988–2006, Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations, 18:4, 447-477
[xxviii] Nick Lowles and Anthony Painter (2011), Fear and Hope Report, Searchlight Educational Trust; Rob Ford and Nick Lowles (2016), Fear and Hope Report, Hope not hate charitable trust; Rosie Carter and Nick Lowles (2017), Fear and Hope Report, Hope not hate charitable trust
[xxix] Clive D. Field (2007) Islamophobia in Contemporary Britain: The Evidence of the Opinion Polls, 1988–2006, Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations, 18:4, 447-477
[xxx] Post September 11 Attitudes (2001) Pew Research Centre, http://www.people-press.org/2001/12/06/post-september-11-attitudes/
[xxxi] Kalkan, Layman and Uslaner (2009) ‘‘Bands of Others’’? Attitudes toward Muslims in Contemporary American Society, The Journal of Politics, Vol. 71, No. 3, July 2009, http://www.gvptsites.umd.edu/uslaner/kalkanlaymanuslanerjop.pdf
[xxxii] Pew research centre for people and the press (2010) Public Remains Conflicted Over Islam, http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/647.pdf
[xxxiii] PPRI (2011) What it Means to be American: Attitudes towards Increasing Diversity in America Ten Years after 9/11 https://www.prri.org/research/what-it-means-to-be-american/
[xxxiv] The Bridge Initiative (2015) The super survey: Two Decades of Americans’ views on Islam and Muslims, http://bridge.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/The-Super-Survey.pdf
[xxxv] Gramlich (2017) About a fifth of Americans cite 9/11 response as event that made them most proud of U.S., Pew Research Centre, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/09/11/about-a-fifth-of-americans-cite-911-response-as-event-that-made-them-most-proud-of-u-s/
[xxxvi] Pew Research Centre (2016) 15 Years After 9/11, a Sharp Partisan Divide on Ability of Terrorists to Strike U.S.,http://www.people-press.org/2016/09/07/15-years-after-911-a-sharp-partisan-divide-on-ability-of-terrorists-to-strike-u-s/#remembering-sept-11
[xxxvii] Pew Research Centre (2016) Political values: Government regulation, environment, immigration, race, views of Islam, http://www.people-press.org/2016/12/08/3-political-values-government-regulation-environment-immigration-race-views-of-islam/#perceptions-of-whether-islam-is-more-violent-than-other-religions
[xxxviii] Cox et al (2011) PRRI, What it Means to be American: Attitudes towards Increasing Diversity in America Ten Years after 9/11 https://www.prri.org/research/what-it-means-to-be-american/
[xxxix] McClaren, Cutts and Goodwin (2011) WHAT DRIVES ANTI-MUSLIM SENTIMENT?
A TEST OF RIVAL THEORIES, https://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/b36fe282-470a-4d70-b5ad-72beb97f678e.pdf
[xl] The Conversation (2017) How attitudes to diversity change after a terrorist attack, http://theconversation.com/how-attitudes-to-diversity-change-after-a-terrorist-attack-78244
[xli] Dahlgreen (2015) French attitudes to migration relatively unmoved by Paris attacks, YouGov, https://yougov.co.uk/news/2015/11/29/no-hardening-attitudes-refugees-france-post-paris/
[xlii] The Local (2015) Post Paris attacks: How the French are thinking https://www.thelocal.fr/20150128/the-mood-of-the-french-public-post-paris-attacks
[xliii] The Conversation (2017) How attitudes to diversity change after a terrorist attack, https://theconversation.com/how-attitudes-to-diversity-change-after-a-terrorist-attack-78244
[xliv] Pew Research Centre (2001) Post September 11 Attitudes, http://www.people-press.org/2001/12/06/post-september-11-attitudes/
[xlv] McClaren, Cutts and Goodwin (2011) WHAT DRIVES ANTI-MUSLIM SENTIMENT?
A TEST OF RIVAL THEORIES, https://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/b36fe282-470a-4d70-b5ad-72beb97f678e.pdf
[xlvi] Wright. O (2015) Paris attacks: Women targeted as hate crime against British Muslims soars following terrorist atrocity, The Independent, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/paris-attacks-british-muslims-face-300-spike-in-racial-attacks-in-week-following-terror-a6744376.html
[xlvii] Press Association (2017) Hate crime reports peaked after three UK terror attacks, The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/society/2017/aug/10/hate-reports-peaked-after-three-uk-terror-attacks
[xlviii]Nisbet, Ostman and Shanahan (2009) Public opinion toward Muslim Americans: Civil liberties and the role of religiosity, ideology, and media use, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/285957074_Public_opinion_toward_Muslim_Americans_Civil_liberties_and_the_role_of_religiosity_ideology_and_media_use
[xlix] Plunkett (2015) Ofcom criticises Fox News for calling Birmingham no-go zone for non-Muslims, The guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/media/2015/sep/21/ofcom-criticises-fox-news-for-calling-birmingham-no-go-zone-for-non-muslims
[l] Arab American institute (2015) AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD ARABS AND MUSLIMS: 2015, http://www.aaiusa.org/american_attitudes_toward_arabs_and_muslims_2015
[li] Bowskill, M., E. Lyons, et al. (2007). “The rhetoric of acculturation: When integration means assimilation.” British Journal of Social Psychology 46 http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1348/014466607X182771/abstract
[lii] Ahmed and Matthes (2016) Media representation of Muslims and Islam from 2000 to 2015: A meta-analysis, \international Communication Gazette, http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1748048516656305
[liii] Kentish. B (2017) Terror attacks receive five times more media coverage if perpetrator is Muslim, study finds, The Independent, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world-0/terror-attacks-media-coverage-muslim-islamist-white-racism-islamophobia-study-georgia-state-a7820726.html
[liv] Wills (2017) Muslim woman pictured ‘ignoring victims of London terror attack’ was fake news Tweet created by Russians, Evening Standard, https://www.standard.co.uk/news/world/russian-bot-account-claimed-muslim-woman-ignored-westminster-attack-victims-a3689751.html
[lv] Mitchell et al (2015) Facebook Top Source for Political News Among Millennials, Pew Research Centre, http://www.journalism.org/2015/06/01/facebook-top-source-for-political-news-among-millennials/
[lvi] Mitchell et al (2014) Political Polarization & Media Habits, Pew Research Centre, http://www.journalism.org/2014/10/21/political-polarization-media-habits/#social-media-conservatives-more-likely-to-have-like-minded-friends
[lvii] Telhami (2017) How Trump changed Americans’ view of Islam – for the better, the Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/01/25/americans-dont-support-trumps-ban-on-muslim-immigration/?utm_term=.91ad1a90b69d
[lviii] Al Jazeera (2017) CAIR: Hate crimes against Muslims spike after Trump win, Al Jazeera, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/07/cair-hate-crimes-muslims-spike-trump-win-170718034249621.html