FEAR & HOPE 2019
HOW BREXIT IS CHANGING WHO WE ARE

Rosie Carter and Nick Lowles
This Fear & HOPE report has been made possible with the generous support of the Paul Hamlyn Foundation.
# CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Summary</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How Brexit changed Britain</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introducing The New Tribes</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A realignment in British politics?</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear, Hope &amp; Loss</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politics and Anti-Politics</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brexit</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamophobia and the Conservative Party</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jeremy Corbyn supporter</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration &amp; Multiculturalism</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Muslim Hatred</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Tommy Robinson supporter</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The appeal of the Far Right – and its limits</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour’s antisemitism crisis</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Nigel Farage supporter</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deal or No Deal, the future looks choppy</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodology</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear and HOPE identity tribes: 2011–2018</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## THE AUTHORS

### ROSIE CARTER

Rosie is senior policy officer at HOPE not Hate. She co-led the National Conversation on Immigration, the largest ever public engagement on immigration, and conducts research on integration, public attitudes, identity and political polarisation. She is a fellow of the Winston Churchill Memorial Trust and holds an MSc in Migration Studies from Oxford University.

rosie@hopenothate.org.uk

### NICK LOWLES

Nick is founder and CEO of HOPE not hate and has co-authored the previous Fear and HOPE reports. He has written seven books on extremism, youth subculture and antiracist struggles and has worked on several TV investigations, including as a consultant on the award-winning England’s Shame. He is an independent member of the Government’s Anti-Muslim Hatred Working Group and advisory board of the Commission for Countering Extremism. He was previously editor of Searchlight magazine.

nick@hopenothate.org.uk
Welcome to Fear and HOPE 2019, the latest in our on-going analysis of British society and the attitudes of its citizens.

We commissioned this report because we were keen to explore how Brexit, and the fact that we were still in the EU after the date that we were meant to have left, had affected us. We wanted to know how the Brexit debate had changed our political and cultural allegiances, whether it was a simple case of Remain and Leave or – as we suspected – there were sub-groups within each of these.

Our first report was in 2011, and British society was still deeply traumatised by the economic crash and the beginning of austerity. Our follow-up February 2016 report reflected a country more at ease with itself – despite austerity, many people were feeling more economically secure and this reflected more relaxed attitudes towards immigration and multiculturalism.

Our third report, in July 2016, was conducted just after Britain voted to leave the European Union and reflected a complete change in attitudes. Those who had been most angry in our February 2016 report, and who voted most heavily to leave the EU, were now the most content. Those who had been content, and who voted most heavily to remain, were now the most angry and resentful. Brexit had polarised Britain.

Fear and HOPE 2017 found this polarisation had continued and, if anything, had deepened. An increasing number of people were more tolerant and open to immigration and multiculturalism, but a quarter of society remained firmly opposed – and their views were hardening.

The findings in this new report today are clear: Brexit has changed Britain. Old allegiances and affiliations have been ripped up. The anger from social liberals that was so palpable in the immediate aftermath of the 2016 EU Referendum has been replaced by frustration and anger from Brexiteers at our failure to leave.

Because of these changes we decided that our previous Fear and HOPE identity tribe segmentation, breaking down society into six groupings (ranging from more liberal to more hostile views), was no longer sufficient. Just as Brexit had driven a coach and horses through our traditional political allegiances, so it had also altered our cultural and identity identities.

This new report now identifies seven distinct groups in society, as opposed to the six in our previous studies. Two of these new groups are positive toward immigration and multiculturalism, and both are strongly Remain. Then there are two who are deeply hostile to immigration and multiculturalism, though one is more driven by Brexit than the other. The group that is not as driven by Brexit is in turn more hostile to immigration and Muslims, and also much more pessimistic about life and the future, as well as more relaxed about violence. This is the group where the supporters of Stephen Yaxley-Lennon are most likely to be found.

We believe that our new seven tribe segmentation will make this report more useful for understanding British society today.

In another departure from our earlier reports, this edition of Fear and HOPE draws on a much wider data set than we have used previously. While most of our report is based on a poll of 6,000 people we conducted in late April 2019, we have also drawn on over 15 other polls HOPE not hate has commissioned over the past months.

In addition, we have also drawn on other data analytics to help us interpret society, including the use of Multi-Level Regression with Poststratification (MRP) – a statistical technique for estimating public opinion in small geographic areas or sub-groups using national opinion surveys.

The culmination of this polling and advanced data analysis is perhaps the most comprehensive study of opinion in Britain today.

As with previous reports, this study will help guide our work over the next couple of years. It will help us target the communities most at threat from extremism, deliver the most appropriate message and highlight areas where further research is required. We are also keen to make this data available to our partners and friends so they too can use it to improve their own work.

In an increasingly complex world, understanding the society around us will massively help our ability to engage in it.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

FEAR AND HOPE 2019
- KEY HIGHLIGHTS
- The Brexit process is decaying public trust in the political system, and there is growing animosity between those who feel most strongly about Brexit.
- Being a “leaver” or a “remainer” has become part of identity politics for many, one to which people feel an emotional bond and a frame through which we process information and make political choices. But there remains a large section of the population who are more ambivalent about leaving the EU.
- There are significant divisions in our core identities and how we see ourselves and interpret the world around us, with a growing ‘culture war’ between those who celebrate diversity and those who perceive growing diversity as a challenge to their own position in the world.
- Our relationship with traditional political parties is breaking, and the two party system in Britain is fracturing. Our polling and modelling suggests that no party could win a majority as it stands, and we may be looking at months, if not years, of political deadlock.
- The public continue to see Muslims as distinctly different – and overwhelmingly more negatively – than any other group. Anti-Muslim prejudice is concentrated among those who see immigration and multiculturalism most negatively, but is also present amongst people who generally have otherwise liberal and tolerant attitudes.
- The British public now consider the far right the greatest threat to public order, above Islamist extremism. Although far right narratives have become increasingly mainstream, violence on the far right is a red line for most people, limiting their appeal.
- The importance placed on tackling climate change by the public has rapidly jumped, following high profile campaigns, and the vast majority of people say that they are willing to make sacrifices in their own lifestyles to stop global warming.

BREXIT HAS CHANGED BRITAIN
Brexit exposed many pre-existing social divisions, but it also added a new dimension to our identities that determined which information we chose to believe and how we saw others around us.
- Almost three years on from the referendum, people continue to associate more strongly with Remain or Leave than any other political or value-based position. When asked whether people consider themselves more of a Remain voter, or more of a Leave voter, the majority of people (60%) now see themselves at the extreme of either side.
- Britain is now overwhelmingly a country of pessimists, the majority of people now more pessimistic than optimistic about the future. Remain voters are most likely to be pessimistic—although this group were more likely to have been optimistic prior to the referendum. Leave voters became more optimistic following the vote to leave the EU, an optimism that has not subsided much over 3 years.
- We have also seen people’s values change as a result of which side of the referendum they most identify with. Those with more liberal views have reinforced and hardened their support for immigration and multiculturalism, overwhelmingly furious with the tone of the referendum campaign and the result.

NEW TRIBES
Since 2011, our Fear and HOPE reports have studied public attitudes to a range of social issues, dividing the country into six ‘tribes’ based on the overlay between economic security and cultural anxieties. Our 2019 Fear and HOPE report introduces our seven new tribes to better understand how Brexit has changed Britain, to reflect the strength of our Brexit identities and a changing relationship with traditional politics.
- Political trust and our expectations of Brexit have created new fault lines in the British population. While there are large sections of the population who share the same opinions and attitudes, their relationship with ‘the establishment’ and trust in institutions means that they act on these sentiments in very different ways.
- The national debate around cultural and identity issues remains polarised, but the share of those who view immigration and
multiculturalism as overwhelmingly positive is larger than those who oppose it. The two liberal, Remain-supporting tribes make up 28.7% of the population, although the share of the population who belong to immigration positive and multiculturalist groups makes up 45%. The share of the population which fits within the two hostile tribes makes up 32.3% of the population.

- The majority of people feel disconnected from the political system, but while many who feel this way are more ambivalent around a range of issues, for those who hold hostile attitudes towards immigration and multiculturalism, this disconnection becomes manifest as anger, antagonism and even violence.

### Identity

There are significant divisions in our core identities and how we see ourselves and interpret the world around us, with a growing ‘culture war’ between those who feel celebrate diversity and those who perceive growing diversity as a challenge to their own position in the world.

- More than twice as many people identify as British (59%) than English (26%), though those who feel most anxious about immigration are more likely to feel English, while those who celebrate diversity most are more likely to feel European than English.

- The majority of people feel that British values are in decline

- Those who most oppose immigration and multiculturalism frequently adopt a defensive position about their own identity, increasingly culturally anxious and fragile about challenges to their privilege, and more likely to say that feminism marginalises men.

- A huge 52% of people agree that you cannot be proud of your national identity these days without being called racist – only 27% disagree. A staggering 71% of 2017 Conservative voters and 75% of Leave voters agree with this statement.

- Staggeringly, a third of people believe that feminism is to blame for making some men feel marginalised and demonised in society (33%), while slightly more disagree. Among men, 42% agreed with the statement and 28% disagreed. A quarter of women agreed, while 47% disagreed.

### Brexit

Where we sit on Brexit has become an important part of how many identify, and the strength of our Brexit identities is shaping how we feel about a range of social issues and questions of values. But there remain a large proportion of the population who feel more ambivalent about the issue.

- The strength of our Brexit identities acts as a filter on the information we choose to believe. The liberal tribes are most concerned about warnings of economic decline following Britain’s departure from the EU, while the two hostile tribes think these predictions are exaggerated in order to keep Britain in the EU and maintain the status quo.

- There is still no consensus over what people want to see from Brexit. Thirty-nine percent (39%) of our poll say that the Brexit outcome they would most support is reversing Brexit entirely and staying in the EU, while 28% say that if it looked like Brexit was about to be reversed, they would get behind a campaign to stop it happening. Among those who would support such a campaign among both of these tribes, 72% would not reconsider their view if, as part of the campaign, there were protests that became violent or threatened violence.

- 45% of people agree that Brexit has enabled and legitimised prejudice towards migrants and ethnic minorities – just 26% disagree. Many are feeling the effects of Brexit resentment borne out through anti-Muslim prejudice. Sixty-one percent (61%) of Pakistani and Bangladeshi respondents agree that Brexit has enabled and legitimised prejudice.

### Environment

The importance placed on tackling climate change by the public has rapidly jumped, following high profile campaigns, and the vast
majority of people say that they are willing to make sacrifices in their own lifestyles to stop global warming

- The Environment has become the third most important issue in the minds of voters after Brexit and the health service. Ranked as one of their top issues by 27% of voters, this put concern for the environment above the economy, crime and education. This was a sharp jump from even last summer, when the Environment ranked as the seventh most important issue at just 17%.
- 79% of people agree with the statement that “We must all be prepared to make some sacrifices to our lifestyles in order to stop global warming”. Only 6% disagreed.
- 59% of respondents supported the statement that “Protection of the environment should be given priority, even at the risk of curbing economic growth”, with just 13% opposing it.

**IMMIGRATION**

Support for immigration continues to grow incrementally, with the share of those who think that immigration has been more good than bad for the country up to 63% from 60% in July 2018, and 40% in February 2011.

- Despite shifts in the proportion of people who see immigration positively, more people continue to believe that new immigrants are given priority ahead of established residents when it comes to benefits or using public services than dispute this: 45% agree, while 28% disagree.
- Arguments about the economic contribution of migrants have not made much traction with Leave voters. Only 17% think that a sharp reduction in immigration after the UK leaves the EU will have an adverse effect on the British economy, something 72% of Remain voters are worried by.

**INTEGRATION & MULTICULTURALISM**

People feel more and more positive about multiculturalism, but it remains a divisive issue, with many cynical about the state of integration in the UK linked to anxieties and prejudice about Islam and Muslims in Britain.

- The proportion of people who feel that having a wide variety of backgrounds and cultures is part of British culture has increased from 49% in 2011 up to 63% in May 2019.
- People continue to see more benefits of multiculturalism for the economy (54%) than for British culture (45%).
- Multiculturalism remains a polarising issue. Conservative voters are sceptical about multiculturalism: 52% think that British culture has been undermined by multiculturalism, compared to less than a quarter of Labour voters (24%).

**ANTI-MUSLIM HATRED**

People continue to see Muslims distinctly differently – and overwhelmingly more negatively – than any other religious group.

- Eighteen percent (18%) of people have an extremely negative view of Muslims, although attitudes to Muslims in Britain are slowly improving, alongside a broader liberal shift. We find a general decrease in the share of people who see Islam as a serious threat to Western civilisation: 44% agree, down from 52% in our 2017 Fear and HOPE poll.
- However, the share of people who believe the ‘Great Replacement’ conspiracy – that Muslim immigration is part of a bigger plan to make Muslims the majority of a country’s population – and also that ‘there are no go areas in Britain where sharia law dominates and non-Muslims cannot enter’, has slightly increased from 32% in July 2018 to 35% in May 2019.
- When those who perceive Islam as a threat are asked why they feel this way, the most popular choices seem to highlight an association between Islam and a ban on free speech, and a threat to British laws and values.
- Anti-Muslim prejudice is concentrated among those who see immigration and multiculturalism most negatively, but is also present amongst people who generally have otherwise liberal and tolerant attitudes.

**THE APPEAL OF THE FAR RIGHT – AND ITS LIMITS**

The British public now consider the far right the greatest threat to public order, above Islamist extremism. Although far right narratives have become increasingly mainstream, violence on the far is a red line for most people, limiting their appeal.

- Public concern about extremism has reduced overall. The percentage of people who do not feel any extremist groups or organisations pose a threat has quadrupled, from 4% in February 2019 to 16% in May 2019.
- But the appeal of the far right in Britain is limited. When asked about potential support for a more extreme political party, we found only a small minority would offer their support. Seven percent (7%) of our December 2018 YouGov poll say they would be likely to vote for a party founded by people with a history of football hooliganism, on the political far right, committed to opposing Islamism and immigration and supporting Brexit.
When we published our first Fear and Hope report in 2011, we found that a traditional left-right, class-based political axis was failing to explain people’s values, attitudes and voting behaviour. We found that attitudes in relation to culture, identity and nation were formed on the basis of a complex interplay of class, personal experience, life circumstance and media consumption.

We worked with the polling experts Populus to develop a richer framework to better understand these issues. We split the population into six ‘identity tribes’. The two groups most open to immigration and supportive of multiculturalism were the Confident Multiculturalists (8% of the population) and Mainstream Liberals (16%), while the two most hostile were Active Enmity (7%) and Latent Hostiles (13%). The two groups in the centre area were the Culturally Concerned (16%) – slightly older, more affluent voters who had cultural concerns around immigration and integration – and Immigrant Ambivalence (26%), who were less concerned about cultural issues but worried about further immigration because of their economic anxieties.

These tribes were not static entities. Over time we saw a shift in attitudes, with the share of the English population belonging to the two ‘liberal’ tribes growing from 24% in 2011 to 39% in 2017. Over this period, we conducted four sets of Fear and Hope polling and saw the middle ground shrink, while the proportion of the population identified in the two ‘hostile’ tribes remained constant (around a quarter). We saw growing polarisation and in particular, a hardening of attitudes towards Muslims in Britain.

Major events and political changes all contributed to a shift in how people saw identity issues. In 2011, while people were still feeling the effects of the 2008 recession, immigration was being increasingly politicised as a politics of culture, identity and nation. The decline of the British National Party (BNP) saw the growth of the English Defence League (EDL) and the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) attempt to capture this appetite.

By 2016, people were feeling more positive about a range of identity issues. At the same time, UKIP had surged to prominence, while the rise of the Islamic State and terror incidents in Woolwich, Paris and elsewhere kept Islamist extremism in the headlines. In our 2017 report, we found the series of Islamist terror attacks in the UK had a profound impact on attitudes to race and faith.

However, the 2016 referendum over the UK’s membership of the EU is the event that had the most profound impact on identity politics and social divisions. The EU Referendum exposed many pre-existing divisions in the UK, which held immigration as a key dividing issue. The Leave message appealed to those most sceptical about immigration, and who were pessimistic about cultural change and assertive about English nationalism. The Remain message appealed most to those with a cosmopolitan worldview, who held pro-migration attitudes and were optimistic about the future.

Of course, those who voted Leave and Remain were in no way homogenous groups. But the 2016 referendum was unique in offering two clear-cut camps where two very different visions of England clashed. By 2019, almost three years on from the referendum, people continue to associate more strongly with Remain or Leave than any other political or value-based position. We have also seen people’s values change as a result of which side of the referendum they most identify with.

Fear and Hope 2019 attempts to better understand the state of the nation in light of these changes, creating a new framework of ‘identity tribes’ to reflect how Brexit has changed Britain.

**Brexit Identities**

Understanding identity issues means we have to understand how people feel about Brexit. People have identified less and less with political parties since the 1970s, yet when asked if they think of themselves more as a Remain voter or a Leave voter, the vast majority of people see themselves strongly pinned to one side. Being a “leaver” or a “remainer” has become part of our identity politics, one to which people feel an emotional bond and a frame through which we process information and make political choices.

When asked whether people consider themselves more of a Remain voter, or more of a Leave voter, the majority of people (60%) now...

---

**Fear and Hope 2019**

*HOW BREXIT CHANGED BRITAIN*
see themselves at either extreme. While we have seen sizeable shifts over time in what people want from Brexit, there has been little shift in how people identify, with Remain voters in particular hardening their stance.

The strength of our Brexit identities is not imitated in regards to any other political allegiance. A huge 73% of our new poll said that none of the main political parties reflect what they think, a figure that has risen dramatically – from 61% in December 2018, to 68% in July 2018. It is now only a small minority of people – just over a quarter (27%) – who are confident that at least one of the main political parties reflects what they think. There is very little warmth towards any of the major political parties in the UK, and less than 10% of people said that they closely identified with any leading figure of any of the main political parties.

The strength of opinion shown during and since the referendum over Britain’s membership of the EU was also about much more than how we feel about being European. Our relationship with Europe has always been complicated. Even before the referendum, fewer people in the UK felt any sense of European identity than in any other country in the European Union.

The 2014 British Social Attitudes Survey found that just 15% of people in Britain identified as “European”, a figure that had changed little since 1996, when the question was first asked. Similarly, our Fear and HOPE studies have found that a sense of ‘European’ belonging has remained a minority view, with no significant change in the proportion of those identifying as European between 2011 and 2019. It now stands at just 7%.

Brexit has created a new identity politics, which has not just exposed pre-existing divisions, but offers a new, emotionally-charged political structure through which we filter information and perceive the world around us.

**THE BREXIT OPTIMISM SHIFT**

Our Fear and HOPE reports have traced whether people feel optimistic or pessimistic about the future since 2011. We found this to be a key driver behind attitudes. People who were more optimistic about their own lives tended to hold more liberal views than those who felt pessimistic. People who were more optimistic tended to feel more in control of their own lives and were less likely to hold negative views toward immigration and multiculturalism.

Using the sophisticated data analytics technique MRP (multilevel regression with post-stratification) to map attitudes, we found that the most optimistic places in the country were areas within core cities and prosperous university towns. Eighteen of the most optimistic constituencies in February 2016 were London boroughs, with Bath and Edinburgh North and Leith also among the most hopeful for the future.

Conversely, we found pessimism in places where unemployment was more prevalent, where there were fewer opportunities and the standard of living was declining. Among the least optimistic in our 2016 pre-referendum poll were Grimsby, Rotherham, Hartlepool, Blaenau Gwent and Boston & Skegness. In all these areas less than 40% of people felt optimistic for the future, with just 36% in Clacton, the least optimistic constituency in Britain.
Brexit, racism and division
The proportion of people in each constituency who believe that Brexit has increased racism and division

London
The most pessimistic constituencies were also among those with the strongest Leave vote in the 2016 EU referendum, while the areas with the highest levels of optimism were among the strongest Remain voting constituencies.

However, the EU Referendum completely reversed these patterns of optimism and pessimism. Two years on, our July 2018 YouGov poll found that 71% of Remain voters said they felt pessimistic for the future, more than twice the proportion of Leave voters (35%). Eighteen percent (18%) of Remain voters felt that the next generation would have more opportunities than us, compared to 53% of Leave voters. Forty-six percent (46%) of Leave voters felt that Brexit would increase the economic opportunities for people like themselves, compared to just 7% of Remain voters.

Our MRP constituency data found that areas with the greatest fall in optimism for the future between February 2016 and July 2018 were among the areas with the greatest Remain vote in the referendum. Hornsey and Wood Green became 23% more pessimistic over two years, Bristol West 22.3% more pessimistic, and Islington North 21.8% more pessimistic than in the months before the referendum.

Conversely, Leave voting areas saw a surge in optimism. Boston and Skegness, the constituency with the strongest Leave vote in the referendum, was 15% more optimistic in our July 2018 poll, with other Brexit strongholds such as Clacton (14.6%), Castle Point (12.4%) and Louth and Horncastle (12.4%) all more optimistic for the future than in February 2016.

This crossing line in optimism and pessimism between Leave and Remain matters, because many of the places experiencing newfound optimism are among those most likely to feel the impacts of predicted economic downturn after the UK leaves the EU.

Take Dudley North, for example. Economic projections suggest that the West Midlands economy could shrink by up to 13% after Britain leaves the EU, which would have a direct negative impact on people living in Dudley, where there are already pockets of acute deprivation. However, just 3.6% of Leave voters in Dudley North feel their economic situation would improve if the UK remained in the EU. An area where under 40% of people felt optimistic for the future in February 2016, by July 2018 optimism in the constituency has surged by 8%.

Our latest Fear and HOPE poll shows that we are overwhelmingly a country of pessimists. On the whole, the majority of Britain is pessimistic about the future (55%), with the rest saying they are optimistic (45%). However, the optimism gap between Leave and Remain voters is closing, with Remain voters more pessimistic (60%) than Leave voters (51%). Meanwhile, delays to the UK’s departure from the EU have dampened some of the optimism Leave voters felt in July 2018, when only 35% of Leave voters felt pessimistic. Remain voters too, are recovering from their initial shock, 11% more optimistic than they were 10 months prior.

We are overwhelmingly a country of optimists, with little change in the Leave-Remain optimism gap. However, we remain divided on our expectations from Brexit. A large 82% of Remain voters think...
that the British economy as a whole would be better if the UK remained in the EU, while 74% think their own economic prospects would be better and 82% think there would be better opportunities for children growing up today.

By contrast, two-thirds (66%) of Leave voters think that the British economy as a whole would be better if the UK left the EU, while 46% think their own economic prospects would be better and 37% think it wouldn’t make much difference either way. Over half (56%) think there would be better opportunities for children growing up today if the UK went ahead with Brexit.

Our Brexit identities continue to shape how we feel about the future, and how we filter information, with Remain voters more likely to believe information about projected economic downturn and job losses, and Leave voters unlikely to think this is true.

REMOTANERS VS. BREXITEERS

Our December 2018 poll conducted by Populus found that 65% of people thought that Britain was now more divided as a result of the referendum. Only 12% of the total population disagreed that Brexit had made us more divided. The proportion of those who were concerned that Brexit was feeding prejudice and division and taking our country backwards rose over a six month period, from 57% in July 2018 to 62% in December 2018. Only a quarter of people disagreed (26%).

Between February 2016 and July 2018, we saw a shift in patterns of optimism and pessimism as areas like Clacton and Lincolnshire, which had been pessimistic about the future displayed a surge in optimism that accompanied the Brexit vote, while areas such as in London and Scotland went from the most optimistic about the future to the most pessimistic.

By January 2019, it seems that this optimism was waning, with the majority of people now more pessimistic than optimistic about the future - with exception of just two constituencies, South Holland and the Deepings where 73.6% of voters endorsed Britain’s withdrawal from the EU, second only to neighbouring Boston; and Rayleigh and Wickford in Essex, where an estimated 68% of people voted to leave the EU.
Indeed, we have seen a rise in recorded hate crime since the 2016 vote, and in our own work in communities across the country we have witnessed discrimination enabled not just against EU migrants but also British Muslims. Many saw the anti-migrant Leave campaign, which also played on anti-Muslim messaging around refugee flows through Europe and Turkey’s membership of the EU, as an enabler of prejudice and racism. However, it is important to separate these sentiments and actions from all Leave voters.

Nonetheless, the strength of our Brexit identities has also enabled animosity towards voters on the other side of the referendum debate. Slurs about “Remoaners”, a term used by right-wing media and Eurosceptic agitators to describe those who are outraged and frustrated at the outcome of the EU Referendum, has engrained a binary discourse of division between those who voted to leave the EU and Remainers, depicted as middle-class, out of touch, and self-interested.

In focus groups on Brexit that we ran through the summer of 2018, we found that some Leave voters felt belittled by Remain voters, and felt that warnings from the Remain side about economic decline was a “sore loser” response just to protect their own interests. Many described Remain voters as elite, self-righteous, cosmopolitan city residents who were only concerned about potential economic decline because it might affect themselves:

“The only reason all these affluent people are up in arms now is because it’s the first time their boat’s been rocked a bit and they’re scared”

“It was when Obama started telling us to remain in the EU. I don’t like anyone telling me what to do. And what’s it got to do with him?”

Peterborough: Leave voters

“Now all these things come up on the news, trade and that... but they’re making it more complicated because they don’t want to leave, ‘cos these big shots in London are gonna lose the most, not the working class”

Blackpool: Labour Leave voter

Anger towards Remain-supporting politicians, and animosity towards “remoaners” is just one side of the coin. We have also noted increasing intolerance from progressives with strong Remain identities, aimed towards Leave voters.

In our Brexit focus groups, most people were measured and respectful of those who felt differently about Brexit to themselves, but we frequently heard Remain voters dismiss those who had voted to leave the EU as racist, inward-looking and uninformed.

There were also occasional sneering comments from Remain voters that maybe those who voted Leave were “getting what they deserved”, that they were “turkeys voting for Christmas”, in response to suggestions Leave voting communities might be made poorer by any economic decline as a result of Brexit.

In our 2016 Fear and HOPE study, conducted immediately after the referendum, we found the two most liberal tribes were overwhelmingly furious with the tone of the referendum campaign and the result. These factors had reinforced and hardened their own support for immigration and multiculturalism, reflected in even stronger views on these issues in our poll. Horrified at the result and the increase in racist incidents, the liberal 48% appeared to have become the angry outsiders.

Immediately after the referendum, we saw the views of the immigration-sceptic tribes soften on many social issues, arguably less angry than they had been a few months earlier, and less angry than they would have been if the UK had voted to remain in the EU. At the same time, we saw the attitudes of the two liberal tribes reinforce and harden their support for immigration and multiculturalism, overwhelmingly furious with the tone of the referendum campaign and the result.

It was clear that Brexit had shifted our perceptions of society, as we aligned closer to our values. Between February 2016 and July 2017, 20% fewer of those in the two liberal tribes, most likely to have voted to Remain in the EU, claimed not to know anyone Muslim well, despite there being very little demographic change over this time. There were less significant shifts among the other social groups: just 6% fewer among the Active Enmity tribe claimed not to know anyone Muslim well over the same time period.

Brexit exposed many pre-existing social divisions, but it also added a new dimension to our identities that determined which information we chose to believe and how we saw others around us. Our 2019 Fear and HOPE report introduces our seven new tribes to better understand how Brexit has changed Britain.

NOTES:
2 https://whatukthinks.org/eu/media-centre/britain-feels-less-european-than-anywhere-else-in-the-eu/
Our new identity tribes reflect both how Brexit has changed us as a nation, and the growing polarisation we have recorded in our previous Fear and HOPE reports.

As with our previous segmentation studies, we have identified two groups with strong socially liberal views, Active Multiculturalists and Liberal Remainers. Both of these groups also identify strongly as Remain voters, and see immigration and multiculturalism as overwhelmingly positive, though with differing levels of enthusiasm.

And just as with our previous reports, we have identified two groups who are strongly opposed to immigration and multiculturalism – Hostile Brexaters and Anti-Establishment Pessimists – showing active hostility towards Muslims and Islam in Britain. However, there are clear attitudinal differences between these groups.

One of these two latter groups identifies strongly as Leave voters, is motivated by Brexit, and also identifies strongly with Nigel Farage and the Brexit Party. This group is optimistic about Brexit, and feels it will bring economic gains to themselves and their families, as well as the country as a whole.

The other tribe in this ‘hostile’ grouping feels completely detached from the political system, and while some voted for Brexit, the members do not feel that it will change anything in their own situation. This group are overwhelmingly pessimistic, are dissatisfied with their own lives, and are most likely to think violence is acceptable.
In the middle sit three other tribes, all less motivated by Brexit, but seeing identity issues differently (and none to any extreme). Established Optimists are most likely to identify with the Conservative Party and see immigration positively. They differ from all the other tribes in their optimism for the future and satisfaction with their own lives.

The other two middle-ground tribes – Comfortable Ambivalent and Anxious Ambivalent – feel there are more important issues than Brexit, though one (Comfortable Ambivalent) sees immigration very positively. The other (Anxious Ambivalent) has some anxieties about immigration and multiculturalism, though not to the same extent as the two hostile tribes, but it does feel disconnected from the political system.

The two liberal, Remain-supporting tribes make up 28.7% of the population, although the share of the population who belong to immigration-positive and multiculturalist groups makes up 45%. The share of the population which fits within the two hostile tribes makes up 32.3% of the population. This reflects our nation’s polarised debate around cultural and identity issues.

A significant difference between the new tribes and our previous Fear and HOPE tribes is that these groups do not just divide through the overlay of economic security and cultural anxieties, but also, and more critically, on political trust and their expectations from Brexit.

WHY TRIBES?

Attitudinal segmentation studies divide the population into a series of groups according to their attitudes and motivations, in order to better understand how the population is divided over key values, and how cultural and economic issues intersect differently among different groups of people.

Once relevant attitudinal clusters are identified, they are further analysed for any other shared or similar traits such as demographic or behavioural attributes.

This helps us to understand voting intentions, messaging and campaigns that will reach certain audiences, and also the limits of how these will appeal. Attitudinal segmentation draws red lines along questions of key values, from which we separate out each of our new tribes.

THE NEW TRIBES

ACTIVE MULTICULTURALIST

The most socially liberal and politically active of the tribes, this tribe holds the strongest Remain identity and is most concerned about Britain’s departure from the EU.

Active Multiculturalists see immigration and multiculturalism as overwhelmingly positive, and have likely hardened their liberal views in response to the increase in racism since the referendum, which they are outraged by. They predict dire consequences for the country, and are the most pessimistic about the future as a result, but they maintain trust in the ‘establishment’: 40% feel represented by at least one political party.

This group is most likely to have voted Remain, and to have voted Labour or Lib Dem. The majority of Labour’s 2017 vote also came from this tribe, who are the most likely of all our tribes to be a member of a political party. They are most likely to live in London and the South East, and most possess a university degree. They have a smaller share of BAME members than the Liberal Remainer tribe, are generally middle class, and are most likely to read the Guardian.

LIBERAL REMAINERS

This group shares the liberal values of the Active Multiculturalist tribe, albeit to a slightly lesser degree. They are driven by Brexit, and are most likely to identify strongly as Remain voters.

They have a higher proportion of BAME and EU citizens than any other tribe, and are three times more likely than the average person to identify as European. They identify most strongly with Jeremy Corbyn and are most likely to have voted Labour, Lib Dem or Green in 2017, and to have voted to Remain in the EU Referendum. This tribe contains the highest proportion of young people and is the most likely tribe to contain members of a trade union.

The majority of this tribe have a degree, are high earners, and are more likely to live in London or Scotland. They are most likely to be non-religious, and unlike their liberal counterparts, the Active Multiculturalists, are indifferent about different religious groups, although a few within this tribe hold anxieties about Muslims and Islam in Britain.
ESTABLISHED OPTIMISTS

This tribe shares the closest affinity to the Conservative Party, and is the only tribe which is more optimistic than pessimistic about the future. It contains an equal proportion of Leave and Remain voters, and overwhelmingly sees a positive effect from immigration and multiculturalism, though Established Optimists are not as active as the two liberal tribes in their articulation of this point.

This is a pragmatic, comfortable, middle-Englander group that favours centrist politics. Established Optimists are most likely to have voted Conservative in 2015 and 2017, and have an unfavourable view of Jeremy Corbyn and Nigel Farage.

COMFORTABLE AMBIVALENT

This group is more likely to see immigration and multiculturalism positively than the average person, and is on the whole ambivalent about cultural issues, but has some concerns about Islam and Muslims in Britain. Of all the tribes, these are the most ambivalent people about Brexit, and see health as a more important issue.

This group contains a high proportion of BAME people, tend to be of working age, and are likely to have a degree, although are not as likely to be high earners.

ANXIOUS AMBIVALENT

This group is not motivated by Brexit and has negative views towards immigration, Islam and Muslims, though to a much lesser extent than the Hostile Brexiter or Anti-Establishment Pessimist tribes. Members of this group feel very detached from the political process and are pessimistic about the future.

They are most likely not to vote, but those who do are just as likely to vote Leave as Remain, or for any of the main political parties. They have generally left the education system at a young age, and are most likely to be white and working class.

HOSTILE BREXITERS

This group is motivated by Brexit, is opposed to immigration and multiculturalism, and members are more likely to see themselves as English than British.

Almost a third of Labour’s lost 2015 vote came from this group, with many feeling disconnected from and resentful of Labour’s growing liberal base. The largest share of UKIP and the Conservatives’ 2017 vote came from this tribe, although they now feel little affinity to the Tories, feeling let down by Brexit. They identify most closely with Nigel Farage as their political leader and are most likely to vote for the Brexit Party.

They are likely to read The Sun, The Daily Mail or The Express, and are almost homogeneously white. They are on the whole older than the other tribes. Most members do not have a degree, and are more likely to live in towns than cities. The highest proportion of people in the West Midlands fits into this tribe.

Hostile Brexiters are optimistic about the effects of Brexit for themselves and the country as a whole, which they feel will bring about greater opportunities and economic gains. They are very concerned about Islam and Muslims in Britain, and 67% of this group believe that there are ‘no-go’ zones in Britain where Sharia law dominates and non-Muslims cannot enter. However, they are less concerned about immigration as a whole than the Anti-Establishment Pessimist tribe, and many from this group see positive economic effects from immigration, despite their cultural anxieties.

ANTI-ESTABLISHMENT PESSIMISTS

This group is very strongly anti-immigration and anti-multiculturalism, but is much less motivated by Brexit. Members are overwhelmingly pessimistic, are most unhappy about their lives so far, and are most likely to think things have got worse over the last 10 years.

They are the most detached group from the political system, with only 13% feeling that at least one of the main political parties represents what they think. They do not share the Brexit optimism of the Hostile Brexiter group, and tend to think things will stay the same, or get worse, after Britain leaves the EU. The vast majority of this tribe think that immigration has been a bad thing for the country. They are least concerned about the economy of all the tribes, indicating their disconnect from the ‘establishment’ and institutions.

This tribe is working class, almost homogeneously white British, is least likely to have a degree, with the majority holding a GCSE-level education or equivalent, and many holding no formal qualifications. The highest share of unemployed people is in this tribe, who are most likely to live in poor households. The majority of anti-Muslim extremist Tommy Robinson’s support comes from this tribe.
THE VIEWS OF BRITAIN’S BLACK AND MINORITY ETHNIC POPULATION

KEY ISSUES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Britain leaving the EU</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economy</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3%
Only 3% of BME respondents identify as English, compared to 26% of people generally.

OVERWHELMING
83% think that immigration has been good for Britain

AID
64% support the Government spending 0.7% of GDP on overseas development, compared to 40% of white respondents

NO
Only 6% of BME respondents strongly agreed with the view that anti-white discrimination is getting as serious a problem as that faced by non-whites

REMAIN V LEAVE
70% identify themselves as Remainers, compared to 30% as Leavers

FEMINISM
Almost a third strongly disagree with the view that feminism is to blame for making some men feel marginalised and demonised in society. This compares to 21% for white people.

PRO-LABOUR
54% view the Labour Party favourably, compared to 31% for white people

REVOKE AND REFORM
52% want the UK to revoke article 50 and remain in the EU, and only 12% want to leave without a deal. For white people the figures are 38% and 29% respectively
In our previous Fear and HOPE report, we found that a third of all people believed that their nationality was the most important factor of their identity, while 28% agreed that the country of their birth was a defining aspect of who they were. This was seen as far more important than religion, ethnicity, the country they lived in now, or any local identity with a city, town, village or local community.

However, our new polling shows that there are significant divisions in the importance different groups place on national identity, and what that means to them. More than twice as many people identify as British (59%) than English (26%), though there are significant differences between the identity tribes.

People in the Hostile Brexiter tribe are more likely to identify as English (50%) than British (46%), with the Anti-Establishment Pessimist group split between feeling English (46%) and British (48%).

By contrast, the Active Multiculturalist and Liberal Remainer tribes are more likely to feel European than English. This reflects the strength of Brexit identities among both of these groups. Overall, however, there has been no real shift in the proportion of people who identify as European: just 7% of the total population (up from 6% in July 2017).

National identity is clearly important for most people in Britain, though many feel differently about how they should express it. A huge 52% agree that you cannot be proud of your national identity these days without being called racist – only 27% disagree. A staggering 71% of 2017 Conservative voters and 75% of Leave voters agree with this statement. Labour voters are split: 38% agree, while 40% disagree.

This split among Labour voters is indicative of the party’s struggle reaching across its traditional base and its newer, more cosmopolitan, younger, educated voters. Just 34% of 18-24s agree that you cannot be proud of your national identity without being called racist, with more disagreeing (42%). For those over 65, two-thirds (66%) believe this to be true, with only 17% disagreeing.

Hostile Brexites and Anti-Establishment Pessimists feel most strongly about this statement, while the vast majority of the two liberal tribes refute the statement.

A sense that you cannot be proud of your national identity speaks directly to concerns about ‘free speech’ and the sentiment that ‘political correctness’ has limited what people are able to say. In fact, the idea that free speech is being suppressed by ‘political correctness’ has become a central tenet of the contemporary far right, which both taps into and exacerbates public concern about ‘the elite’.

Fifty-five percent (55%) of our May 2019 poll said that political correctness is used by the liberal tribes.
elite to limit what we can say, while 45% thought that concern about political correctness had been whipped up by the right-wing media to undermine those who believe in tolerance and anti-racism.

A huge 72% of Leave voters and 71% of 2017 Conservative voters believe that this apparent political correctness is limiting what we can say. Across the identity tribes, a majority of all groups with the exception of the two liberal tribes feel that they cannot express themselves fully as a result of ‘P.C. culture’.

**DECLINE AND POWER**

This sense of not being able to express your thoughts freely reflects a broader feeling of detachment with the political system, a loss
of trust in public institutions and mainstream media, and a rising resentment towards ‘elites’. This sentiment is profound, not just among the hostile identity tribes, but also among the middle-ground tribes, too.

We find pessimism about people’s sense of British identity across all of the identity tribes. Overall, people are more likely to feel that British values are in decline than believe they are as strong as they ever were.

This pessimism to some extent reflects the tribes’ position on immigration and Brexit. The two hostile tribes feel that immigration and multiculturalism have had a negative impact on British culture. The two liberal tribes feel that British values have been dented by Brexit, which they feel has fuelled prejudice and division.

However, it is clear that most people still hold tolerance as a core British value. Our poll shows that people are more likely to think that you can maintain British values and still live a life consistent with your religious faith whatever that is, than think that sharing and upholding British values makes holding to some religious principles difficult. The majority of the identity tribes are neutral on this question, with the exception of the active multiculturalist group, who firmly see compatibility between British culture and religious faith.

OUTLOOK

People’s social standing remains an indicator of how well they feel they are doing. One third (32%) of social grades C2DE (manual workers or unemployed) say that they are disappointed with their life so far, whereas 24% of ABC1 (those in professional employment) would say the same.

A huge 40% of social grade E and 37% of social grade D say that they disappointed with their lives so far. Only 21% of social grades A and B say the same. Of course, this perception is not a direct indicator of attitudes, but we find that those who feel least content with their own lives are less likely to see others favourably.

For example, 35% of social grade E and 32% of social grade D say they think things will be worse for themselves and their family in 10 years’ time. Yet only 27% of social grade A say the same. However, those in social grade A are more pessimistic about Britain as a whole than social grade E and D: 47% of the former say they think things will be worse for Britain as a whole in 10 years’ time, while slightly fewer –45% – of social grades D and E say the same.

Brexit has made social grades A and B, who were most likely to vote Remain, more pessimistic for the future, as they fear the economic damage that Brexit will bring. However, as a group – generally more economically secure – they are less concerned about the impacts of this economic decline on themselves and their families. This gap between perceptions of the impact on Brexit as a whole, and where the impact will likely hit, is driving a wedge between people, which adds to resentment among those who already feel frustrated and angry, and who feel that things are not working for them.

In focus groups on Brexit that we ran through the summer of 2018, we found that some Leave voters felt belittled by Remain voters. They felt that warnings from the Remain side about economic decline were representative of a ‘sore loser’ response, designed to protect their own interests. Many described Remain voters as an elite who were self-righteous: cosmopolitan city residents only concerned about potential economic decline because it might affect themselves.

“The only reason all these affluent people are up in arms now is because it’s the first time their boat’s been rocked a bit and they’re scared”

Leave voter in Peterborough focus group

It was this resentment that often led people
who had voted Leave, or were sceptical about the benefits of immigration, to believe media stories that leaving the EU, or a sharp reduction in immigration, would have a detrimental impact on the economy.

Moreover, we often found that when people expressed themselves, they amalgamated their frustrations and anxieties together about multiple different issues. We frequently heard people express their anger towards an unspecified ‘they’. Sometimes this referred to migrants or minorities. Sometimes it referred to an out-of-reach and out-of-touch elite, which might be the Government or politicians, sometimes the EU, sometimes big business or ‘the City’. But sometimes it referred to all these groups at once – external powers who, directly or indirectly, account for this loss. More often than not, ‘they’ were the people for whom the system worked, those in cosmopolitan cities who felt the benefits of immigration.

**DISTANCE FROM POWER AND HOSTILITY**

Across the tribes, the Anti-Establishment Pessimist tribe were the most likely to feel disappointed in their lives: over a third, 35%, said so, with only 19% of the Established Optimist tribe saying the same. The Anti-Establishment Pessimists were also the most pessimistic of all the tribes, most likely to think that things had got worse, and would continue to get worse, both for themselves and the country as a whole.

As a group that is predominantly white, working class, and less educated than the other groups, as well as disconnected from the political system, they feel powerless and that the odds are stacked against them. They are most likely to think that immigrants are given priority to services and that these immigrants have a negative cultural and economic impact on the country. The Anti-Establishment Pessimists are also most fearful about being displaced altogether by rapidly increasing diversity. They are most likely to feel detached from power and to feel their voices are not heard or represented.

The frustration and anger that the anti-establishment tribe feel towards the political class becomes combined with a feeling that their social status has been undercut by migrants, minorities and those who champion them. For this group, resentment is channelled into hate. The economic instability of many in this group is not the sole reason for their attitudes towards others. In terms of demographics and economic circumstances, the Anti-Establishment Pessimist tribe are most similar to the Anxious Ambivalent group, although this tribe do not share their anti-immigrant views to the same extreme. The Anxious Ambivalent group have become more detached from messages on identity issues, but could easily slip into the Anti-Establishment Pessimist group, if their pessimism grows and they are met with messaging that resonates with their concerns to convert it into hate.

**STATUS, FRAGILITY AND LOSS**

Economic instability is important in determining how we see others, but this also reflects the
fragility many of us hold about our social position. A recent study\(^2\) looking at the election of Donald Trump in the USA challenges dominant economic theories to argue that the 2016 election was determined by far more complex drivers. Rather than poverty and deprivation, the study published in the *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* found that support for Trump stemmed from a sense of power and privilege slipping away:

“It used to be a pretty good deal to be a white, Christian male in America, but things have changed... It was about dominant groups that felt threatened by change and a candidate who took advantage of that trend.”

The study found that party loyalty overwhelmingly explained voting patterns, but analysis of swing voters found that losing a job or income between 2012 and 2016 did not make a person any more likely to support Trump. Neither did unemployment or the density of manufacturing jobs in one’s area. Worries about education, retirement or medical bills also had little impact. More broadly, the U.S. economy was improving before the 2016 election.

Instead, a dislocation of identity and resistance to change were overwhelming factors in voting outcome. Trump support can be directly tied to people who see hierarchy as intrinsic to society, and correlating with a belief that high-status groups, such as whites, Christians or men, faced more discrimination than low-status groups, such as minorities, Muslims or women. As Mutz, the report’s author writes:

“It’s much more of a symbolic threat that people feel. It’s not a threat to their own economic well-being; it’s a threat to their group’s dominance in our country over all.”

Similarly, our research has found that lost industry and changing work, local decline, alongside changing neighbourhoods and increased diversity, means that identity issues and people’s standard of living become intertwined\(^3\). Resistance to change is not only about a decline in welfare and opportunity, as these anxieties trigger a defensive instinct to protect and reassert a social position.

We have found that tradition is revived in places which have seen rapid change. Media stories about bans on Easter eggs or nativity plays stick with people, because they resonate with a broader worldview that they have lost part of their identity. A sense that British or English identity is waning becomes more pronounced.

This is evident in looking at how questions of race and identity further divide the identity tribes. The two liberal tribes are concerned about racial equality, and actively want to fight discrimination and prejudice against migrants and minorities. On the other end of the spectrum, the two hostile tribes, overwhelmingly white British, struggle to keep up with progressive values, and feel that discrimination against white people has become as big a problem as discrimination against non-white people.

For some in these groups, ‘whiteness’ and ‘Britishness’ are synonymous, and this belief that white people are as affected by discrimination as non-white people reflects their fear of decline, and of rapidly increasing diversity.

Population estimates vary, but it is not disputed that the UK is rapidly becoming a more diverse country. Some believe that by 2050, 30% of the UK’s population will be from black and minority ethnic groups, while Oxford demographer David Coleman sets the rate much higher, arguing that by 2060 white British people will be a minority.

In our January 2018 poll, we found that when given Coleman’s population estimates,
the majority of people react negatively. For Londoners, Labour or Liberal Democrat supporters, plus Remain voters, under-25s, or highly-educated people, the most common response was indifference. However, the majority of people felt uneasy (35%) or unhappy (31%) or disappointed (25%) at Coleman's suggestions. The strongest negative responses came from Conservative voters, over-65s or Leave voters.

Fragility in one’s status is also linked to attitudes and sense of place in the world relating to questions of gender. Staggeringly, a third of people believe that feminism is to blame for making some men feel marginalised and demonised in society (33%), while slightly more disagree.

We polled this question to better understand potential support for men’s rights and anti-feminism activism, which has increasingly become a slip road to the far right, appealing to young men feeling emasculated in an age of changing social norms. UKIP’s Carl Benjamin, who made jokes about raping a female MP, recently made a similar statement: “This is what feminism has wrought – a generation of men who do not know what to do, who are being demonised for what they are.”

Among men, 42% agreed with the statement and 28% disagreed. A quarter of women agreed, while 47% disagreed. Despite the fact that younger age groups hold more socially liberal views over all, 18-24-year-olds were more likely to hold this anti-feminist view (33%) than people of working age (29% among 25-49-year-olds).

Average position of the tribes on a scale of 0-100, where 0 Today’s feminists continue to fight for important issues, and 100 is Today’s feminists have gone too far.
But those most likely to hold anti-feminist views came from those most likely to hold hostile attitudes overall, who felt detached from the political system and that things were not working for them.

Forty-five percent (45%) of the Anti-Establishment Pessimist tribe agreed with this statement, with just 20% disagreeing; 41% of the Anxious Ambivalent tribe agreed with it. A huge 54% of the Hostile Brexiter tribe said the same, indicative of their resentment towards ‘the liberal elite’.

The positions of the tribes when asked if ‘feminism has gone too far’ are split in much the same way, with those who hold the most conservative values and feel resentful towards a ‘liberal elite’ reasserting themselves against the liberal tribes. Those who are frustrated about issues of race, immigration and multiculturalism are also angry about changing social norms, and fear being unseated by those fighting for equality.

The divisions we find in our core identities, in how we see ourselves and interpret the world around us, show significant division. Nonetheless, identity and attitudes are fluid and multi-layered. The overlay we see between issues of identity and political trust, security, and instability, indicates some of the factors which drive divisive identity politics, but also suggest some of the ways in which progressives can shift the debate.

NOTES:
1 Social grade is not taken as a direct proxy for class, which is far more complex, but is used as one indicator.
2 http://www.pnas.org/content/early/2018/04/18/1718155115
The 2019 European election results were a stunning rejection of both main political parties, with the combined share of the vote the lowest for the two leading parties in a national election in over 100 years.

Coming just two years after the Conservatives and Labour parties polled a combined 88% of the vote in a General Election, the results represented a remarkable turnaround. Representatives of both were quick to dismiss the election results as a protest vote and normal service would return before too long.

But perhaps this is just wishful thinking and the European elections is just the latest signal that the two party system in Britain is fracturing.

HOPE not hate and Best for Britain commissioned Focal Data to conduct analysis of the combined polls of 15,231 people using a method called MRP (multilevel regression with poststratification) to estimate opinion to each constituency in Britain.

The results found that the Conservative Party would lose 181 of the seats it currently holds, mainly to the Brexit Party but also some to the Lib Dems and the SNP and a handful to Labour.

The Labour Party only falls back slightly from its current number of seats despite a 40% drop in its 2017 vote. This is due to the concentration of support but also the splitting of the Conservative/Brexit vote.

The Brexit Party would come second, winning 135 seats, 124 off the Conservative Party and 11 off Labour.

The Liberal Democrats would win 53 seats, up from its current 11, almost all from the Conservative Party, though seven from Labour, including Cambridge, Leeds North West, Portsmouth South and Bermondsey & Southwark.

Leading Conservative MPs such as Penny Mordaunt, Amber Rudd, James Brokenshire, Gavin Williamson, Johnny Mercer and David Mundell would all lose their seats. Boris Johnson’s Uxbridge and Ruislip seat and Iain Duncan Smith’s Chindford and Woodford Green seat both become very marginal.

Only 48% of people who voted Conservative in 2017 now say that they would vote Tory in a new general election: 37% would vote for the Brexit Party, while 8% would vote Lib Dem, 2% each for the Labour Party and the Greens and 1% for the SNP.

The table shows the predicted vote share for each party based on polling of 15,231 people between 17 and 30 May 2019.

---

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Predicted Vote Share</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brexit Party</td>
<td>22.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change UK</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative Party</td>
<td>21.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green Party</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour Party</td>
<td>24.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Democrat</td>
<td>17.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plaid Cymru</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scottish National Party</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK Independence Party</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1% for Change UK. So, for every one vote the Conservatives loses to remain parties, it loses three and a half votes to the Brexit Party.

Only 57% of people who voted Labour in 2017 now say that they would vote Labour in a new general election: 30% would vote for Remain parties (19% to the Lib Dems, 9% Greens and 2% for Change UK). A further 2% would support Plaid and the SNP. 10% of the 2017 Labour vote would go to the Brexit Party. So, for every one vote Labour loses to the Brexit Party, it loses slightly more than three to Remain parties.

Based on our evidence it seems virtually impossible that Labour could get a majority in Parliament with its current Brexit policy.

The only way it can form a Government will be in coalition with the Liberal Democrats and/or the SNP – and the price for such a deal will likely be a second EU referendum, a change to the voting system and/or a promise of a new independence referendum for Scotland.

With the Conservative Party likely to choose a new leader with a more hardline position on Brexit, the chances for a soft Brexit or indeed any form of compromise with Labour looks even more remote. Our polling and modelling suggests months, if not years, of political deadlock.

### REMAIN VOTERS DESERT LABOUR

Our research found that for every one vote Labour loses to the Brexit Party, the Conservatives lose three and for every one vote the Labour Party loses to the Brexit Party, it loses 3.5 to the Lib Dems, Greens, Change UK and the nationalist parties.

The Labour Party loses several seats in strong Leave-voting areas, such as Stoke-on-Trent North, Dudley North, Crewe and Nantwich and Ashfield to the Brexit Party. However, in all these seats, Labour is losing more of its 2017 vote to the Remain parties (Lib Dems, Greens and Change UK) than to the Brexit Party, so rather appealing to its Leave voters and risk alienating even more of its Remains voters, the party needs to reduce the slippage to these Remain parties.

On our prediction, Labour is set to lose Crewe and Nantwich by 3%, yet 21% of the vote is going to Remain parties – up from 5.8% these parties polled in 2017. Likewise, in Stoke-on-Trent, Labour is set to lose by 5% and yet the combined support for Remain parties is 17% - up from 3.8% in 2017.

There are also a number of safe Labour seats which are suddenly marginal because of the hemorrhaging of Tory votes to the Brexit Party and Labour losing 2017 voters to both the Brexit Party and Remain parties (Lib Dems and Greens). However, even in these seats, Labour is losing more voters to the Remain parties than the Brexit Party and to hold these seats it needs win back some of its remain voters who have moved away. In Hemsworth, for example, our model predicts Labour and the Brexit Party both on 33% of the vote, a significant drop on the 56% Labour polled in 2017. However, the bulk of Labour defections have gone to remain parties, which are now on 17%, up from the 4% they received in 2017.

Labour and the Brexit Party are also neck and neck in Dagenham & Rainham, with both parties on 31%. The combined support for remain parties is 15%, up from 2.2% they polled in 2017.

The party fails to win many of the seats it needs to win if it is to win a General Election. In 2017 Labour was 3.4% behind the Conservatives. Today, our model suggests that Labour remains 2% behind, despite the Tory vote shrinking from
Predicted seat breakdown:
Hope not hate and Best for Britain MRP based on polling of 15,231 people between 17 and 30 May 2019

- Scottish National Party
- Green Party
- Plaid Cymru
- Labour Party
- Liberal Democrats
- Brexit Party
- Conservative Party

London
49% in 2017 to 29% now. The combined support for the remain parties is 25%, up from 4.6% the Lib Dems and Greens gained in 2017. Likewise, Labour is just 3% behind Boris Johnson in his Uxbridge & Ruislip South seat and just 0.2% off from taking Iain Duncan Smith’s Chingford and Woodford Green seat. The combined remain vote in the two constituencies is 23% and 26% respectively.

There is also a total Labour wipe out in Scotland, where the party not only loses the seats it holds now but nationally it would be down to 15.8% of the vote, way off the SNP’s 38.9% and even behind the Conservatives.

THE HAPPY REMAINERS

The Liberal Democrats look set to benefit from the Conservative Party’s increasingly hardline position to deliver Brexit and the Labour Party’s refusal to support a second referendum.

The party’s gains are overwhelmingly at the expense of the Conservative Party, from whom it takes 34 seats, as opposed to the seven it wins off Labour. This can partly be explained by the fact that Liberal Democrats are more entrenched in traditionally more Conservative areas of the South West, Cheshire and more affluent areas of south west London, but it is also a reflection that many Labour voters have not forgiven the party for its time in the Coalition Government. While the Liberal Democrats win 19% of the 2017 Labour vote, the Greens take 9% and Change UK 2%.

The Lib Dems will, however, be vulnerable to the Labour Party changing position on Brexit in the seats it wins off them. Conversely, if Brexit happens with the support of Labour and then proves to be economically harmful to the country, the Liberal Democrats would expect to win considerably more Labour-held seats.

With the new Conservative Party leader likely to adopt a more hardline Brexit position, seats like Esher and Walton, Newbury, Woking and Wokingham become winnable as more moderate Conservative voters reject a no deal Brexit.

CONSERVATIVE VOTERS MOVE RIGHT

Less than half of people who voted Conservative in the 2017 General Election would do so if there was an election held today. Over a third (37.2%) would back the Brexit Party, while 11% would go to Remain parties.

These results show there is little room for a new Conservative Party leader to operate or even threaten a general election as a means to get the mandate to deliver a hard/no-deal Brexit in the event of Parliament remaining deadlocked. Even a 50% reduction in support for the Brexit Party would still be enough to prevent the Conservative Party from winning a working parliament majority and the ability to deliver a hard/no-deal Brexit.

While a new Conservative Party leader, especially one who publicly commits to leaving the EU on 31 October, even if they have not secured a deal with the EU, will experience a bounce in the polls, it is far from clear whether they will win back all the voters it is currently losing to the Brexit Party.

Nigel Farage is clearly an astute politician and as was shown during the recent European elections the Brexit Party is well run and events stage-managed, and it will not be hard for them to attack the new Conservative leader from the sidelines and undermine their credibility on Brexit.

It should also be remembered that many of those who now support the Brexit Party are not traditional Conservative Party voters or have long broken with the Conservatives. Between 30-40% of Brexit Party voters would have voted UKIP in the 2015 General Election and only 42% of this group then voted Conservative in 2017.
THE VIEWS OF THE SCOTS

KEY ISSUES

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Britain leaving the EU</strong></td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Health</strong></td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economy</strong></td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Environment</strong></td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

65 V 35
65% of Scots consider themselves more of a Remainers, while 35% identify themselves as Leavers

FAR RIGHT THREAT

37% think that far right organisations pose the greatest threat to community cohesion and public order, as opposed to 24% who list Islamist groups

73%
Think global warming poses a serious threat to the world, compared to 27% who think the threat is exaggerated

NHS FUNDING
68% think taxes should be increased to put extra money into the NHS

ANTI-FEMINISM
35% think feminism is to blame for making some men feel marginalised and demonised in society

ABOLISHED
71% think zero contract hours should be abolished

HALF
47% of Scots think a sharp reduction in immigration after the UK leaves the EU will have an adverse effect on the British economy
Our Fear and HOPE reports, stretching back to 2011, have consistently marked a positive shift in attitudes, but they have also noted a growing gulf between those who share the most liberal outlooks and those with the most hostile. This polarisation has occurred alongside growing place-based change increasingly, graduates congregate in urban areas that celebrate diversity, while many towns age and struggle to adapt to the pace of change.

The conversations we had as part of the National Conversation on Immigration revealed some stark differences in attitudes towards immigration between towns and core cities – areas which have prospered – and those which have seen decline. Our discussions were often about much more than immigration, but were about broader dissatisfaction.

Our recent report, Fear, Hope and Loss, published in autumn 2018, set out to understand the drivers of fear and hate. It pulled together six years of polling from 43,000 people, and mapped political and cultural attitudes in England and Wales to neighbourhoods of 1,000 houses. Unsurprisingly we found that it was in areas which had lost most through industrial decline, places with little diversity and little opportunity where the greatest enmity toward immigration was concentrated. These are places where up to 61% of over-16s do not have a single educational qualification, where jobs are few and far between, and where if work is available it is precarious and badly paid.

Where opportunities are greater, and where people feel more in control of their own lives, and optimistic about their success, these communities become more resilient to hateful narratives and to political manifestations of hatred. The factors that influence social attitudes are hugely individualistic, but our data suggests that environmental factors also have a substantial role to play.

We found that our previous ‘hostile’ tribes, the Active Enmity and Latent Hostile groups, were concentrated where there were high levels of deprivation – especially around employment, education and skills – in post-industrial and coastal towns, areas with predominantly white British populations. Conversely, the most liberal tribes were concentrated in core cities and near universities, where populations were generally younger, more diverse and highly educated. Not necessarily the wealthiest areas, but places where there was opportunity.

These trends are even more stark when looking at specific indicators of deprivation, such as education, training and skills or employment. Of the 100 areas most closely affiliated to the Active Enmity and Latent Hostile groups, we found that most of these areas had an average of 95% white British populations, with almost all in the 10% most deprived areas of the country. All were areas with low levels of employment, where residents were less educated and skilled than the majority of the population, and with many children growing up in poverty. There were few opportunities in these places, and the lack of education, skills and disposable income made the poverty trap very difficult to escape, with people struggling to make ends meet.

By contrast, the 100 areas most closely affiliated to the Confident Multicultural and Mainstream Liberal tribes were all located in core cities or prosperous university towns. As mostly urban areas, these were places with opportunity and were situated in the least deprived 20% areas of the country by income. All had diverse populations, with an average 63% white British population. Notably, of the 100 places most closely affiliated to the Confident Multicultural tribe, over 90% were within a few hundred metres of universities, and according to data from the indices of deprivation, were among the most educated and skilled places in the country.

There were also clear differences in the concentration of the hostile tribes, according to the size, demographics and socio-economic makeup of each conurbation. Hostile attitudes were most likely to be held by people in ex-industrial or coastal towns, while the most liberal attitudes were concentrated in inner London, and to a lesser extent in outer London and commuter towns.

Resentment towards ethnic minorities, migrants and Muslims is often part and parcel of broader resentments in people’s lives, a sense of unfairness, and of something that has been lost or taken away. Issues are often merged in their articulation.

It is not that economics alone drive hostility towards others, but a sense of displacement and loss feeds anxieties, and speaks to pre-existing
prejudice, as a sense of power and privilege slipping away fuels resentment. Globalisation has rapidly changed the structures that govern people's lives, but immigration that has occurred alongside offers a tangible target for resentment. A sense of loss fuels fears among dominant groups of being 'overtaken', from a dislocation of social status and wellbeing for those who are white and British, who struggle to keep up with progressive social norms.

HOPE not hate was founded on the very principle that if we are to counter narratives of hate, we must offer hope. We have long understood hate to often be a response to loss and an articulation of despair. But when given an alternative, especially one that understands and addresses their anger, most people will choose hope.

The growing polarisation we see stems from growing divides in our society. If people cannot have hope in their own lives, it will be so much harder for them to be hopeful about others. If we want to shift the debate, we have to start by understanding where these perspectives come from, by engaging in meaningful ways, and by offering genuine hope.

NOTES:
1. Jennings, W (2016) The bifurcation of politics: Two Englands and a divided world, University of Southampton
THE VIEWS OF TRADE UNION MEMBERS

KEY ISSUES

- 55% Brexit
- 42% Health
- 33% Economy
- 31% Environment

HALF

49% want Brexit to be stopped and the UK remain in the EU.

DISLIKE

Only 2% have a very favourable opinion of Stephen Yaxley-Lennon

WELCOMING

72% think immigration has been good for Britain

ADVERSE EFFECT

Over half think that a sharp reduction in immigration after the UK leaves the EU will have an adverse effect on the British economy

X4

Four times as many trade unionists think their personal economic circumstances will get worse if Britain leaves the EU

POLITICALLY ACTIVE

Trade union members are far more likely to have signed a petition, donated to charity and been on a demonstration than the population generally

75%

Three-quarters say that the NHS requires more funding

NHS

55% Brexit
42% Health
33% Economy
31% Environment
**THE VIEWS OF THE WELSH**

**KEY ISSUES**
- Britain leaving the EU 48%
- Health 41%
- Economy 30%

**MORE PESSIMISTIC**
57% are pessimistic about their future, slightly higher than the British average.

**REVOKE V NO DEAL**
40% of Welsh people want to Revoke Article 50 and remain in the EU, compared to 25% who want to leave without a deal.

**GOING GREEN**
83% think we all need to make some sacrifices to our lifestyles in order to stop global warming. Just 5% disagree.

**TWO-THIRDS**
64% think zero hours contracts should be abolished.

**BREXIT GLOOM**
Only 13% think their personal economic circumstances will improve once the UK leaves the EU.

63%
Think that on the whole immigration has been good for the country.

**SOS NHS**
63% think taxes should increase to boost NHS funding.

**THUMBS UP**
59% think that immigration has improved the country.
People have identified less and less with political parties since the 1970s, but our polling finds a dramatic nosedive in the levels of trust towards the political class which has occurred over just a few months. As the deadlock in Parliament over Brexit goes on, and infighting swamping the major parties, political mistrust has swirling.

The percentage of people who feel that none of the main political parties speak for themselves has risen dramatically – from 61% in December 2018 to 68% in July 2018. By May 2019 it had risen to a huge 73%, that’s nearly three out of every four people in the country. Just over a quarter – 27% – are confident that at least one of the main political parties reflects what they think.

This rapid surge in mistrust is for many a response to how Brexit has been managed. More than half of all Leave voters feel very negatively about the decision to delay Britain’s departure from the European Union (56%), while the vast majority of Remain voters want to reverse Brexit and remain in the EU (74%), a position not adopted by any of the main political parties.

Infighting among the major political parties over Brexit has further weakened public trust. Our poll from February 2019 found that only 2% of people were impressed with the way politicians had handled the Brexit process, while three-quarters (75%) felt that politicians put the interests and views of big business before people like them.

When asked about leading political figures, this disconnect is clear across the political spectrum. Less than 10% of people who have heard of each person say they identify closely with any leading political figure.

Not only do people not feel they are getting what they want from Brexit, but there is a widespread perception that politicians have left the public in the dark over the process, which is distracting them from more important issues. Exactly half (50%) of our latest poll believe that the media and politicians work together to lie to the public (this includes 44% of Remain voters and 51% of Leave voters).

During a series of focus groups on Brexit throughout the summer of 2018 people expressed a profound distance they felt from Westminster.
Not only did they feel alienated by the language and process of Brexit, but they also underlined that feeling of politicians keeping them in the dark over what exactly was happening. The perception was that politicians were acting in their own self-interest to promote their careers. Following on from this, in our January 2019 YouGov poll, a majority (57%) of people agreed: ‘Brexit is a symptom of problems in society, not a cause. It is a distraction from fixing the problems we have as a country.’ Only 21% disagreed. Leave voters are slightly more likely to feel they are not represented by our political parties than Remain voters, though both sides of the Brexit debate feel let down by how the main political parties are handling Britain’s exit from the EU.
A huge 79% of Leave voters say they do not feel that any of the main parties speak for them, while two-thirds (67%) of Remain voters feel the same way.

**Broken Relationships**

When asked about the warmth people feel towards different political groups, it is evident that the main political parties have a broken relationship with their voters. Fewer than 10% of people feel very warm towards any of the established political parties.

A lack of clarity around the Labour party’s position on Brexit has damaged the relationship with their voters. Our polling from January 2019 found that only 9% of 2017 Labour voters said they would view the party more positively if Labour agreed to support the implementation of Theresa May’s Brexit deal. At the same time, only 5% of Labour 2017 voters felt strongly that they would never now vote for the party. But our new poll shows that Labour Leave voters are more likely to have abandoned the party than Labour Remain voters. Just 2% of Labour Remain voters feel most strongly that they would never vote Labour now compared to 11% of Labour Leave voters, though our focus group research suggests that this is not only because of the party’s position on Brexit, but because this group are more likely to have less political trust overall, and many feel the party is not acting in their interests.

The Conservative party appears to have an even worse relationship with its 2017 base. People who voted Conservative in 2017 are more likely (73%) than those who voted Labour (69%) to feel that none of the main political parties speaks for them. Moreover, over time there has been a greater decrease in political trust among Conservative voters than voters of any other party. The proportion of those who say they are confident that at least one of the main political parties reflects what they think is falling sharply, from 44% in July 2018 to only 27% less than a year later. Political trust among Labour voters fell by half that rate over the same time.

Only 11% of 2017 Conservative voters now say that they feel very warm towards the party, while 7% feel very strongly that they would never vote for the party. Three times as many Conservative Leave voters (9%) as Conservative Remain voters (3%) feel strongly that they would never vote Conservative now.

A broken relationship between the Conservative Party and its voters over Brexit is haemorrhaging into support for Nigel Farage’s Brexit Party. Almost a quarter of 2017 Conservative voters (23%), and a third (32%) of Conservative Leave voters, feel very strongly warm towards the Brexit party.

**Political Trust and the Tribes**

Trust in mainstream politics is a key dividing line for our new identity tribes. Across all groups, more people feel that there is no political party that reflects what they think than feel represented, but the force with which some groups feel shafted by the political system frames much of their broader worldview.

The two groups who feel least represented by the political system, the Anti-Establishment...
Pessimists and the Anxious Ambivalents, are most likely to have left the education system at a young age, are most likely to be working class, and are mostly white British. These are groups of people who feel that they do not have a voice, are most detached from the political system and are both unlikely to vote. They are pessimistic about the future, though differ to the extent this resentment and feeling of ‘voicelessness’ transfers into hostility towards migrants and minorities.

The Hostile Brexeters tribe and the Established Optimists also find no political party reflects their views, though both of these groups are more likely to vote. Established Optimists are a pragmatic, comfortable middle-Englander group, who have a greater degree of faith in the political system than the other identity tribes despite their feeling that no political party reflects their centrist views. Hostile Brexeters identify strongly with Nigel Farage, and show a high level of support for his Brexit Party.

Those with the strongest views on Brexit and identity issues are most likely to think that the political system is broken. The liberal tribes feel angry about Brexit, and feel that the political system is broken because they believe they are the silenced 48% of the population (who voted to remain in the EU). The tribes who are most in favour of Britain's departure from the EU feel that the political system is broken because they feel that politicians are working in their own self interest, and thus feel betrayed by ‘treacherous’ politicians.

Looking at the degree of warmth each of the tribes feels towards the main political parties and to leading political figures, there are clear divides. The two liberal tribes see Jeremy Corbyn favourably. However, he is among the least popular figure among all the other tribes. Those who view Jeremy Corbyn favourably tend to be middle class, to be educated to degree level or higher, and are more likely to live in London.

No tribe shows a lot of warmth towards Theresa May or the Conservatives, but the middle ground tribes have maintained some faith in the party, and are likely to continue to vote for them.
Average position of the tribes on a scale of 0-100 how warm do you feel towards each of these parties, where 0 means you absolutely would never vote for the party and 100 means you feel politically very warm towards the party.
Average position of the tribes on a scale of 0–100, where 0 means you do not identify at all with this political figure and 100 means you identify closely with this political figure.

**Active Multiculturalists**

**Liberal Remainers**

**Established optimist**

**Comfortable ambivalent**

**Anxious ambivalent**

**Hostile Brexiters**

**Anti-establishment pessimists**
The Hostile Brexiter tribe held the highest share of the 2017 Conservative vote, but now feels betrayed by the party as a result of delays to Brexit. They are now most likely to identify with the Brexit Party.

A lack of faith in the main political parties, politicians, and the political system as a whole also reflects a sentiment among many that they have been suppressed by ‘P.C. culture’. Those who have struggled to keep up with progressive social norms feel challenged by an elite they feel is out of touch, and which does not understand the problems they face and only acts in their own interest.

Just over half (55%) of our May 2019 poll say that political correctness is used by the liberal elite to limit what we can say, while 45% think that concern about political correctness has been whipped up by the right-wing media to undermine those who believe in tolerance and anti-racism. A huge 72% of Leave voters and 71% of 2017 Conservative voters believe that political correctness is limiting what we can say.

People who feel detached from the political class, who feel suppressed and voiceless, are also most likely to think that politicians and the media conspire together to lie to the public.

A huge 60% of the Anti-Establishment Pessimist tribe and the Anxious Ambivalent tribe believe that politicians and the media are working together to lie to the public. The Liberal Remainer tribe is also more likely to believe this conspiracy, reflective of its members’ frustrations over Brexit, and what they see as a biased media offering a platform to figures such as Nigel Farage, to share what they consider extreme views.

We find a clear appetite across all of the identity tribes for greater engagement between politicians and ordinary people, to ensure their voices are heard and represented. If there is one lesson we should be taking away from the Brexit vote and its fallout, it is that we need to start doing politics differently.

With Parliament deadlocked, no side of the referendum happy about any of the options on the table, and discussion over the UK’s future with the EU confined to the chambers of Westminster, public faith in the political system has disintegrated. People clearly want consultation, and the majority of all our identity tribes, even the liberal groups who feel most represented by the political system, want politicians to pay more attention to voters’ views.

As mentioned above, this sentiment is most profound among the identity tribes who feel voiceless. The Anxious Ambivalent group feels a similar detachment from the political system to the Anti-Establishment Pessimist group, but differs in its attitudes towards migrants and minorities, with the Anti-Establishment Pessimists angry – and even willing to endorse or endure violence. If the Anxious Ambivalents continue to feel voiceless, their anti-elitism could easily turn into resentment, and that could lead to a drift into the Anti-Establishment Pessimist tribe.

Despite their faults, the media do their best to hold politicians to account and call them out when they are caught lying

The media and politicians work together to lie to the public
BREXIT ‘TRAITORS’ AND THE POTENTIAL FOR VIOLENCE

A lack of trust in politicians, growing as a result of the Brexit process, is creating a toxic atmosphere in our political and national discourse, with MPs now on the receiving end of serious threats and abuse. With Brexit further and further delayed, Remain-supporting MPs and law makers have increasingly been targeted, often aggressively, and occasionally violently labelled as ‘traitors’.

We have seen an increasing number of far-right figures attempting to capitalise on the anger many feel about Brexit. These attempts are being orchestrated by a tiny, but organised, minority who don’t represent most Leave voters.

Nonetheless, these aggressive tactics have increasingly been adopted by mainstream media outlets and political figures. The Daily Express newspaper ran a threatening headline: “Ignore the will of the people at your peril”, while the Daily Mail’s front page declared: “Enemies of the people”, set against photographs of three judges who had ruled that the UK Government would require the consent of Parliament to give notice of Brexit.

Nigel Farage launched his Brexit Party with an aggressive speech in which he set out to “to put the fear of God into our members of Parliament in Westminster. They deserve nothing less for the way they have treated us over this betrayal.”

In March 2019 we surveyed MPs about the level and nature of abuse they receive. The vast majority have told us that it was growing, with the abuse directed at MPs and their staff becoming increasingly aggressive. We were told that Brexit was often a motivating factor, with abuse received from all sides of the debate. Female MPs are receiving the majority of vitriol, and are more likely to have received threats to themselves and their families:

“The referendum result...seems to have given licence for people to say things online that they would never have said previously. There is a different atmosphere in our political debate”

“Verbal abuse and threats to staff have grown. Used to be disgruntled constituents or those at end of immigration processes but more recently shift is towards politically motivated abuse - including from Labour members.”

Public mistrust of the political class, alongside the mainstreaming of anti-politics sentiment, means that there appears to be little resistance to abuse towards ‘the establishment’.

Our previous Fear and HOPE reports have also all asked whether people would support a campaign against the construction of a mosque, and whether they would reconsider their views if things on either side became violent. In July 2018, 66% of people said that they felt violence from either side was unacceptable and would reconsider their view. Only 21% felt that the issues were so serious that you would have to be prepared to support one side or the other, even if some people on your side sometimes took things too far.

When we asked this question in light of a supporting a campaign to reverse Brexit, just 17% of people who would support such a campaign said that they would reconsider their view if there were protests that became violent or threatened violence. A near-two-thirds majority – 64% – said violence would not make them reconsider their view.

With no consensus in Parliament over the approach to Brexit, some people have suggested that the government should hold citizens assemblies in towns and cities across the country, where a cross-section of the public are selected to discuss Brexit and decide the way forward. Would you support or oppose such citizens assemblies of this kind?

Fieldwork: 23rd - 24th January 2019 Sample size 1,657 YouGov

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Support citizens assemblies and the outcome should be binding for future decisions surrounding Brexit</th>
<th>Oppose citizens assemblies</th>
<th>Support citizens assemblies but should only be used to inform future decisions surrounding Brexit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>29%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Don’t know | 10%

NOTES:
When asked whether people consider themselves more of a Remain voter, or more of a Leave voter, the majority of people (60%) now see themselves at either extreme. While there have been sizeable shifts over time over what people want from Brexit, there has been little shift in how people identify, with Remain voters in particular hardening their stance.

Our Fear and HOPE reports have traced whether people feel optimistic or pessimistic about the future since 2011. We found this to be a key driver behind attitudes. People who were more optimistic about their own lives tended to hold more liberal views than those who felt pessimistic. People who were more optimistic tended to feel more in control of their own lives and were less likely to hold negative views toward immigration and multiculturalism.

However, the EU referendum completely reversed these patterns of optimism and pessimism. Two years on, our July 2018 YouGov poll found that seventy-one percent (71%) of Remain voters said they felt pessimistic for the future, more than twice the proportion of Leave voters (35%). In our latest polling, we continue to find that Remainers are most likely to predict dire consequences for the future, a view not shared by Leave voters.

Pessimism that things will get worse after Britain leaves the EU have hardened for Remainers since July 2018, but Brexit optimism remains among many Leave voters. A high number – 82% – of Remain voters think the economy as a whole would be better if Britain remained in the EU (up from 77% in July 2018), but 66% of Leave voters think it would be better if the UK leaves the EU (up from 65% in July 2018). Nearly three-quarters (74%) of Remain voters think their personal economic situation would be better if the UK remained in the EU (up from 69% in 2018), but among Leavers, 46% think their personal economic situation would be made better by leaving the EU (up from 45% in 2018). Meanwhile 82% of Remainers think that opportunities for children growing up today would be made better by remaining in the EU (up from 76% in 2018), while 56% of Leave voters think this would be made better by leaving (up from 54% in 2018). Eight out of ten – 80% – of Observer readers think that opportunities for children growing up today would be better if the UK remained in the EU, compared to only 21% of Daily Star readers.
However, Brexit was never as clear-cut as Leave or Remain, and groups of voters on both sides of the referendum were in no way homogenous. Our new identity tribes show how Brexit identities do not just divide us between Leave and Remain. The extent to which we identify with Leave or Remain also reveals our social attitudes, as well as our trust in the establishment, the way in which we filter information, and our expectations for the future.

The two liberal tribes, Active Multiculturalists and Liberal Remainers, identify strongly with Remain and are extremely concerned about the predicted economic damage Brexit is likely to cause. Overwhelmingly, they see benefits from immigration, and are concerned about the impact that Brexit will have on this.

On the whole, 45% of people agree that Brexit has enabled and legitimised prejudice towards migrants and ethnic minorities – just 26% disagree. However, this view is concentrated among the liberal tribes. A massive 93% of the Active Multiculturalist group and 87% of the Liberal Remainer tribes worry about this; conversely only 11% of the Anti-Establishment Pessimists and 12% of the Hostile Brexiters believe that Brexit has legitimised prejudice and discrimination towards migrants and ethnic minorities.

It is clear that many are feeling the effects of Brexit resentment borne out through anti-Muslim prejudice. Sixty-one percent (61%) of Pakistani and Bangladeshi respondents agree that Brexit has enabled and legitimised prejudice towards migrants and ethnic minorities, while just 10% disagree.
The two identity tribes which are most strongly opposed to immigration and multiculturalism identify more as Leave voters. However, Brexit draws a core divide between these two groups, who otherwise hold very similar attitudes.

The Hostile Brexeters tribe are strongly motivated by Brexit, and feel that leaving the EU will change things for the better. Nearly half – 47% – of this tribe think that things will be better for the country as a whole in 10 years’ time, with only 19% saying that things will be worse.

The Anti-Establishment Pessimists strongly identify as Leave voters, and are frustrated about delays to Brexit, but do not feel as hopeful that Brexit will change things for the better. The most dissatisfied with their lives of all the identity tribes, Brexit has brought this group little hope.

They share much pessimism about the future with the liberal tribes, although unlike these groups the Anti-Establishment Pessimists’ cynicism is not driven by fears about Brexit triggering economic decline. Almost half – 49% – of this tribe say that things will get worse for Britain as a whole in 10 years’ time, with only 11% thinking things will get better.

While the Hostile Brexeters identify most with Nigel Farage and are most likely to vote for the Brexit Party, the Anti-Establishment Pessimist tribe feels detached from the political system, feeling that things will get worse for both themselves and the country as a whole, and are resigned in thinking that Brexit won’t change anything.

The three middle-ground tribes are less motivated by Brexit, and all contain a mix of Leave and Remain voters. The Active Multiculturalists are the most forward-thinking, with 48% of the tribe saying things will get better for the country as a whole in 10 years’ time. The Comfortable ambivalent tribe is more evenly split, with 43% agreeing and 34% disagreeing. The Hostile Brexeters are the most pessimistic, with 21% of the tribe saying things will get better and 22% saying things will get worse.

A sharp reduction in immigration after the UK leaves the EU will have an adverse effect on the British economy.
Remain voters. They see Britain’s departure from the EU as an important issue, but see other issues as more important, and feel that Brexit is distracting from this. Many in these middle groups would like to see Brexit over and done with, and are a little perturbed that the process of leaving the EU has dragged on for so long.

Almost two-thirds (65%) of Leave voters say that if it looked like Brexit was about to be reversed, they would get behind a campaign to stop it happening.

The strength of our Brexit identities acts as a filter on the information we choose to believe. The liberal tribes are most concerned about warnings of economic decline following Britain’s departure from the EU, while the two hostile tribes think these predictions are exaggerated in order to keep Britain in the EU and maintain the status quo. Ninety percent (90%) of Active Multiculturalists think that now that the UK has begun the process of leaving the European Union, the country’s economic circumstance will get worse over the next few years. Only 23% of the Hostile Brexiter think things will get worse, while 43% think things will get better.

Similarly, the hostile tribes are unlikely to believe news predicting adverse impacts from labour shortages following Britain’s departure from the EU, while the Active Multiculturalist and Liberal Remainer groups do worry about this.

With such different expectations from Brexit, there is still no consensus over what people want to see from Brexit. Thirty-nine percent (39%) of our poll say that the Brexit outcome would most support is reversing Brexit entirely and staying in the EU, 13% would accept the Government’s deal, and just 8% would choose to leave the EU but stay inside the single market and customs union. Remain voters still strongly favour reversing Brexit to stay in the EU (74%) over leaving the EU on the terms negotiated by the Government (8%); leaving the EU, but staying inside the customs union and single market (9%); or leaving the EU with no deal (4%). Leave voters still favour leaving the EU with no deal (58%) over leaving the EU on the terms negotiated by the Government (19%); leaving the EU, but staying inside the customs union and single market (8%); or reversing Brexit to stay in the EU (6%).

Almost two-thirds (65%) of Leave voters say that if it looked like Brexit was about to be reversed, they would get behind a campaign to stop it happening (50% would strongly support such a campaign). Unsurprisingly, the more Brexit-motivated Hostile Brexiter tribe is slightly more likely to support this campaign (71%) than the Anti-Establishment Pessimist group (57%).

However, among those who would support such a campaign among both of these tribes, 72% would not reconsider their view if, as part of the campaign, there were protests that became violent or threatened violence.

When we have previously asked a similar question, where people were asked if they would support a campaign against the construction of a mosque, and whether they would reconsider their views if things on either side became violent, just 21% of people said that they would continue to support the campaign if there was violence on either side.

Although those who would be willing to enact violence in defence of their political position remains a tiny minority, the fact that this would not make the majority of people reconsider their views indicates a political shift. Indicative of the emotion people feel behind their Brexit position, this should raise some concern.

Do you think that each of the following will be better if the UK remains in the EU, or if the UK leaves the EU, or do you not think it doesn’t make much difference either way?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic prospects for you and your family</th>
<th>Jul-18</th>
<th>Apr-18</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Better if the UK Remains in the EU</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better if the UK Leaves the EU</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It doesn’t make too much difference either way</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opportunities for children growing up today</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Better if the UK Remains in the EU</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better if the UK Leaves the EU</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It doesn’t make too much difference either way</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The economy as a whole</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Better if the UK Remains in the EU</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better if the UK Leaves the EU</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It doesn’t make too much difference either way</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The public want the final say on Brexit

The proportion of people in each constituency who agree with the statement that "the politicians have failed on Brexit - let's give the public the final say"
THE VIEWS OF LONDONERS

KEY ISSUES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Britain leaving the EU</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

WHO ARE WE?

Only 50% on Londoners describe themselves as British and 21% as English. Both considerably less than any other region in Britain.

73%

73% think having a wide variety of backgrounds and cultures is part of British culture, compared to 63% nationally. 73% also think that immigration has been good for the country, compared to 62% nationally.

MORE POSITIVE

66% of Londoners think Britain is a successful multicultural society. This compares to 53% nationally.

NO SUPPORT HERE TOMMY

Only 1% of Londoners have a very favourable view of Tommy Robinson.

REMAIN CENTRAL

63% identify themselves as Remainers.

3:1

By a margin of almost 3 to 1, Londoners think their personal economic situation will get worse after Britain leaves the EU.

OVERWHELMING

83% think it is wrong to blame all Muslims for the actions of a violent minority.

ADVERSE EFFECT

52% think a sharp reduction in immigration after the UK leaves the EU will have an adverse effect on the British economy. Only 20% disagree.
The combination of the Extinction Rebellion protests in London over Easter, which saw over 1,100 people arrested during a week of civil disobedience in the capital, and the airing of Sir David Attenborough’s ‘Climate Change – The Facts’ documentary on the BBC in the same week, had a profound effect on the public opinion. HOPE not hate's polling, conducted in the last few days of April, saw the Environment become the third most important issue in the minds of voters after Brexit and health. Ranked as one of their top issues by 27% of voters, this put concern for the environment above the economy, crime and education.

This was a sharp jump from even last summer, when the Environment ranked as the seventh most important issue at just 17%.

Unsurprisingly, those who voted Green in 2017 ranked the Environment highest (60%), followed by Lib Dem voters (46%), Labour voters (34%) and then Conservative voters (19%).

Almost 40% of Remain voters (39%) listed the Environment as a key issue, compared to just 16% of Leave voters. It is the second most important issue for young people, with 38% of 18-24 year-olds listing it, compared to 25% for over 65's, though this still made it their equal third most important issue (up from 15% in July 2018).

Clearly the further to the right of the political spectrum one goes the less important of an issue the Environment is. Only 14% of people who strongly like Nigel Farage rank it as a key issue, and just 11% who have favourable views of Stephen Yaxley-Lennon (Tommy Robinson) do so.

Across the whole population, there is overwhelming support for greater action to protect the environment, with 79% agreeing with the statement that “We must all be prepared to make some sacrifices to our lifestyles in order to stop global warming”. Only 6% disagreed.

Support for action crossed all political, gender and age categories, including three-quarters of all Conservative voters, 74% of 2016 Leave voters and even 63% of people who voted UKIP in 2015. Even Farage supporters backed this statement by a margin of four to one and Yaxley-Lennon supporters by almost three to one. However, there was much bigger divergence when asked if people felt that “the threat of climate change is exaggerated.” Overall, a quarter of people polled supported this statement, though only 8% backed it very strongly.

The view that the climate change threat is being exaggerated is held by 33% of 2017 Conservative voters and the same number of those who voted leave in the Referendum. However, the figure rises to 44% of UKIP’s 2015 voters, 43% of those who strongly support Farage and 51% of those who hold favourable views of Stephen Yaxley-Lennon.
In a mid-May 2019 HOPE not hate poll of 9,483 voters conducted with DataPraxis, 59% of respondents supported the statement that “Protection of the environment should be given priority, even at the risk of curbing economic growth”, with just 13% opposing it.

There was support for the view across the political spectrum, with even Brexit Party supporters agreeing with it over opposing it by a margin of almost two to one. Unsurprisingly, young people had the strongest views on this, backing the proposition by 72% to 6%.

Almost 60% of people felt that climate change posed such a danger that it needed to take priority over other issues. Just 17% disagreed.

While Remain voters felt more strongly about this issue, 43% of 2016 Leave voters also supported this view, with just 27% opposing it.

Our polling revealed a major spike in concern over climate change and a growing determination for greater action in the immediate aftermath of the Extinction Rebellion protests and the documentary by Sir David Attenborough. However, as the memory of this fades and the 31st October Brexit deadline looms, there is a real danger that this will fall down the political agenda yet again.
At the time of the EU Referendum, the Ipsos Mori attitudes tracker found that immigration was the most salient issue facing the country, a trend that had been consistent over several years, with 48% in June 2016 listing immigration as the single biggest issue of concern.

However, after the referendum, immigration sharply dropped off the public’s list of most important issues. While there had been no significant change in the scale or rate of immigration, the public’s concern dwindled.

Our latest Fear and HOPE poll finds that support for immigration continues to grow incrementally, with the share of those who think that immigration has been more good than bad for the country up to 63% from 60% in July 2018, and 40% in February 2011.

The reasons for this more positive view of immigration are complicated, but much can be attributed to a broader liberal shift in public attitudes, increased diversity, and an improvement in economic conditions. For those with more hostile attitudes, a sense that Brexit might solve the ‘immigration problem’ had reduced concern, or their concerns were wrapped up in their focus on Britain’s departure from the EU. For those who already saw immigration positively, Brexit triggered a hardening of their support.

Yet the overall shift on immigration has improved across political and demographic divides. Ipsos Mori found in March 2019 that of those who had said they were becoming more positive about immigration, half attributed it to more positive discussion about immigrants.

Indeed, ahead of the referendum, a Kings College study found that immigration and the economy were the two most-covered issues in national media, which they described by as “acrimonious and divisive”. Yet since the referendum – with migration flows from the Middle East and Africa to Europe (in what was commonly referred to as ‘the migration crisis’) slowing – media coverage of immigration appears to have changed.

Widespread coverage of the Windrush scandal in 2018, which revealed that thousands of British Caribbean people had been wrongly detained, denied legal rights, threatened with or wrongfully deported by the Home Office as a result of the Hostile Environment policy, garnered public sympathy and outrage rather than furthering anti-migrant sentiment.

Overall, immigration is seen more negatively by Leave than Remain voters, but is not such a polarising issue as we might think. There remains a moderate majority with balanced views of immigration.
Among the different tribes, only the Anti-Establishment Pessimists see immigration as having a more negative than positive effect on the country, though support varies across the different groups.

The Anxious Ambivalents and Hostile Brexeters both see immigration as having a more positive economic rather than cultural effect. Just over a quarter (27%) of the Hostile Brexeters and half (50%) of the Anxious Ambivalent tribes see a positive effect from multiculturalism on the British economy, but only 12% of the Hostile Brexeters and 35% of the Anxious Ambivalent groups feel that it has been positive for British culture.

At the same time, arguments about the economic contribution of migrants have not made much traction with Leave voters. Only 17% think that a sharp reduction in immigration after the UK leaves the EU will have an adverse effect on the British economy, something 72% of Remain voters are concerned about. Over half (52%) of Leave voters actively dispute this, which may highlight a link between their optimism about Britain’s economic success after Brexit and a view among many that migrants are a drain on resources.

Most of the identity tribes, especially those with the most positive view of immigration, feel more strongly that this impact has been on the country
as a whole than on their local community. This may be because many respondents feel more neutral about migration in their own areas, but it also reflects what we found in the National Conversation on Immigration.

The largest ever public engagement on immigration, for National Conversation on Immigration (run jointly with British Future) we travelled to 60 different towns and cities across the UK and engaged around 20,000 people in conversations on immigration. Many people we spoke to saw the positive gains from immigration on a national scale, but felt that the impacts of immigration were local. We found that people discussed their concerns about immigration in relation to local pressures on public services, such as shortages of hospital appointments.

Despite shifts in the proportion of people who see immigration positively, more people continue to believe that new immigrants are given priority ahead over established residents when it comes to benefits or using public services than dispute this: 45% agree, while 28% disagree.

The vast majority of Conservative voters think that this is true (64% agree, 14% disagree), as do the majority of Leave voters (69% agree, 11% disagree). However immigration will continue to be an issue that Labour struggles with, with its 2017 vote split on the issue: 32% agree that new immigrants are given priority ahead over established residents, while 42% disagree. And a quarter believe that new immigrants are given priority ahead over established residents when it comes to benefits or using public services (24%).

Immigration has become a less salient public issue since the EU Referendum, but there are clearly still concerns about immigration. There are also expectations by many that immigration will decrease after Brexit, but there is currently little clarity about what policy changes on immigration will take place. With rising anger, frustration and a growing anti-politics and anti-establishment sentiment, it seems immigration could once again rear its head, ripe for exploitation in public and political debate once the Brexit outcome is decided.

NOTES:
1 https://www.ipsos.com/ipsos-mori/en-uk/political-monitor-archive
3 https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/may/10/brexit-eu-referendum-campaign-media-coverage-immigration
Positive attitudes towards immigration
The proportion of people in each constituency who believe that immigration, on the whole, has been a good thing for Britain

Negative attitudes towards immigration

London
The attitude of Conservative Party members is far more negative towards Muslims than society at large – which is alarming given that their party runs the Government.

New polling carried out exclusively for HOPE not hate shows that Conservative members – the very people who are currently deciding who Britain’s next prime minister will be – show worrying beliefs in Islamophobic myths, don’t want a Muslim to be Prime Minister, and overwhelmingly reject even the very idea that the Conservative Party has a problem with this issue.

Our polling has revealed worrying levels of Islamophobia among Conservative Party members, as well as a shocking level of denial about the problems the party faces.

While Conservative members believe that discrimination against Muslims is a big, rather than small, issue by 48% to 39%, members also buy into Islamophobic myths:

- 67% believe the lie that “there are areas in Britain that operate under Sharia law”, as opposed to just 18% who do not believe this to be the case.
- 45% believe the lie that “there are areas in Britain in which non-Muslims are not able to enter”, as opposed to just 34% who do not believe this to be the case.

Conservative members also show a high level of hostility to the Muslim community:

- 39% of members believe that “Islamist terrorists reflect a widespread hostility to Britain amongst the Muslim community”.
- Just 8% of members agreed that “I would be proud of Britain if we were to elect a Muslim as our Prime Minister”, while 43% agreed that “I would prefer to not have the country led by a Muslim”.
- Conservative members are much more opposed to immigration from people from a Muslim background than from those of other faiths: just 3% say that immigration policy should be geared to higher Muslim immigration, compared to 12% for people fleeing war, 16% for Jewish people and 25% for Christians. The fact that members view immigrants different according to their faith suggests an underlying prejudice.
- 40% of Tory Party members believe that we should lower the number of Muslims entering Britain, as opposed to just 5% who want to see fewer Christians or Jewish people enter the country.

These numbers underline the fact that the spate of media stories about Conservative members are not isolated incidents.

Given the anti-Muslim sentiments of huge numbers of members, it is not surprising to learn that they dismiss the recent spate of incidents of Islamophobia:

- Just 8% of members think there is a problem of Islamophobia or racism towards Muslims within the Conservative Party. A massive 79% don’t think there is a problem.
- Only 15% of members think the Conservative Party should be doing more to combat any Islamophobia or other racism within the party, compared to 76% of members who think the party is “already doing all it reasonably can to combat Islamophobia and other racism within the party”.

**FROM THE GRASSROOTS TO THE GREAT OFFICES OF STATE**

It’s not just members of the party who have expressed Islamophobic views.

At the very top of the party, Boris Johnson infamously disparaged Muslim women as looking like “letterboxes” and “bank robbers”. In the days after Johnson made his comments, Muslim women who wore the niqab reported having those words thrown at them as insults on public transport.

Johnson has a track record of this sort derogatory and ignorant comment towards Muslims. In his Have I Got Views For You book, he wrote: “The proposed ban on incitement to “religious hatred” makes no sense unless it involves a ban on the Koran itself.”

Complaints about Islamophobia amongst leading activists and councillors have been piling up.

HOPE not hate has written to the Conservative Party and the leadership candidates to raise our concerns – but to date we have had no response. We have urged them to show leadership by
publicly and unambiguously committing to tackle this issue and – as we have done with Labour over antisemitism – offered to work with them in this process.

The poll was conducted by YouGov, with a total sample size of 864 adults. The fieldwork was undertaken between 14th – 18th June 2019. The survey was carried out online. The figures have been weighted and are representative of all GB adults (aged 18+).

NOTES:
THE VIEWS OF THE JEREMY CORBYN SUPPORTER

Those who hold very favourable views towards Jeremy Corbyn

KEY ISSUES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brexit</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

BLEAK DAYS

74% think Britain’s economy will get worse if Britain leaves the EU, just 9% think it will get better

POSITIVE EFFECT

Three-quarters believe that multiculturalism has had a positive effect on the British economy

WHO ARE WE?

Only 13% identify themselves as English, half the national figure

AS STRONG AS EVER

50% think British values are as strong as ever, compared to 34% nationally

COMING TOGETHER

55% think that community initiatives that work to bring people from different backgrounds together so they can get to know one another is the best way to improve relations between Muslim and non-Muslim communities

THUMBS UP FOR IMMIGRATION

82% think immigration has been good for Britain

89%
Think we need to make some lifestyle sacrifices to help combat climate change
REVOKE AND REMAIN
68% want to revoke article 50 and remain in the UK

DISTRUSTING MMS
63% think the media and politicians work together to lie to the British people

SOS NHS
82% want higher taxes to provide extra funds for the NHS

DISCRIMINATION
Almost 80% say Muslims face serious discrimination in Britain today

THE JEREMY CORBYN SUPPORTER
HOPE not hate has profiled those who view Jeremy Corbyn very favourably and they have slightly different views from Labour Party voters generally. They are slightly less concerned about Brexit, crime and pensions, though considerably more concerned about the environment, housing and education.

They are less likely to identify with as British or English, and much more likely to identify as European.

Unsurprisingly, Corbyn supporters are much more strongly opposed to Theresa May and the Conservatives than Labour voters in general, but at they also more attracted to the Greens and Caroline Lucas.

They are slightly more active than the average Labour supporter and a lot more active than the average person. Two-thirds have signed a petition in the last year, and they are three times more likely to have donated to a political cause, three times as likely to have been on a demonstration and twice as likely to have attended a political or community meeting.

Corbyn’s own suspicions of the media is mirrored by his strong supporters. Almost two thirds think that the media and politicians conspire to lie to the public.

Their loyalty to Corbyn is being tested over Brexit. They are considerably more in favour of Remain and 68% want to Revoke article 50 and remain in the EU.

With three-quarters believing the country would be worse off if Britain leaves the EU, Corbyn’s ambiguous position on Brexit is stretching their patience and ultimately their support.
Since we published our first *Fear and HOPE* report in 2011, we have seen a general liberal shift, alongside a softening in attitudes to immigration, with more and more people seeing multiculturalism as a positive thing.

The proportion of people who feel that having a wide variety of backgrounds and cultures is part of British culture has increased from 49% in 2011 up to 63% in May 2019. The proportion of those who think that having a wide variety of backgrounds and cultures is part of British culture.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perception</th>
<th>Anti-Establishment Pessimists</th>
<th>Hostile Brexites</th>
<th>Anxious ambivalent</th>
<th>Comfortable ambivalent</th>
<th>Established Optimists</th>
<th>Liberal Remainers</th>
<th>Active Multiculturalist</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Britain’s multiracial society isn’t working and different communities generally live separate lives</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain is a successful multicultural society where people from different backgrounds generally get along well together</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Having a wide variety of backgrounds and cultures has undermined British culture</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Having a wide variety of backgrounds and cultures is part of British culture</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Those who think that the variety of cultures and backgrounds are part of British culture

Those who think that having a wide variety of backgrounds and cultures has undermined British culture

London

Attitudes towards Britain's multicultural society
The proportion of people in each constituency who believe that having a wide variety of backgrounds and cultures has undermined British culture

30.0
40.0
50.0
backgrounds and cultures has undermined British culture has decreased from 51% in 2011 to 37% in May 2019.

But multiculturalism remains a polarising issue. Conservative voters are sceptical about multiculturalism: 52% think that British culture has been undermined by multiculturalism, compared to less than a quarter of Labour voters (24%). More than twice as many over-65s (50%) as 18-24-year-olds (23%) think British culture has been undermined by multiculturalism. People with higher levels of education, those who live in London, or those from BAME minorities are all more likely to feel that multiculturalism benefits British culture.

Support for multiculturalism marks a critical division between the identity tribes. In fact, 99% of the Active Multiculturalist tribe believe that having a wide variety of backgrounds and cultures is part of British culture, while only 14% of the Anti-Establishment Pessimist tribe feel the same way. This strong enmity towards multiculturalism among the latter reflects their prejudice as well as anger and resentment towards city elites, and their sense that multiculturalism is not benefiting them or their communities.

And despite growing overall support for multiculturalism, we have seen a hardening of concerns about Muslims and Islam in Britain, and an increase in the public salience of integration.
These public perceptions of integration are cynical and often at odds with the reality of community relations in the UK. People are now more likely to feel that Britain is a successful multicultural society where those from different backgrounds generally get along well together (53%). But there remains a large share of the population with a cynical view of community relations, who think that Britain's multicultural society isn't working and different communities generally live separate lives (47%). This has increased from January 2018, when 50% thought that Britain was a successful multicultural society (once ‘neither’ and ‘don’t knows’ were taken out).

The greatest pessimism is among Leave, Conservative and UKIP voters, older people, and those with no formal qualifications. Only 28% of BAME people feel that Britain's multicultural society isn't working and different communities generally live separate lives. The tribes are predictably split on this question, with the two liberal groups at odds with the Hostile Brexiter and Anti-Establishment Pessimist groups.

Half – 50% – of people living in rural areas, and 49% of people in towns, perceive that Britain's multicultural society isn't working and different communities generally live separate lives, a statement only 34% of people in London support. There remains a divide in perceptions of multiculturalism. Among people who have lived in London, 66% feel that Britain's multicultural society is working well, 20% greater than those who live in Yorkshire and Humberside (46%), the East and West Midlands (48%) and Wales (49%).

People continue to see more benefits of multiculturalism for the economy (54%) than for British culture (45%). However, they are also more likely to see a negative impact of multiculturalism on culture (36%) than the economy (20%), too. These are polarising questions for the tribes, with the two hostile groups seeing a negative effect of multiculturalism on both culture and the economy, and the immigration-supporting tribes holding a positive view of multiculturalism's cultural and economic effects.

But the centre-ground tribes are split. They see a positive economic impact of multiculturalism on the economy, but not such a positive impact on British culture. Both the Comfortable Ambivalent and the Anxious Ambivalent groups see multiculturalism as having a positive effect on the British economy, but are more sceptical about the cultural effects. For the Anxious Ambivalents, 50% think multiculturalism has been positive for the British economy, but only 35% would say the same about its effect on culture, with 40% believing its effects are negative.

Muslims continue to be seen as uniquely different from the majority British public, too, and distinctly different from other religious groups, with a huge 31% of the population believing that Islam poses a threat to the British way of life and only 32% believing Islam and the British way of life are compatible.

The idea the ‘Muslims don't want to integrate' is stated as a justification for almost a third of people (28%) who think that Islam poses a threat, although we found geographic differences in concerns about integration. A perception that ‘Muslims do not want to integrate' was a reason that 34% of people in the North West and in the West Midlands, and 36% of people in the East Midlands, felt Islam was a threat. However, it was only a reason used to explain perceptions of Islam as a threat by 20% of people in Scotland and Wales and 19% in the North East.

Most people have a pragmatic view of how integration could be improved, and favour measures to bring people together and support new migrants over measures which place bans on cultural practices or control and reduce immigration. Only 14% of people think that making all immigrants swear an oath of allegiance embracing British values would be among the best ways to improve integration and community relations in Britain.

However, what we mean by ‘integration', and how we think we get to an integrated society, differs according to our wider social values. For the liberal tribes, community initiatives to bring people together and reducing discrimination through a more positive media coverage of Muslims are most important. For the hostile tribes, their anti-migration stance and prejudice against Muslims is reinforced, as they feel banning religious clothing that covers the face, like the ‘burqa’, as well as clamping down on immigration, would make things better.

Conservative voters' view of integration remains assimilationist, centred on their perception that Islam is not compatible with the British way of life. They are most likely to think that integration would be improved by compulsory English classes for all new immigrants (47%), cracking down on extremists (43%) and banning religious clothing that covers the face, like the 'burqa', as well as clamping down on immigration, would make things better.

Labour voters are more likely to think integration is improved through community initiatives that work to bring people from different backgrounds together (49%), cracking down on extremists (46%) and compulsory English classes for all new immigrants (33%).

There are, however, some integration measures that win support across attitudinal, demographic and political divides. All of the identity tribes feel that English classes for all new migrants would help people to get along better, all want to see a crackdown on extremists in communities, and there is a consensus that Government action is needed to prevent the formation of very segregated communities.
Which two or three, if any, of the following do you think would better improve integration and community relations in Britain? Selection of up to three (%)

- A crackdown on extremists in all communities
- Compulsory English classes for all new immigrants
- Community initiatives that work to bring people from different backgrounds together so they can get to know one another
- Banning religious clothing that covers the face, like the burqa
- Controlling and reducing new immigration
- Government action to prevent the formation of very segregated communities
- Closer monitoring of faith schools, including Muslim faith schools
- Making all immigrants swear an oath of allegiance embracing British values
- None of these would improve community relations in Britain
- Don't know
THE VIEWS OF THOSE WHO HOLD VERY STRONG ANTI-MUSLIM ATTITUDES

KEY ISSUES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Britain leaving the EU</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration &amp; asylum</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

WHO ARE WE?

39% identify themselves as English, compared to 26% of the general population

IN DECLINE

80% think British values are in decline

UNDERMINED

73% think having a wide variety of backgrounds and cultures has undermined British culture, compared to the national figure of 37%

RACIST?

82% say you cannot be proud of your national identity these days without being called racist

TOMMY V FARAGE

21% have favourable views towards Tommy Robinson and 48% towards Nigel Farage

CLEAN BREAK

50% want the UK to leave the EU without a deal, while just 15% want to revoke and remain

IMMIGRATION IS BAD

69% think immigration has been bad for the UK

ALMOST UNANIMOUS

90% think Islam poses a threat to Western civilisation

OPTIMISM

55% think Britain will be economically better off outside the EU, almost twice the national average
Our previous Fear and HOPE reports have noted a shift in public anxiety from race and racism to Islamophobia and religious discrimination. Muslims have become the focus of much of the public’s concerns about diversity and cultural change, increasingly linked to extremist activity carried out by a small minority. Attitudes towards Muslims and Islam in Britain softened between 2011 and 2017, but the series of terror attacks in 2017 had a profound impact on public perceptions of Muslims in Britain, and attitudes have hardened once again.

Our latest poll finds that people continue to see Muslims distinctly differently – and overwhelmingly more negatively – than any other religious group. Eighteen percent (18%) of people have an extremely negative view of Muslims. By contrast, just 7% share the same view of Christians, only 8% of Jews, 7% of Hindus, 7% of Sikhs, and 6% of atheists.

There is a huge age gap in perceptions of Muslims. Only 8% of 18-24 year olds see Muslims extremely negatively, compared to 22% of all people aged over 50. Conservative Leave voters are among those with the highest proportion who see Muslims very negatively (26%).

Looking at the identity tribes, the Active Multiculturalist and Established Optimist groups are the only groups who have a more positive than negative view of Muslims overall.

The Liberal Remainers are ambivalent about religion and cluster in the middle, together with the Comfortable Ambivalent tribe. Hostile Brexeters do not see Muslims as negatively as the Anti-Establishment Pessimist or Anxious Ambivalent group, but this is contradicted in their many answers to anti-Muslim statements, which are in fact stronger than the Anti-Establishment Pessimists. This might indicate a hesitancy to associate all Muslims with their more general belief in conspiracies about Islam. The Anxious Ambivalent group hold the strongest anti-Muslim beliefs, despite the fact that they see immigration and multiculturalism more positively than the hostile tribes.

The bigger picture, however, is that attitudes to Muslims in Britain are slowly improving, alongside a broader liberal shift, with fewer people over the last 17 months perceiving Islam poses a threat to British culture.

Again, we find significant age and educational divides in responses to perceptions of Islam in Britain. Sixteen percent (16%) of 18-24-year-olds think Islam is a threat to the British way of life, while 44% think it is compatible. Only 23% of over-65s think that it is compatible, while 43% believe it poses a threat. More than three times as many people with a low-level education (43%), compared to those with high levels of education (19%), see Islam as a threat to the British way of life.

There are also big regional differences between people who hold this opinion. Among people who have lived in London, 40% think Islam and the British way of life are compatible, with 24%
concerned that Islam poses as threat. In Yorkshire and Humberside, meanwhile, 33% think Islam poses a threat while 26% think it is compatible with British culture.

While the Conservative Party has been under the spotlight for Islamophobia, we find anti-Muslim attitudes common among its 2017 voters. A huge 44% of Conservative voters see Islam as a threat, with only half that amount (22%) saying it is compatible.

When those who perceive Islam as a threat are asked why they feel this way, the most popular choices seem to highlight an association between Islam and a ban on free speech, and a threat to British laws and values.

There were some interesting regional differences in why people see Islam as a threat. In Yorkshire and Humberside, the most common reason for perceiving Islam as a threat was because ‘Islam promotes discrimination of and the physical abuse of women, for example the grooming of white British girls’, highlighting the importance of local events and the impact of media coverage on shaping public opinion. In the West Midlands, this was only cited as a reason by 24% of people. A perception that ‘Muslims do not want to integrate’ was a reason that 34% of people in the North West and in the West Midlands selected this choice, while 36% of people in the East Midlands felt Islam was a threat. But this was only a reason used by 20% of people in Scotland and Wales, and 19% in the North East.

Across the tribes, there is little difference in the reasons given by those who say they see Islam as a threat, with the exception of the liberal groups. Although the proportion of people who feel Islam is a threat is too small to be representative for the Active Multiculturalist tribe, Liberal Remainers who see Islam as a threat are more likely to do so because they believe ‘Islam promotes discrimination of and the physical abuse of women, for example the grooming of white British girls’ than any other tribe (46% of Liberal Remainers who think Islam poses a threat to British culture).

The claim that Islam opposes women, in ways significantly different from and worse than the ways in which women are treated in other religions and cultures, is engrained in much
thinking among liberal groups who otherwise claim to act for feminist causes, and is often spoken about distinctly differently from a broader struggle for the rights of all women.

Our polling shows that anti-Muslim prejudice is distinct and more common than other prejudices among people who otherwise hold socially-liberal values.

A quarter of Guardian reader think that Islam poses a serious threat to Western civilisation, while 14% think that Islam poses a threat to British culture and 18% believe the conspiracy that there are no-go zones where sharia law dominates and non-Muslims cannot enter. Although these groups are less likely to feel that Islam is a threat due to international terrorism reflecting Islam as a violent political ideology, or because Muslim populations may replace white British populations, there are clearly some anti-Muslim beliefs that cross otherwise deep-seated attitudinal boundaries.

At the same time, the vast majority of the liberal identity tribes, and especially the Active Multiculturalist group, actively want to stand up against discrimination against Muslims. Ninety percent (90%) of the Active Multiculturalist tribe, and 78% of Liberal Remainers, agree that discrimination is a serious problem for Muslims in Britain, something just 28% of Anti-Establishment Pessimists agree with.

We also find a general decrease in the share of people who see Islam as a serious threat to Western civilisation: 44% agree, down from 52% in our 2017 Fear and HOPE poll. This reflects recovery from the series of terror events in 2017, which increased anxieties among Britons. At the same time, certain political and demographic groups remain concerned about Islam, which they associate with global terrorism: 62% of Conservative voters and 65% of Leave voters believe that Islam is a serious threat to Western civilisation.

However, the share of people who believe the ‘Great Replacement’ conspiracy – that Muslim immigration is part of a bigger plan to make Muslims the majority of a country’s population – and also that ‘there are no go areas in Britain where sharia law dominates and non-Muslims cannot enter’, has slightly increased from 32% in July 2018 to 35% in May 2019.

This was a belief that we also found to be common through the National Conversation on Immigration. In many of the citizens' panels, integration problems were linked to specific locations in the UK, with participants concerned about cities being 'overtaken' and concurrently naming places with large Muslim communities, such as Birmingham or Tower Hamlets. Many we spoke to felt that British culture was under threat because people were ‘forced’ to pander to ‘political correctness’ and the sensitivities of Muslims. We were frequently told people's beliefs that schools were no longer allowed to put on nativity plays at Christmas or celebrate Easter because of the Muslim community.

There are significant political and demographic differences in people's belief in this conspiracy. Just 18% of 18-24-year-olds believe this ‘Great Replacement’ conspiracy and prevalence of ‘no go’ zones is true, while half of over-65s do. A huge 49% of Conservative voters think it is true, as do 25% of Labour voters. People in urban areas are less likely than those in towns and rural area to believe the conspiracy, compared
to 39% of people in Wales, the West Midlands, the North West and Yorkshire and Humberside, compared to 26% of people in London.

Across the tribes, the Hostile Brexiter tribe is more likely to believe this conspiracy (67%) than the Anti-Establishment Pessimists, despite their views generally being slightly softer than the other group. The Hostile Brexites are more likely to live out of urban areas, and are less likely to have day-to-day contact with Muslims than the Anti-Establishment Brexites tribe, which might be why they are more likely to believe the conspiracy. Despite their overall liberal views, 37% of the Established Optimist tribe believe that there are ‘no-go zones’, but the majority of this group live outside of diverse urban centres.

These anxieties are evidenced when people are asked about the size of the UK’s Muslim population. A third (33%) of the British population overestimates the proportion of British people who are Muslim, while 38% are unsure. There is less difference between the tribes in estimating the size of the Muslim population in Britain. Although the two liberal tribes are more likely to guess the actual incidence of Muslims in Britain (5%), or slightly underestimate it, 28% of the Active Multiculturalist tribe overestimates its size.

However, overestimating the size of the UK’s Muslim population is not indicative of broader values. For example, 18–24-year-olds are more likely to overestimate the size of the UK’s Muslim population (39%) than any other age group, and even 23% of Muslims overestimate the size of the Muslim population in the UK.

Just under a quarter – 23% – of the general public say they would feel very uncomfortable if they passed a woman in the street wearing religious clothing that covered her face, increasing to 36% among over-65s. Only 9% of 18–24s say they would feel very uncomfortable at such a sight. Those with less education were likely to feel significantly more uncomfortable. Meanwhile 32% of people with low education would feel very uncomfortable, compared to just 14% of those with degree-level education or higher. Only 2% of the Active Multiculturalist tribe would feel very uncomfortable, compared to 46% of the Anti-Establishment Pessimist group.

Attitudes to Muslims remain distinct from any other ethnic or religious group, and differ distinctly in that anti-Muslim prejudice crosses political divides more than other identity issues, with some prejudice towards Muslims emerging among parts of the population who otherwise see people different to themselves in overwhelmingly positive terms.

### Attitudes of our tribes to Islamist terrorism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tribe</th>
<th>Percentage estimating the actual incidence of Muslims in Britain (5%)</th>
<th>Slightly underestimate (28%)</th>
<th>Overestimate (67%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Active Multiculturalists</td>
<td>99</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Remainers</td>
<td>98</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishment optimists</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comfortable ambivalent</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>33</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anxious ambivalent</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>44</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hostile Brexeters</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>72</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-establishment pessimists</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>88</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTES:

Stephen Yaxley-Lennon (aka Tommy Robinson) is a marmite character of British politics. The vast majority of people strongly dislike him, though there is a small, but very strong support base for him. Polling by HOPE not hate earlier this year found 55% of people had heard of him, and of those 37% had seen one of his videos or speeches on social media. This figure rose to 57% of 18-24 year olds.

Only six per-cent of Britons have a favourable view of Yaxley-Lennon, though considerably more accept that he raises issues that are generally ignored by the mainstream media.

Yaxley-Lennon is viewed far more favourably by men than women, with 13% of men viewing him positively while just 8% of women thinking likewise and of these, only 2% viewing him very favourably.

Middle-aged men are his biggest supporters, with 13% of 25-64 years viewing him favourably, compared to 9% of 18-24 year-olds and 8% of over 65’s. The contrast is even more stark when just counting those who view Yaxley-Lennon ‘very favourably’.

Viewed geographically, the former EDL leader is better liked in the North West and Yorkshire & Humber and least liked in London and the South East. Only 4% of those who hold a degree view him favourably compared to 18% for those who have no educational qualifications.

Over a quarter of people who have bought the Daily Star in the past year have favourable views of Yaxley-Lennon, considerably more than the readership of any other national newspaper.

There will be little surprise that his supporters, especially people who view him ‘very favourably’, have very negative views towards immigrants and Muslims. 86% agree with the view that new immigrants are given priority ahead over established residents when it comes to benefits or using public services, with just 7% disagreeing. Nine out of ten think Islam is a threat to Western Civilisation.

While the views of Yaxley-Lennon’s supporters to race and Islam is perhaps not surprising, their attitude to their own lives and their futures is particularly interesting. Two-thirds are pessimistic about the future and 41% are disappointed with their lives so far, considerably higher than the 27% amongst the population overall. Almost 90% think things are worse for the country than ten years ago, and 43% say that things have got worse for themselves and their families – both considerably higher than the national average.

They are also considerably pessimistic about the future. Two-thirds think things will get worse for Britain as a whole over the next ten years, almost 50% higher than the national average.

However, the one bright spot for them is Brexit. Yaxley-Lennon’s strong supporters are much more optimistic that things will get better once Britain leaves the EU. Two and a half times more of his supporters think their own economic position will improve than the national average. Almost half think the economic fortunes of the country will improve, considerably higher than the 20% for the population as a whole.

Over two-thirds think the opportunities for their children will improve after Brexit, compared to an average of just 27% nationally.

It is unsurprising then that three-quarters of his supporters would back a campaign if it looked like Brexit was about to be reversed, of which only 10% of these people would be concerned if these protests turned violent.
Immigration and Asylum is the most important issue for Lennon supporters, whilst it ranks eighth amongst the wider public.

80% think Islam is a threat to the British way of life.

57% think that banning the burqa is the best way to improve integration and community relations in Britain.

72% are very angry that Britain did not leave the EU on 31st March.

Three-quarters think that there are no go areas in Britain where sharia law dominates and non-Muslims cannot enter.

53% of Lennon supporters identify themselves as English, compared to 26% in the population as a whole.

74% of Lennon’s supporters think Islamist terrorists reflect a widespread hostility to Britain amongst the Muslim community, three times the level of the general population.

Lennon’s supporters hold more favourable views of former UKIP leader Gerard Batten than Brexit Party leader Nigel Farage.

Lennon’s supporters are pessimistic about their lives, but optimistic about how Brexit will improve things.
Much of this report paints a bleak picture about public attitudes in the UK today. We are divided on identity issues, our trust in the political system and in public institutions is at an all-time low, and we are overwhelmingly a country of pessimists. We have also tracked the mainstreaming of far right ideologies, with cynical perceptions of multiculturalism, anti-Muslim hatred shockingly widespread, conspirational thinking about ‘no-go-zones’ and ‘race replacement’ rife, and growing resentment. It would seem that the conditions are ripe for far right groups to succeed. Indeed, the public now believe that the far right pose the greatest threat to community cohesion, more so than Islamist extremist groups. But we also find that the far right remains marginalised in the UK, as evidenced by Tommy Robinson’s poor performance in the recent European elections, with the majority of the population concerned about, but also resilient to, narratives of hate.

PERCEPTIONS OF THE THREAT

Our polling finds that concern about the far right has increased dramatically over just a few months. Between February 2019 and May 2019, the proportion of people who consider the far right the greatest threat to community cohesion and public order jumped from 28% to 33%, meaning that far right groups or organisations are now seen as a greater threat to public order than Islamist extremist groups or organisations. At the same time, public concern about extremism has reduced overall. The percentage of people who do not feel any extremist groups or organisations pose a threat has quadrupled, from 4% in February 2019 to 16% in May 2019. People are also much less likely to think the far left pose a threat- now 8% down from 22% in July 2018. Many more people from groups who feel targeted by the far right see a threat; 57% of Jewish respondents and 62% of Muslim respondents are most concerned about the Far right. 57% of Remain voters are concerned about the far right, something that concerns just 15% of Leave voters. Almost as many Leave voters are concerned about far left organisations (13%). And only 13% of Remain voters are concerned about Islamist organisations, compared to 40% of Leave voters. 53% of people with high level education are most concerned about the threat of the far right. Only 16% of people with low level education think the same.

The reasons for the rise in concern about the far right is occurring amidst a rise in far-right terrorist activity, according to the director general of MI5, Andrew Parker, and Cressida Dick, the commissioner of the Metropolitan police1. Increased public anxiety about the far right also follows horrific high profile attacks carried out by right wing extremists; in Pittsburgh in 2018, in which eleven people were killed in the deadliest attack on the Jewish community in the United States; and in Christchurch, New Zealand in 2019, in which fifty one Muslims were killed by a white supremacist gunman who live-streamed the massacre on Facebook.

It is not just media coverage of high-profile attacks which has increased anxiety, but also in increased exposure to hateful content on social media, which Sara Khan, the UK’s lead anti-extremism commissioner has termed, “a ‘frightening amount of legal extremist content online’. Our polling finds that Twitter users are 10% more likely (43%) than the average person (33%) to believe that the far right pose the greatest threat to community relations, perhaps as a result to exposure of far right content. Further the elections of Donald Trump, Victor Orban, Jair Bolsonaro and the electoral success of Matteo Salvini, as well as the rise of populist and far-right parties and figures in the most recent European elections have added to growing fears about the far right. At the same time, a decline in public perceptions of an extremist threat reflects a continued recovery in public anxiety, which spiked following

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Which of the following groups and organisations, if any, do you think pose the biggest threat to community cohesion and public order?</th>
<th>3-4 Feb 2019</th>
<th>26th April-1st May 2019</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Far right groups or organisations</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Far left groups or organisations</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamist extremist groups or organisations</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None of these pose a threat</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Andrew Parker, the Director General of MI5, and Cressida Dick, the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police.
the spate of Islamist terror attacks that hit the UK in 2017.

Looking at the identity tribes, the concern each hold about different extremist groups reflects their broader attitudes. The two liberal tribes mostly say they are unconcerned about Islamist groups, reflecting their attempt to stand up against a conflation of Muslims with international extremism. The two hostile tribes are overwhelmingly concerned about Islamist organisations, indicative of their prejudice towards all Muslims, but have little concern about the far right.

Hostile Brexeters also say they are very concerned about the far left, reflecting their pushback against progressives and a ‘liberal elite’, who they see as a challenge to their conservative values, privilege and social status.

**MAINSTREAMING OF FAR-RIGHT IDEALS**

The rise in public concern about the far right also reflects the increasing mainstreaming of far right ideology, and the far right’s move to more mainstream platform. As our Fear and "HOPE" report has shown, large parts of the contemporary far-rights platform - namely anti-Muslim politics, co-option of the free speech debate and an anti-elite populism - have widespread public support.

The state of anti-Muslim hatred is profound, whereby a huge 44% agree that Islam poses a threat to Western civilisation; 31% of people think that Islam poses a threat to the British way of life; and 35% of people falsely believe that there are no-go zones in Britain where sharia law dominates and non-Muslims cannot enter - greater than the proportion who believe this is false (27%). Moreover, the contemporary far-right’s narratives around an oppressed ‘people’, silenced by ‘PC culture’ speaks to a sense of loss, abandonment, decline and pessimism felt by the anti-establishment pessimist tribe.

In our December 2018 YouGov poll, 20% of people, and a staggering 40% of those who voted to leave the EU in 2016, said that they would now be likely to vote for a party founded by former members of UKIP, on the political far-right, committed to opposing Islamism and immigration and supporting Brexit.
Support for such a party had grown over just 6 months when we first asked the question in July 2018, from 17% to 20% among the general population. A third of Conservative voters say that they would be likely to support this party.

**The Limits of the Far Right**

But the appeal of the far right in Britain is limited. In the most recent European elections, founder of the EDL Tommy Robinson, running as an independent MEP candidate polled just 2.2%, taking only 39,000 votes in the north-west and losing his deposit.

Our polling from January 2019 has found that more people have heard of Tommy Robinson (55%) than have not (45%), however, of those who had heard of him, 70% viewed him negatively, with his main support coming from white, working class, UKIP voting men (though not necessarily older) and his main opposition coming from more educated, middle class, city residents.

In our new Fear and Hope polling, we asked people’s opinion of Tommy Robinson again, and found that he continues to be seen in overwhelmingly negative terms. The vast majority of people see Tommy Robinson between 0-10 (42%), on a scale of 0-100, where 0 means very unfavourable and 100 means very favourable. Just 2% placed themselves at 91-100, or very positively.

Even for the tribes with the most negative view of immigration, multiculturalism and the political establishment, the anti-establishment pessimist group, Tommy Robinson is seen more negatively than positively.

Those who show the strongest support for Tommy are among the most pessimistic in the country, the see little hope for themselves and others around them. They are almost all white British, working class, with low levels of education and little access to opportunity. They believe feminism oppresses men, and are most willing to believe violence is acceptable. They feel betrayed by Brexit, but unlike the Hostile Brexiter tribe, who find a political home in Farage’s Brexit party, Tommy supporters are unlikely to vote and are most distanced from the political system.

Violence remains a red line that limits far right support. Despite one in five of our December 2018 poll saying that they said that they would now be likely to vote for a party founded by former members of UKIP, on the political far-right, committed to opposing Islamism and immigration and supporting Brexit, when asked about potential support for a more extreme political party, we found it was only a small minority – just 7% – who would offer their support for a party founded by people with a history of football hooliganism, on the political far-right, committed to opposing Islamism and immigration and supporting Brexit.

Among Conservative Leave voters this support rose to 13%, reflective of anti-Muslim views among some conservative voters, who may be willing to move their support to a far right group.

Our April 2019 poll found that the majority of people would be put off supporting a campaign to stop Brexit if protests became violent or threatened violence.

There is clearly a lot of work still to do to challenge the far right in the UK, especially as the negative economic impacts of Brexit create greater instability. However, our report indicates clear areas where resilience can be built upon. There is an obvious need to rebuild trust in politics and the political system, to engage more with people, especially those who feel that the system does not work for them, and to challenge some of the divisions between us.

---

NOTES:

A recent BBC Panorama’s programme laid bare Labour’s failure to deal with antisemitism in its ranks.

The programme featured stark and gut-wrenching testimony. In a sense, what the programme did was reinforce something we knew: there have been many, many incidents of antisemitism, which have left Jewish members outraged, and fearful. Jewish members have been subjected to antisemitic comments at party meeting, and abuse online.

What was particularly powerful was the strong testimony of so many former party staff members who had worked in the unit dealing with the claims of antisemitism. That so many should be willing speaking out at potentially huge financial cost to themselves, appears testament to the truth of the election.

Party members who have made clearly antisemitic comments online and offline have been dealt with too slowly, and too leniently. There has been a campaign of denial - where supporters of Jeremy Corbyn have at best sort to downplay sickening racism, and at worst have engaged in antisemitic smears about a supposed conspiracy to ‘weaponise’ fake antisemitism.

In response to the programme, HOPE not hate commissioned new polling to try and understand voters’ views. Here are the key numbers:

- Voters think the issue is genuine and serious: 42% agreed with that sentiment, whole 16% of voters said they thought the issue was being exaggerated to undermine Jeremy Corbyn.
- Amongst Labour voters, just over a third said they thought it was being exaggerated to undermine Corbyn, but 26% of Labour’s own voters agreed the issue is genuine and serious.
- A third of all voters now think Labour is an antisemitic party, including 15% of Labour voters. 45% of Labour said that they don’t know if it is an antisemitic party or not.
- Only one fifth of Labour voters say that the party is doing all it can to tackle antisemitism, while 39% say they should more. 49% of all voters say the party should do more to tackle the issue.

We already knew that Labour has a serious issue to tackle. We know because victims of anti-Jewish racism have said so, repeatedly. What we know now is that voters can see this problem too, and they want Labour to do more to tackle it.

**Which of these comes closest to your view?**

- Antisemitism in the Labour Party is a genuine and serious issue

- Antisemitism within the Labour Party is being exaggerated by opponents of the Labour Party in order to undermine Jeremy Corbyn

- Neither

**Do you think the Labour Party is or is not an anti-Semitic party?**

- The Labour Party is doing all it reasonably can to tackle antisemitism within the party

- The Labour Party should be doing more to tackle antisemitism within the party

- It is not

- Don’t know

- Antisemitism within the Labour Party is being exaggerated by opponents of the Labour Party in order to undermine Jeremy Corbyn

- Antisemitism in the Labour Party is a genuine and serious issue

- Neither

**Which of these comes closest to your view?**

- The Labour Party is doing all it reasonably can to tackle antisemitism within the party

- The Labour Party should be doing more to tackle antisemitism within the party

- Don’t know

- Antisemitism within the Labour Party is being exaggerated by opponents of the Labour Party in order to undermine Jeremy Corbyn

- Antisemitism in the Labour Party is a genuine and serious issue

- Neither

- It is not

- Don’t know
It will be of little surprise to anyone that the strong Nigel Farage supporter is obsessed with Brexit and holds rightwing views on immigration, multiculturalism and Muslims.

Our Fear & HOPE polling reveals that 11% of the population have a very positive opinion of Farage, more than double the strong support for any other political leader in this country.

Overall, a quarter of people have a favourable opinion of Farage. This compares to 25% for Theresa May, 21% for Jeremy Corbyn, 17% for Vince Cable and 17% for Caroline Lucas.

However, he is also the politician who generates the most intense opposition to as well. Half of all respondents rated Farage in the 0-10 category, the lowest favourable rating possible.

The Farage supporter is older and whiter. Almost two thirds rank ‘Britain leaving the EU’ as their top issue, followed by immigration and asylum at 38% (compared to 13% of the population as a whole), and Health, at 31%. Crime came in fourth with 29%, fifty percent higher than the national average.

While the strong Farage supporter hold rightwing views on immigration, multiculturalism and Muslims, they are not as extreme as those of Tommy Robinson’s supporters. Conversely though, their views on Brexit are more hardline and much more optimistic.

Over eight out of ten Farage supporters (84%) want to leave the EU without a deal, compared to 68% of Yaxley-Lennon’s and 27% nationally.

Only 12% think Britain’s economy will suffer outside the EU, compared to 53% nationally, and 75% think opportunities for their children will improve as opposed to just 27% nationally.

The Farage supporter is more likely to have signed an online petition than the average person, though slightly less likely to have done any voluntary work over the past 12 months.

They hold strong anti-establishment views, with 84% believing that ‘political correctness is used by the liberal elite to limit what we can say’ and 79% believing that ‘political correctness is causing the police and media to deliberately play down the ethnic background of some child sex’.

A staggering 88% believe that ‘you cannot be proud of your national identity these days without being called racist’.

They strongly disagree with the notion that Brexit has ‘enabled and legitimised prejudice towards migrants and ethnic minorities’, while overwhelmingly believe that ‘new immigrants are given priority ahead over established residents when it comes to benefits or using public services’.

On economic issues, Farage supporters are strongly opposed to the state and Government intervention. Over two-thirds support ‘lower taxes, smaller government and less spending public services’ and half agree that ‘the costs of the NHS are going up too much, too fast and we need to re-think the affordability of national healthcare’.

Farage supporters are twice as likely to think that the threat of global warming is being exaggerated, while 79% think feminism has gone too far, compared to 51% nationally.

Over 80% think Islam poses a threat to Western civilisation and two-thirds think ‘there are no go areas in Britain where sharia law dominates and non-Muslims cannot enter’, almost double the national average.
THE VIEWS OF THE NIGEL FARAGE SUPPORTER

**BREXIT**
Almost two-thirds of Farage supporters list Brexit as a key issue, a lot higher than the population as a whole. Immigration is their second most important issue.

**TOMMY ROBINSON**
30% have a favourable view of the former EDL leader.

**TWO THIRDS**
65% think that there are no go zones for non-Muslims where sharia law is dominant. Only 11% disagree.

**84%**
Over four-fifths of Farage’s supporters want the UK to leave the EU without a deal.

**ECONOMY**
83% think the British economy will improve outside the EU, compared to just 32% in the population as a whole.

**UNDERMINED**
Three-quarters think having a variety of backgrounds has undermined British culture.

**ENVIRONMENT**
43% say the threat of global warming is exaggerated.

**EVEN SPLIT**
There is an even split between those Farage supporters who identify as being British (49%) and those who identify as being English (48%).

**OPPORTUNITIES**
Three-quarters think opportunities for our children will improve outside the EU, compared to 27% of the general population.

**ANTI-FEMINIST**
56% think feminism is to blame for making some men feel marginalised and demonised in society.

**83%**
Over four-fifths of Farage’s supporters want the UK to leave the EU without a deal.

**30%**
30% have a favourable view of the former EDL leader.

**30%**
30% have a favourable view of the former EDL leader.

**83%**
Over four-fifths of Farage’s supporters want the UK to leave the EU without a deal.

**43%**
43% say the threat of global warming is exaggerated.

**30%**
30% have a favourable view of the former EDL leader.

**30%**
30% have a favourable view of the former EDL leader.
In a little over three months’ time there is a very real possibility that the UK could leave the European Union without a deal. Just a few months ago, as the initial March deadline passed, the idea that this could happen was seemingly unthinkable. The Government did not want it to happen, the City of London and British manufacturers did not want it to happen, the British public did not want it to happen and MPs were determined to simply not allow it to happen.

Now, not only is it back as a possibility but the chances of it happening are growing significantly each week. And this would be a complete disaster for Britain.

In March 2018 HOPE not hate warned against a hard/no deal Brexit. We agreed with the view of most economists that a hard Brexit – whereby Britain leaves the EU without a deal – would have disastrous economic and social consequences.

While most experts focused on the economic impact of a no deal Brexit in pure financial terms, we were more concerned about the impact on communities, especially those communities already struggling from decades of de-industrialisation and more recently austerity.

Not only would the material conditions for people worsen but a no deal Brexit would also prove a fertile breeding ground for the Right. As unemployment rose and the Government received less in tax revenue, resentment would grow – especially among those who believed the idea that Brexit would deliver a better future for them and their families.

The backlash is likely to provide fertile ground for right-wing demagogues to exploit anger and resentment.

What’s more, those expecting Brexit to be accompanied by a sharp reduction in immigration might be in for a severe shock. While migration from EU countries is likely to fall substantially, the country’s economic needs and specific sector shortages will require continued immigration at much the same level as before only this time it will be from outside Europe. Given that the vast majority of Brexit voters think that there will be a sharp decline in immigration after we have left the EU, they might not take too kindly to even greater numbers of non-European immigrants entering the country.

Given dire predictions of the economic impact of a no deal Brexit, with some economic forecasts predicting the economy would contract by as much as 9% and even the Treasury suggesting that £90bn would be lost in Government revenue, it seems inconceivable that it is even being countenanced.

Despite this, not only are there people still advocating for a no deal Brexit, the clamour for one is growing. The success of the Brexit Party
in the European Elections helped to quicken the demise of Theresa May and seemingly all but ended support for a soft Brexit deal.

Recent polling from HOPE not hate has found that 53% of those people who voted Leave in the 2016 Referendum now support leaving the EU without a deal. HOPE not hate’s recent poll of Conservative Party members, the very people who are currently choosing our next Prime Minister, found support for leaving without a deal at 56%.

And while overall there remains a majority of people think a no deal Brexit would be bad for Britain, the gap has been shrinking. When we asked people in July 2018 if leaving without a deal would be good or bad for Britain, 48% said bad, 14% said good, 21% said it would make no difference and 17% did not know.

When we asked the same question in July 2018, 44% said it would be bad and 23% said it would be good. A three-to-one margin of difference last year had dropped to slightly less than two-to-one now.

A HOPE not hate poll in early July showed an even more startling result, with 39% of people in a poll of 6,632 carried out between 2-8th July, backing leaving without a deal. Just 44% opposed this.

The narrowing of opinion has come despite growing numbers of people believing that the fortunes of the British economy, and so their own personal situation, is best served by Britain remaining in the EU. The reason for this is that the desire of Brexit supporters to leave the EU clearly outweigh the potential economic downside of leaving without a deal.

With the UK having delayed leaving the EU once before, there is growing clamour now from Leave voters just to get out – deal or no deal – regardless of the economic consequences.

It is becoming clear that Boris Johnson privately does not want a No Deal Brexit. He is playing to the political right in order to secure the leadership, but also in his mind to strengthen his hand in forthcoming negotiations with the EU. Privately, he is winning over moderates that his hard rhetoric is merely positioning and that he is determined to leave the EU on 31 October with a better deal.

But it might not be as straightforward as Johnson thinks and there is a real danger that the No Deal Brexit train might be hard to stop.

His supporters will not countenance a further delay beyond 31st October, and Johnson himself has made leaving by that date – deal or no deal – one of his very few red lines. But it is highly questionable whether he will be able to agree a better deal with the EU in time, especially given that negotiations won’t start until the beginning of September. It is also unlikely that the EU will tear up their own red lines over the backstop and regulatory alignment given that they refused to revisit the Withdrawal Agreement after it was agreed.

To make matters worse, attitudes in the EU are hardening and, led by France, there is now a growing consensus that if Britain does not agree to the Withdrawal Agreement by October then it should just cut us adrift.

How confident, if at all, are you that Boris Johnson will obtain a better Brexit deal from the EU than Theresa May achieved? (Conservative voters in brackets.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very confident</th>
<th>Fairly confident</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total confident</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total not confident</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

So faced with failing to change the Withdrawal Agreement to the satisfaction of right wing Brexiteers, Johnson will face a choice of leaving without a deal or repackaging May’s deal as something better and getting it over the line, with DUP support and the 20-30 Labour MPs who now publicly claim that they would back May’s deal.

While his right wing support would be angry and feel betrayed, there is a chance that Johnson could carry this off. He, after all, lead the Leave campaign during the Referendum and would have some political capital with Leave voters that May ‘the Remainer’ never had. He would clearly argue that a repackaged deal – but essentially the same deal - is not perfect but it is a transitional measure that would at least ensure the UK left the EU by 31st October.

His position would be even stronger if he used attempts by MPs to block a No Deal Brexit to call a snap General Election in late September or early October on the basis that he needed a strong mandate to go to Brussels to demand changes to the Withdrawal Agreement. With Labour in continuing disarray over Brexit and Johnson’s tough rhetoric winning the support of many who voted for the Brexit Party in the European Elections, it is quite conceivable that he would be returned with a decent majority.

He could then renegotiate his promises and get a repackaged May deal over the line and claim victory without the fear that a handful of MPs could bring him down.
On 23rd June 2016, the UK voted to leave the European Union. If each of the following were included in a deal with the EU, do you think that it would or would not uphold the result of the referendum? The UK continuing to follow EU rules and legislation:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ALL VOTERS</th>
<th>17%</th>
<th>55%</th>
<th>28%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>This outcome would uphold the outcome of the referendum</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This outcome would not uphold the outcome of the referendum</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONSERVATIVE VOTERS</th>
<th>9%</th>
<th>77%</th>
<th>14%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>This outcome would uphold the outcome of the referendum</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This outcome would not uphold the outcome of the referendum</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There would be a short-term euphoria amongst Brexit supporters that the UK had left the EU, but it is unlikely to last. HOPE not hate's polling graphically demonstrates that the overwhelming majority of Leave voters do not consider a Brexit deal that keeps Britain aligned to EU rules and prevents us from striking new trade agreements as honouring the 2016 Referendum result. And while that might not be enough to stop Johnson selling a repackaged May deal to a tired Parliament, as each day passes after we have left the EU support for the deal – and so by extension Johnson – will fade away. Not least because Nigel Farage will do what he does best, standing on the side lines shouting ‘Traitor’ at the Prime Minister.

So even if we have avoided a No Deal Brexit, with all the economic dislocation that will bring, a deal that is not seen to be honouring the 2016 Referendum result and does not deliver the expected economic improvements many Leave voters believe, is likely to lead to an angry backlash.

And that backlash is likely to come from the populist right and the Brexit Party. Shouting betrayal, riding the anti-politics wave and using the language of English nationalism, we could well be on the cusp of a serious populist right party that has become a feature of the political landscape in so many European countries. And with that comes the tensions within our communities, friction between the English and the Scots and the outright hostility towards Europe, Europeans and foreigners generally.

This Fear & HOPE has shown how Brexit has changed us over the last three years, but it is clear that the story is not over yet. Deal or no deal, the UK is heading for difficult times ahead.
False optimism?
The proportion of 2017 Labour Leave voters in each constituency who think Brexit will improve economic opportunities for people like them.
METHODOLOGY

FEAR AND HOPE 2019 polling was conducted by YouGov plc using an online interview administered members of the YouGov Plc GB panel of 185,000+ individuals who have agreed to take part in surveys. All figures, unless otherwise stated, are from YouGov Plc. Total sample size was 6,118 adults. Fieldwork was undertaken between 26th April - 1st May 2019. The survey was carried out online. The figures have been weighted and are representative of all GB adults (aged 18+).

Segmentation of the new tribes was created from our 6,000-sample YouGov Fear and HOPE 2019 polling. The segmentation is created from a subset of both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ questions on a series of key issues around race, belonging, optimism, Brexit and identity.

A form of Latent Class Analysis called “Dfactor Modelling” was used: Exploratory Technique Involves the creation of four factors (known as Dfactors) which summarise the responses across questions.

The factors can be thought of as four different cuts of the data. Each factor cuts the data into two groups: those Low on a dimension AND those High on the same dimension. These are then interpreted by profiling each factor. The four factors emerge in such a way that in combination they maximise our ability to explain different response patterns across the underlying questions.

FOCALDATA MRP

Our constituency estimates were compiled by Focaldata from polling commissioned by HOPE not hate over the past 12 months and using a statistical method called multi-level regression with poststratification (MRP).

MRP has two main elements. The first is to use a survey to build a multi-level regression model that predicts opinion (or any quantity of interest) from certain variables, normally demographics. The second is to weight (post-stratify) your results by the relevant population frequency, to get population level (or constituency level) estimates.

At the end of this process you get more accurate, more granular (thus more actionable) estimates of public opinion than traditional polling. There are however significant technical challenges to implementing it effectively. These include large data requirements, dedicated cloud computing resources, and an understanding of Bayesian statistics.

THIS REPORT ALSO REFERENCES THE FOLLOWING RESEARCH COMMISSIONED OR UNDERTAKEN BY HOPE NOT HATE:

Fear and HOPE 2011: Populus interviewed a random sample of 5,064 adults aged 18+ online between 28th January 2011 and 31st January 2011. Interviews were conducted across England and the results have been weighted to be representative of all adults.

Fear and HOPE February 2016 Populus interviewed 4,015 adults aged 18+ between 1st February 2016 and 9th February 2016 representative by age, gender, social grade and ethnicity. The sample was segmented using the same variables as 2011. These relate to attitudes and exposure to race, multiculturalism, immigration and religious minorities. This means that the 2016 analysis and 2011 segmentation is comparable. Where the results do not sum to 100, this is due to rounding or the inclusion of multi-select answer options.

Fear and HOPE July 2016: In the week after the Referendum, the polling organisation Populus asked 4,035 people in England a total of 84 questions about their attitudes to race, identity, multiculturalism and their thoughts on the EU Referendum itself.

July 2017: Populus interviewed 4,015 adults aged 18+ in England between 30th June 2017 and 4th July 2017. Quotas were set and weights applied so that the sample was representative of the overall adult English population not just by age, gender, SEG and region, but also a range of other attributes including EU referendum vote, health status, working status, tenure, marital status, ethnicity, car ownership, and engagement in politics. The sample was segmented using the same variables as in 2011, February 2016 and July 2016. These relate to attitudes and exposure to race, multiculturalism, immigration and religious minorities.
January 2018: Britain Divided poll Our exclusive YouGov poll of over 5,000 people, carried out in late January 2018, revisits many of the questions we’ve asked during our Fear and HOPE surveys – examining race, faith and identity – since 2011, and also poses some new ones.

June–July 2018: Between 28 June and 6 July and 26 and 31 July, YouGov polled 15,340 people on behalf of HOPE not hate and Best for Britain with a range of questions about Brexit and other political and cultural issues.

December 2018: All figures, unless otherwise stated, are from YouGov Plc. Total sample size was 1,660 adults. Fieldwork was undertaken between 14th - 15th December 2018. The survey was carried out online. The figures have been weighted and are representative of all GB adults (aged 18+). YouGov is a member of the British Polling Council and abide by their rules.

January 2019: All figures, unless otherwise stated, are from YouGov Plc. Total sample size was 8,690 adults. Fieldwork was undertaken between 02th - 09th January 2019. The survey was carried out online. The figures have been weighted and are representative of all GB adults (aged 18+). YouGov is a member of the British Polling Council and abide by their rules.

January 2019: All figures, unless otherwise stated, are from YouGov Plc. Total sample size was 5,125 adults. Fieldwork was undertaken between 02th - 07th January 2019. The survey was carried out online. The figures have been weighted and are representative of all GB adults (aged 18+). YouGov is a member of the British Polling Council and abide by their rules.

March 2019: HOPE not hate sent out a survey to all MPs across all political parties via email through an anonymised response portal to better understand the scale and nature of abuse they have been receiving.

April 2019: All figures, unless otherwise stated, are from YouGov Plc. Total sample size was 2,244 adults. Fieldwork was undertaken between 1st - 2nd April 2019. The survey was carried out online. The figures have been weighted and are representative of all GB adults (aged 18+).

May 2019: HOPE not hate and Best for Britain of 9,483 voters conducted with DataPraxis/YouGov. All figures, unless otherwise stated, are from YouGov Plc. Total sample size was 9,260 adults. Fieldwork was undertaken between 8th - 17th May 2019. The survey was carried out online. The figures have been weighted and are representative of all GB adults (aged 18+). YouGov is a member of the British Polling Council.

June 2019: Conservative party members poll conducted by YouGov, with a total sample size of 864 adults. The fieldwork was undertaken between 14th – 18th June 2019. The survey was carried out online. The figures have been weighted and are representative of all GB adults (aged 18+).

THE NATIONAL CONVERSATION ON IMMIGRATION

Run by HOPE not hate and British Future over 18 months from February 2017, was the largest ever public consultation on immigration and integration.

The National Conversation had three main components:

- 60 visits to towns and cities across the UK, chosen to offer a mix of places with different experiences of migration, as well as political and geographic variety.
- An online survey, hosted on our website, completed by 9,327 people over an 18-month period.
- A nationally representative poll of 3,667 UK adults undertaken in June 2018 by ICM.

In each location we ran a citizens’ panel made up of members of the public, recruited to be representative of the local area. Basing our conversation on a discussion guide, the citizens’ panels discussed the approach that they would like to see the Government take to different types of migration. They were also asked their views about integration. Crucially, participants considered what would need to change in order for the Government to get their support for its handling of immigration. In a separate meeting in each location we met with local stakeholders, including councils, business groups and civil society organisations.

We were given the opportunity to work alongside the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, which undertook its own inquiry on the future direction of immigration policy. Our findings were given as evidence to the Home Affairs Committee Inquiry on building consensus on immigration policy, and informed the Committee’s recommendations.
The previous Fear and HOPE identity tribes: 2011-2018

CONFIDENT MULTICULTURAL
This tribe tends to be highly educated graduates or postgraduates who see immigration and diversity as hugely positive, both economically and culturally. 91% agree that it has benefited the country and 94% see cultural diversity as an integral part of British culture. Economically comfortable, outgoing, social and happy with their lives, they are confident about their own, as well as their country’s, future. They tend to live in London or the core cities and are most likely to identify politically with Labour, the Liberal Democrats and the Greens and to have voted Remain in the EU referendum. Although typical of the so-called ‘metropolitan liberal elite’, this tribe has become more mixed since 2011, as economic recovery and a growing sense of confidence and security have encouraged more people to adopt an optimistic, outward-looking perspective.

MAINSTREAM LIBERAL
This tribe shares much of the views of the Confident Multicultural tribe, though tend to be less enthusiastic in their views. These people are optimistic, self-motivated and for the most part educated to at least degree level. They are comfortable with increasing diversity, and see immigration and multiculturalism as beneficial for the country, though to a lesser extent than the confident multicultural group- 86% agree that immigration has benefited the country both economically and culturally.

IMMIGRANT AMBIVALENT
This group views other groups through the prism of its economic impact on their opportunities and the social impact on their communities. On the whole, those who fit within this tribe are less financially secure and less optimistic about the future than the two liberal groups. They are more likely to be working class, of working age, and to live in social housing. The largest single segment to vote Labour, the group also includes a high proportion of non-voters. They are more likely to have voted Leave in the EU referendum (40%) or to not have voted in the referendum (31%). This group are most likely to swing into the more liberal or more hostile tribes as economic conditions change for the better or for the worse.

CULTURALLY CONCERNED
This group is more economically secure than the Immigrant Ambivalent tribe, but is concerned about the pace of change. They are generally older and 27% of the over 65s identify with this tribe. Many are (or have been) professionals and managers but the social class make-up of this group has changed since 2011 to include a greater proportion from C2DE classes. This group forms the largest segment of those identifying with the Conservative Party and are most likely to have voted Leave in the 2016 referendum (54%). They are more likely to view immigration as a cultural issue with concerns about the impact of immigration on national identity and about immigrants' willingness to integrate. Around half the group believe immigration has been good for the country (45%) and they see positive economic impacts through migrants taking jobs British people are unwilling to do, but over three quarters (77%) also feel that there is an increasing amount of tension between the different groups living in Britain and see Muslims as distinctly different from the majority population.

LATENT HOSTILE
For this group, immigration has undermined British culture, public services and their own economic prospects. More likely to be over 35, not university-educated, and more than likely working class. They view their own future with uncertainty and Britain’s future with pessimism. They would support political forces that stood-up for their identity and way of life, but are less confrontational than those in the Active Enmity tribe. This group was most likely to identify with UKIP and to have voted Leave in the EU referendum. This tribe is more likely to be economically pessimistic and fears the impacts of immigration on British culture.

ACTIVE ENMITY
The most hostile of all the tribes, this group sees immigrants and what they think immigration represents as having negative effects on all aspects of life. Just three percent (3%) of this tribe feel immigration has been good for the country. Opposed to all ethnicities or religions other than their own, many also believe that violence is acceptable if it is a consequence of standing up for what is ‘right’. This tribe draw more support from the unskilled and the unemployed, and people most disengaged from traditional political processes.